TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2021 (12) TMI 994
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....hed, notwithstanding very many averments made in the writ affidavit and very many grounds raised in the writ affidavit, learned counsel in his campaign against the impugned order made three pointed submissions and they are as follows: (a) The registration of the assessee (which according to him) is a registered 'Public Charitable Trust' under Section 12AA of said Act has been cancelled vide the impugned order without giving an opportunity to the writ petitioner-assessee; (b) The benefit of Sections 11 and 12 of said Act vide registration under Section 12AA of said Act is being given to the writ petitioner-assessee for over thirty years and it has suddenly been declined; (c) The impugned order is a non-speaking order and therefore, it calls for interference in writ jurisdiction. 3. Before I proceed further, it is necessary to give short facts or in other words, factual matrix in a nutshell containing essential facts that are imperative for appreciating this order. Short facts shorn of unnecessary particulars are that the writ petitioner-assessee claims to be a public charitable trust having been so registered vide a Trust deed on the file of Sub....
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....h captioned writ petition turns, with the consent of learned counsel on both sides, captioned main writ petition was taken up and heard out. 6. In response to the points raised by learned counsel for writ petitioner, learned Revenue counsel made submissions a summation of which is as follows: (a) Cancellation of registration under Section 12AA of said Act is not vide the impugned order but the impugned order merely records the fact and more particularly, the impugned order records the fact that the writ petitioner-assessee has not uploaded the Section 12AA registration certificate either in response to notice under Section 142(1) of said Act or two reminders thereafter; (b) It is incorrect to say that the writ petitioner-assessee is being continuously given the benefit of exemption under Section 12AA of said Act for thirty years as even according to the writ petitioner and even according to the case file placed before this Court, such exemption was negatived for the assessment year 2018-19 vide assessment order dated 30.04.2021 bearing reference DIN ITBA/AST/S/143(3)/2021-22/1032744474(1); (c) It is not tenable to say that the impugned order is a non-s....
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....aforementioned two paragraphs leaves this Court with the considered view that the cancellation of registration under Section 12AA of said Act is not vide the impugned order but it only records the cancellation; (b) There is nothing to demonstrate why the writ petitioner did not upload the registration certificate under Section 12AA of said Act in spite of adequate ample and multiple opportunities being given to the writ petitioner, all of which is captured in the aforementioned two paragraphs; (c) On a demurrer, even if it is to be construed that the cancellation is vide impugned order cancellation of registration under Section 12AA of said Act is also revisable under Section 264 of said Act. Suffice to say that there is an effective and efficacious alternate remedy even against cancellation. To be noted, as mentioned in the opening part of this point this is on a demurrer; (d) The submission that the writ petitioner-assessee being given the benefit of registration under Section 12AA of said Act for thirty years continuously falls flat on its face in the light of aforementioned assessment order dated 30.04.2021 made for the assessment year 2018-19. The mo....
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....thstanding alternate remedy rule being a rule of discretion, Hon'ble Supreme Court which in a long line of case laws i.e., in a catena of case laws starting from Dunlop India case [Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal Vs. Dunlop India Ltd., and others reported in (1985) 1 SCC 260] ; Satyawati Tandon [United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon and others reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110] and K.C.Mathew [Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and another Vs. Mathew K.C. reported in (2018) 3 SCC 85], has held that in fiscal law Statutes, alternate remedy rule has to be applied with utmost rigour. Relevant paragraph in Dunlop case is paragraph No.3 and relevant portion of the same reads as follows: '3. ....... Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article....
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....espite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.' (underlining made by this Court to supply emphasis and highlight) Paragraph 10 of K.C.Mathew case extracts the Satyawati Tandon principles i.e., portions of the case law from Satyawati Tandon and the same has been reproduced. Therefore, I deem it appropriate to not to burden this order with extracts from Satyawati Tandon case. To be noted, these three case laws are not an exhaustive list qua alternate remedy principle in Fiscal Law Statute but they are illustrative qua a long line of case laws. In addition to the above line of authorities, the latest case law is Commercial Steel Limited case [The Assistant Commissioner of State Tax and others Vs. M/s.Commercial Steel Limited in Civil Appeal No. ....
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....order may not be the order by which the Section 12AA registration has been cancelled. Though not specifically pointed out, I am of the view that this alleged NJP violation if at all and if that be so would be predicated and posited on the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 12AA of said Act. This did not arise as the impugned order merely records a cancellation. This is buttressed and bolstered by the writ petitioner not uploading the registration certificate more so when it is the positive and categoric averment of the writ petitioner that the 12AA registration has been repeatedly renewed for over a continuous period of time whereas only the 80G registration was discontinued post 31.03.2000. To be noted, even now, even in this writ petition case file, Section 12AA registration certificate has not been produced. This Court is of the considered view that the writ petitioner has not given any acceptable reason for not uploading the 12AA registration certificate which the writ petitioner claims is in its possession. 10. The above takes us to Section 142(1) notice which becomes relevant. A scanned reproduction of 142(1) notice dated 30.08.2021 is as follows: What is of relevanc....
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....ua 2018-19 has been assailed by the writ petitioner by way of a statutory appeal. The arguments that vide assessment order 2018-19 there is cancellation of 12AA registration certificate, does not hold water and does not carry the writ petitioner any further for two reasons. One reason is as already alluded to supra, the impugned order is not the order by which the cancellation has been made and on a demurrer even if that be so, the same is revisable under Section 264 of said Act and more importantly the second reason is sauce for Goose is sauce for Gander too. If the writ petitioner can assail the assessment order for 2018-19 (where Section 12AA benefit have been negatived) by way of a statutory appeal under Section 246 of said Act, there is no reason as to why the writ petitioner cannot do it qua impugned assessment order. This by itself downs the curtains from all these arguments and it douses the writ petitioner's campaign against the writ petitioner. 13. Notwithstanding the dismissal of the captioned writ petition, if the writ petitioner chooses to avail the alternate remedy either by way of an appeal under Section 246 of said Act or by way of a revision under Section 26....