TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1987 (3) TMI 88
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....ed dated August 31, 1974, for a consideration of Rs. 46,000 A notice under section 269D(1) of the Act was served upon the appellant, thereby initiating proceedings under section 269C for acquisition of the said rice mill, on the ground that the apparent consideration recorded in the instrument of transfer was less than the fair market value by more than 15%. It was alleged that the consideration mentioned in the sale deed is not the true consideration that passed between the parties. The appellant submitted his objections; but, by his order dated December 6, 1978, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Acquisition Range (competent authority), passed an order under section 269F(6) acquiring the said property. The copy of the or....
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....ithin forty-five days from the date of such order : Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may, on an application made in this behalf before the expiry of the said period of forty-five days or, as the case may be, thirty days, permit, by order, the appeal to be presented within such further period as may be specified therein if the applicant satisfies the Appellate Tribunal that he has sufficient cause for not being able to present the appeal within the said period of forty-five days or, as the case may be, thirty days." A perusal of the proviso would immediately disclose that in the matter of an appeal under this sub-section, the Act has made a departure from section 253, which provides for appeals to the Appellate Tribunal against the ord....
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....e appeal must, therefore, be held to be clearly barred. Mr. Y. Ratnakar, learned counsel for the appellant, however, submitted that by virtue of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the provision contained in section 5 of that Act becomes applicable and the Tribunal has the power to condone the delay in filing the appeal for sufficient cause. He relied upon the decisions of the Punjab and Haryana and Madhya Pradesh High Courts, respectively, in Manoj Ahuja v. IAC of I.T. (Acquisition Range) [1984] 150 ITR 696 and CIT v. Trilokinath [1984] 147 ITR 613. The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that inasmuch as neither section 269F nor any other provision in the Act excluded the application of the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limit....
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....ivision Bench of this court took the view that it has no such power because the Limitation Act applies only to civil courts, and not to tribunals, and also because there is no provision in that Act making section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to proceedings under that Act. It was, however, held that so far as the revision to the High Court provided by the Act is concerned, the High Court being a civil court has power to extend the period under section 5 of the Limitation Act. This decision was expressly approved by the Supreme Court and it made the following observations (AIR 1985 SC 1279, 1280, para. 3): " After hearing both sides, we have unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that there is no substance in this appeal and that the vi....
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....nd that there is none. Accordingly, it held that section 5 does not apply and the appellate authority has no power to condone the delay in filing the appeal. The said decision clearly holds that the Limitation Act applies only to civil courts and not to quasi-judicial tribunals, even though such tribunals may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. Section 29(2) does not have the effect of extending the application of the Limitation Act to tribunals. It only says that where a different period of limitation is prescribed by any special enactment or local law, the provisions of section 3 of the Limitation Act shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Sch....
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....on) v. Kedar Nath Jhunjhunwalla [1982] 133 ITR 746, wherein it has been held that the Tribunal has no power to extend the period prescribed for filing an appeal under section 269G(1). But, we must say the reasoning behind this conclusion is altogether different from the one given by us hereinbefore. The reasoning of the Patna High Court is that the application of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is excluded by the context, viz., that Chapter XX-A of the Income-tax Act is a self-contained Code. It is not necessary for us to deal with this point of view inasmuch as, according to us, section 29(2) cannot have the effect of applying the Limitation Act to tribunals, and if so, the question of its exclusion by the context would not arise. Suff....