Special limitation under section 269G bars post-expiry condonation; tribunal lacks power to extend time after limitation ends.

Section 269G creates a special limitation regime for appeals, requiring any request for extension to be made before expiry of the prescribed period on showing sufficient cause. The text states that this provision departs from the general appellate limitation scheme under section 253(5) and does not confer a general power to condone delay after limitation has expired. It further states that section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to quasi-judicial tribunal proceedings through section 29(2). As no application for extension was filed within time, the appeal remained barred and was treated as not maintainable.

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Issues: Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has power to condone delay in filing an appeal under section 269G of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by applying section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, read with section 29(2) thereof.

Analysis: The proviso to section 269G(1) makes a deliberate departure from the general appellate limitation scheme under section 253(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Under section 269G, extension of time is available only if an application is made before expiry of the prescribed period and sufficient cause is shown; the provision does not confer a general power to condone delay after expiry. The Limitation Act applies to courts and not to quasi-judicial tribunals, and section 29(2) does not enlarge that principle so as to apply section 5 to tribunal proceedings. The appellant had admittedly filed no application for extension within time, so the appeal remained barred.

Conclusion: The Tribunal had no power to condone the delay, and the appeal was not maintainable.

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