TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1991 (1) TMI 461
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....ic Association represented by its General Secretary, the second plaintiff, who has also been the Joint Secretary of the Indian Olympic Association, has filed the suit impleading the first defendant described as the President of the Indian Olympic Association and the second defendant described as the Secretary General of the Indian Olympic Association and alleging that the Association is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act having its office at New Delhi. The members of the Association consist of National Sports Federations/Associations whose sport is included in the Olympic/Asian or Commonwealth Games, National Sports Federations/Associations which represent widely played Indian sports recognised by the Association, Olympic Associations of States as well as centrally administered Union Territories, service Sports Central Boards and Indian citizens who are member of the Olympic Committee. The Association has its own constitution containing the Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations which is the binding contract between the members of the Association. The management of the Association is entrusted to the Executive Council constituted under the Rules.....
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.... the plaint, at a meeting held on 28-5-1990 decided that in view of certain facts (alleged in the plaint) the Special General Meeting could not be convened. Yet, by a notice issued on 28-5-1990, the first defendant convened a Special General Meeting of the Association on 15-6-1990 at Park Sheration Hotel at Madras to consider and pass the following resolution as required by the requisitionists. "Resolved that this House has lost confidence in the present Executive Council of the Indian Olympic Association and to elect New Executive Council leaving the legality of the requisition to be decided by the General Assembly. The plaintiffs have not only sought a declaration that the notice dated 28-5-1990 issued by the first and second defendants on the basis of the requisition notices convening the Special General Meeting of the Indian Olympic Association on 15-6-1990 is illegal, null and void, but also a consequential injunction restraining the defendants from convening and conducting the Special General Meeting on the said date or on any other day at any other place and from considering and taking decision on the resolution mentioned in the notice. The plaintiffs have als....
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....15th June. "Since the Hon'ble Court was reopened after summer holidays on 11th only we could not file the suit and the application earlier and seek for interim orders," and that "I submit that if this Hon'ble Court is not inclined to grant the interim order of injunction restraining the holding of the Special General Meeting for any reason, I pray that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to order that the resolution viz., "Resolved that this House has lost confidence in the present Executive Council of the Indian Olympic Association and to elect new Executive Council." shall be passed in the Special General meeting of the IOA to be held on 15th June 1990 at 12.15 p.m. at Park Sheraton Hotel, Madras by secret ballot only and that the IOA President shall preside over the said meeting." On that very day Learned Trial Judge ordered for Judge's summons under Order 14 Rule 8 of the O. S. Rules read with S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and handed over the same to the learned counsel for the plaintiffs. This time it said, why the Court be not pleased to order that the resolution me....
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....cheduled and the respondent/ appellant herein however barged into the meeting hall with about 100 outsiders shouting that Sri B. S. Adityan, the President should not preside over the meeting and, "The President informed the members about the orders issued by this Hon'ble Court and the Delhi High Court. The observer also read out order of this Hon'ble High Court and said that the members must abide by the order. The respondent and his men shouted that there will be voting only by show of hands and they rushed towards the chairs occupied by the President, Secretary General and the Observer. The said persons placed two chairs near the President and the respondent occupied the same and declared that the resolution of No Confidence has been passed and he has been elected as the President of I.O.A. When Sri B. S, Adityan instructed the officials of I.O.A. to issue the ballot papers the respondent instigated his supporters to go and seize the papers. Apprehending violence the President Sri. B. S. Adityan gave a request to the Commissioner of Police for a bandobust for peaceful voting. The President, Secretary General, the observer and t....
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....ourt in the Special General Meeting to be held on 15-6-1990 at Madras." It is submitted, (i) That outsiders other than members of the Indian Olympic Association were present inside the meeting hall where the requisitioned meeting was taking place; (ii) That entry to these outsiders was denied by the members of the Indian Olympic Association posted at the entrance door of the hall but by reason of Thiru V. C. Shukla shouting to these members and asserting himself under cloak of his status as a Member of Parliament and a former President of the Indian Olympic Association the outsiders brought by him gained entry into the meeting hall. (iii) That Shri Avadh Behari Rohtagi, former Judge of this Hon'ble Court and Observer read out the order of this Hon'ble Court in CMP No. 6953 of 1990 to the entire assembly before commencing voting by secret ballot. (iv) That this Hon'ble Court's order required the poll to be conducted through secret ballot but Thiru V. C. Shukla, Thiru Mishra, Thiru Khan and Thiru Raj Singh and persons who are outsiders pounced on Thiru Avadh Behari Rohtagi, former judge of the Delhi High C....
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....ersign the identification cards and alleging that the only motive behind the blatant and open violation by the respondent/appellant, a Member of parliament, former Cabinet Minister and a former Chief Minister, of the orders of this court, which had been read out by Thiru Avadh Behari Rohatgi at the commencement of the meeting with so many witnesses including the newspaper reporters was to somehow or other usurp the office of president of the Indian Olympic Association with the hope that the Government of India and the Ministry of Sports would support him in his adventure so that he could be the president of the Indian Olympic Association to represent India at the Asiad to be held in Beijing and the respondent appellant on the very next day, broke open the lock of the office of the Indian Olympic Association in the Jawahar Lal Nehru stadium and had physically trespassed and occupied the office, plaintiff/applicant sought a direction that Thiru E. S. Adityan continued to be the president of the Indian Olympic Association and that the meeting, if any, purported to have been held by Thiru V. C. Shukla after the adjournment of the Special General Meeting on 15-6-1990 and the resolution ....
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....that it was he who had tried to create a pandemonium with the sole purpose of calling off the meeting and declare himself elected by secret ballot. 9. The plaintiff/respondents supported the allegation of contempt by filing a copy of the order of the Delhi High Court in I.A. No. 4515 of 1990 in Suit No. 1871 of 1990, a report of the observer appointed by the Delhi High Court and submitted in Suit No. 1871 of 1990 in the Delhi High Court, an extract of a newspaper report supported by the affidavit of the Reporter and a copy of the First Information Report lodged by a Police Officer. 10. The respondent/appellant supported his stand by filing an affidavit of one V. K. Malhotra, who is the President of the Archery Association of India, a Member of Parliament and one of the members of the Association and affidavit of one G. S. Mandar, the President of the Wrestling Federation of India (Director General of Central Industrial Security Force) and a member of the Association, who attended the meeting and prepared the minutes of the meeting. 11. Thiru Murugan has filed a reply-affidavit and alleged, "No meeting at all was held at the Park Sheraton Hotel on June, 15, 1....
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.... High Court, importance need not be attached to them and according to the learned counsel, since the said observer had been paid Rs. 20,000/- by way of cheque issued by the IOA which was allowed to be encashed by V. C. Shukla, the report is a biased one. As regards this contention I wish to point out that this Court in placing reliance not because he happened to be a retired Judge of the Delhi High Court, but he happened to be an observer appointed by the High Court whatever office he held before. I do not think that the said observer could have wholly given a wrong version of the incident as regards the order passed by this Court being made known to V. C. Shukla and others by the observer as well as by B. S. Adityan. Since the resolution proposed to be moved against Adityan, it was not proper for Mr. Adityan to be the President of the meeting. Such an objection could have been raised and objection could have been given in writing to Adityan and they would have requested the meeting to be postponed to get further orders from this Court. Even under the Constitution of IOA the President shall preside over the meeting of the Assembly and the Executive Council. Even assuming for a mome....
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....upreme Court on 5-9-1990 passed orders during the pendency of this appeal to the effect that the affairs of the Indian Olympic Association are in the very sorry state indeed and urgently need looking into it observing, "Unless some remedial measures are taken, it appears that it might be difficult to conduct the management of the Association in a democratic manner in accordance with its constitution." The Supreme Court passed no substantive order in the matter as it found that the appeal was to be heard by this Court, but ordered "There will however be an order that neither Mr. V. C. Shukla nor Mr. Adityan shall represent the Indian Olympic Association at the Asian Games commencing on September 22, 1990. It is clarified that this order will not prevent either of them from going to attend the Games in their private capacity or in any other capacity. The Government of India, if it think fit may nominate any person eminent in the field of sports other than a party to the dispute in this case to represent the Government and accompany the Indian Olympic Team. It is clarified that such person shall, however, not claim in any manner to represen....
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.... V. P. Singh was replaced by Mr. Avadh Behari Rohtagi, a retired Judge of the Delhi High Court, who it is admitted, was present on 15-6-1990 at the commencement of the meeting at Park Sheraton Hotel. He has submitted a report dated 31-6-1990 in which he has stated that he reached the venue of the meeting at 11-30 a.m. on 15-6-1990. The meeting was to begin at 12-15 p.m. When however he reached, an order of the Court dated 14-6-1990 passed in C.S. No. 481 of 1990 was served on him. In that order, Learned Judge directed that the voting on the resolution would be by secret ballot and ballot papers would be signed by the Secretary General of the Indian Olympic Association as well as by the observer appointed by the Delhi High Court and only such ballot papers as were signed by them would be held to be valid. The Court had further directed that the meeting to be held on 15-6-1990 would be presided over by Sri Adityan who was the President of the Indian Olympic Association. Since the Delhi High Court had allowed the Special General Meeting to consider and vote upon the resolution afore-quoted which had been moved by certain members of the Association against the present set of office-bea....
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....roke loose. It was a free for all right with no holds barred. Such a State was not conducive to voting or election on any sane discussion for that matter. It was impossible to conduct the meeting in the confusion and chaos that prevailed. The requisitionists saw to it that voting does not take place. The Madras High Court order was set at naught." Sri Avadh Behari Rohtagi has said in his report, "Adityan complained that Shukla has brought in people without accreditation cards. Similar was the complaint of Shukla against Adityan. I cannot say anything on this as there was trouble from the very beginning and nothing was orderly." 17. From what we have already noticed, it can be said : (1) Certain members of the Association wanted convening of Special General meeting and accordingly gave notice dated 16-5-1990 to resolve that the House had lost confidence in his Executive Council and to elect a new Executing Council. The notice suggested that the meeting should be convened at New Delhi within the specified period or else the requisitionists would hold the said meeting on 16-6-1990 or on any day thereafter at the National Stadium, New Del....
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....rpose of calling off the meeting and declare himself elected by secret ballot. (6) According to one version when Sri Adityan found that the supporters of Sri Shukla were not allowing the voting by secret ballot, he adjourned the meeting. According to the other version, in spite of the attempt of Sri Adityan and his supporters to somehow forestall the meeting or to get himself declared as elected by a Sham secret ballot, the no confidence resolution was adopted and Sri Shukla elected at the said meeting as the President by show of hands and was authorised to nominate the other office-bearers. 18. Thus the meeting of the Association either ended in the pandemonium without any vote of no confidence or election of the meeting adopted the resolution of no confidence a majority vote by show of hands and authorised Shukla to nominate other members of the Executive Council. In either case, this Court's direction was not carried out. Whether it was on account of the supporters of Sri Shukla interfering or on account of Sri Adityan deliberately withholding the information about the order of this Court and whether the alleged meeting was adjourned after pandemonium by Ad....
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....e being in force for the recovery of rent of agricultural land from the procedure of such land." Section 151 of the Code states, "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court." 21. Similar provisions may be found in Ss. 5 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 wherein again it is stated, "S. 5. Nothing contained in this Code shall in the absence of a specified provision to the contrary affect any special or local law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force. S. 482. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limits or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." 22. We do not think it necessary in the instant case to make any comparative study of the ....
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....tion of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and the members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of this Constitution." This not only saves the existing jurisdiction of this Court, but also saves the inherent jurisdiction. As a result of these provisions, it can be slated without any hesitation that as the incidence of Court of Record, this Court has got the power to determine the question as to its own jurisdiction and it has inherent power to punish for its contempt summarily. 24. In Govindarajulu v. Imperial Hank of India AIR1932Mad180 , when a learned single Judge of this Court was confronted with an argument that if an injunction cannot be passed under the provisions of Order 39, Rule 1 or 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it would not be permissible to seek the power under Section 151 of the Code in order to justify such an order, accepted the contention that an injunction to restrain the respondent from executing a certain decree could not be granted in exercise of the inherent power of the Court (which has been subsequentl....
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....cumstances purely upon English precedents and without any reference to the terms of the Code of Civil Procedure. But there is authority for the view that the High Courts, over and above the powers which they enjoy under that Code possess an equitable jurisdiction derived from the old Supreme Court to issue an injunction in appropriate cases. This is the basis of the decision in Pariakaruppan Chettiar v. Ramaswami Chettiar AIR 1928 Mad 497where Ramesam and Devadoss, JJ. held that the Chartered High Courts have such a power following Rash Behary Day v. Bhowani Churn Bhose I.L.R.(1907) Cal 94 and Mungle Chand v. Gopal Ram I.L.R.(1907)Cal 101. In that former of these two decisions Woodruff ,J. who certainly is a high authority on question of procedure, gave it as his opinion that a High Court had and has, independently of the Civil Procedure Code, power to make an order of the nature sought, and he answered in the negative the question whether there was anything in the Civil Procedure Code which took away that power. That case was decided under the old Code, but I do not think that there is anything either in S. 151 or any other provision of the new Code which would deprive a High Cour....
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.... then proceeded to examine as to what this "special jurisdiction "is and noticed that the term "special jurisdiction" is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code but the words "special law" defined in Section 41 of the Indian Penal Code would mean "a law applicable to a particular subject" and the said (Para 3) "..... In the absence of any specific definition in the Criminal Procedure Code, we think that that brings out the ordinary and natural meaning of the words "special jurisdiction" and covers the present case. Contempt is a special subject and the jurisdiction is conferred by a special set of laws peculiar to Courts of Records." Making thereafter a study of the law on the subject, the Supreme Court proceeded to take notice of the view of the Courts in India and referred to several authorities on the subject and stated (page 5) "This has long been the view in India. In 1867, Peacock C.J., laid down the rule quite broadly in these words In 'In re Abdool: (1867) 8 SWR 32 '. "There can be no doubt that every Court of Record has the power of summarily punishing for contempt. It is true the same le....
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....ourt of Record is the sole and exclusive judge of what amounts to a contempt of court ..... and unless there exists difference in the constitution of the Recorder's Court at serrc Legion the same power must be conceded to be inherent in that Court..... We are of opinion that it is a Court of Record and that the law must be considered the same as in the country." The 1884 edition of Belchamber's Practice of the Civil Courts also says at page 241 that : "Every superior Court of Record whether in the United Kingdom ,or in the colonial possessions or dependencies of the Crown has 'inherent' power to punish contempts, without its precincts, as well] as 'in facie curiae' ..... So also 7 Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham edition) page 2. "The superior courts have an 'inherent jurisdiction' to punish criminal contempt etc....." But reverting to the developments in India, the High Court of Allahabad was established in 1866 under the High Courts Act, 1861 and was continued a Court of Record. In 1906 the Privy Council remarked at page 108 of its judgment in -- 'In the matter of Sashi Bhushan....
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....Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 and said. "In any case, so far as contempt of a High Court itself is concerned, as distinct from one of a subordinate court, the Constitution vests these rights in every High Court, so no Act of a legislature could take away that jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority." and concluded. "We hold, therefore, that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply in matters of contempt triable by the High Court. The High Court can deal with it summarily and adopt its own procedure. All that is necessary is that the procedure is fair and that the contemner is made aware of a the charge against him and given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself." 26. In Manohar Lal v. Seth Hiralal AIR1962SC527 , however, the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to make orders ex debito justitiae was recognised by the Supreme Court in these words, (at p. 537 of AIR). "It is true that the High Courts constituted under charters and exercising ordinary original jurisdiction do exercise inherent jurisdiction to issue an injunction to restrain parties in a suit before them from proceed....
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....gs. The courts in their attempt to identify the nature of contempt have noticed however three different sorts of contempt viz., (1) scandalising the court itself. (2) abusing parties who are concerned in causes before it and (3) prejudicing mankind against persons before the case is heard. We need not however wander into this arena as the Parliament has enacted the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and defined "contempt of Court" to mean civil contempt or criminal contempt, 'civil contempt" to mean wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court" and, ..... "Criminal contempt" to mean the publication, whether by words, spoken or written or by single or by visible representations, or otherwise of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which scandalizes or tends to scandalise or lowers or tends to lows the authority of any Court or prejudice or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any Judicial proceedings or interferes or tends to interfere with or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner. The present appeal is conce....
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....maged or alienated by any party to the suit or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree or that the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property with a view of defrauding his creditors or threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit and in any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained of or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or related to the same property or right. 31. We have already noticed that a Court's power to grant injunction is not confined to Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Appropriate cases, the Court can grant injunction exercising its inherent power. Yet, a departure from the rule that any order or direction in the nature of injunction should be directed to the parties to the suit or litigation before it cannot easily be allowed. That is why the first thing to know in such a case is who the contemner is, a party to the proceeding or a stran....
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.... argument that he was a mere spectator and could not therefore be considered as an aider or abetter was also rejected because it was shown that far from being a mere spectator, he was in fact acting as a promoter. The Court however accepted in that case that being a mere spectator was not enough per se to prove that he was aiding and abetting the breach. 32. In Thorne RDC v. Bunting (No. 2) (1972) 3 All ER 1084, a Bench of the Court of Appeal considered a case of breach of undertaking and liability of third parties for contempt. Observing on facts, Russell LJ, held. "The mother and son had submitted to orders about their registrations limited to the specific and small portions of the relevant land that belonged to the council. The undertaking which the father submitted to (although it would seem apparently that it went further than could have been obtained if the matter had been fully fought out) extended to much more land; that is to say, to other land not the property of the council. The result of the orders against the mother and son and the undertaking by the father has been, of course to clear from the registration the lands in the whole area in fact belongin....
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....ns based on six lines in the Salkeld report (In Butler's case 1696-2 Salk 596) that if anybody does anything which tends to deprive a plaintiff of the fruits of an order, they are in contempt of court. All I can say is, I cannot see it at all. It will be observed, as 1 ventured to observe in the course of the hearing, that what are the fruits of the order depends on the order. They may be desert apples or they may be crab apples; and here the only undertaking the council got out of the father was that he would take some steps which by themselves, if other people did not do something voluntarily to aid him, would not achieve the ultimate aim that the council were looking for; that is to say, to get all this land totally deregistered. But the trunk of the fruit tree was a weak one, although it seeks to have been rather stranger than in law the council were entitled to obtain against the father." 33. In the case of Northern Counties Securities v. Jackson & Steeple (1974) 2 All ER 625, a judgment of the Chancery Division, Walt on J. delivered adjustment in a case in which a certain undertaking to use best endeavours to obtain quotation for and permission to deal in shares and is....
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....rgo, for any shareholder to vote against a resolution to issue the shares here in question to the plaintiffs would be a contempt of court, as it would be a step taken by him knowingly which would prevent the company from fulfilling its undertaking to the court. Counsel for the plaintiffs admitted that he could find to authority which directly assisted his argument, but equally confidently asserted that there was no authority which precluded it. Counsel for the directors indicted the argument of counsel for the plaintiffs as being based on a nominalistic salary His precise proposition was formulated as follows: "Whilst directors have special responsibilities as executive agents of the company to ensure that the company does not commit a contempt of court, a shareholder when the position has been put before them generally who chooses to vote against such approval will not himself be in contempt of Court. Putting this into less formal language, what counsel for the directors submitted was that although it is perfectly true that the act of the members in passing certain special type of resolutions binds the company, their acts are not the ac....
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....hat where a court makes an order directing a party to an action to observe or do some act, this does not impose an obligation on someone who is not a party to the action to do anything, but observed, "If applied to the directors of the company subject to such an order of the court it is misleading. The directors, although not in express terms parties to the action, do come under an obligation to procure that the company acts in conformity with the order of the court, for the simple reason that if they did not there would never by any effective remedy of this nature against a company..... I have no doubt that where conditional contract is entered into-conditional, for example, on the shareholders approving an increase in the capital of the company there is, in general, no duty on the company to procure the fulfilment of the condition....." There is yet another observation in the judgment, "It would, of course, be otherwise if one could envisage any circumstances in which an order was made by the courts on a company to do something, for example to increase its capital (as distinct from using its best endeavours to increase its capital), which must of nec....
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....the said injunction." In the first judgment, it is said, "I now return to the judgment of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.C. "(a) In no case (apart from Smith-Barry v. Dawson, the Irish case) has a third party, C., been held to be in contempt of an order restraining a named person, B from doing an act unless C has been privy or party to the doing of an act which is a breach of precise terms of the order." If Smith-Barry v. Dawson ,(1891) 27 LR 558 is accurately reported, there was some confusion between the species of contempt which consists of disobeying, or assisting in the disobedience of an order of the court and that which consists of interfering with the due administration of justice, and this may have stemmed from the fact that no argument was addressed on behalf of the alleged contemnors. Mr. Smith Barry had been declared by a final judgment, to which the alleged contemnors were not parties, to be entitled to possession and to quiet enjoyment of his patent rights to hold a market in the Fair Green. The alleged contemnors had held a rival market in the Fair Green with knowledge of that decision and of the fact that an injunction had been granted against t....
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.... doing of the prohibited act. If they do so, they will not have disobeyed the order, but they will have interfered with the due administration of justice and may be liable to be proceeded against on that account. That this is the position is made even clearer by the two motions Lord Wellesley v. Earl of Morning ton (1848) 11 Beav. 180 and Lord Wellesaley v. Earl of Morning ton (No. 2) (1848) 11 Beav, 181. There the injunction Order omitted any reference to servants or agents. Lord Langdale M. R. dismissed the first motion to commit Mr. Batley, the Earl's land agent, who had cut down some trees which the Earl had been forbidden to cut. He did so because the motion was based upon an allegation that Mr. Batley had acted in breach of the order. As Lord Langdale M. R. pointed out, the order was not addressed to Mr. Batley and he was not enjoined thereby. However, the second motion accused Mr. Batley not of breaching the order, but of knowingly assisting in a breach of the order and thereby obstructing the process of the court. As Lord Langdale M. R. put it at p. 183: "If the matter had been pressed, I should have found it my duty to commit Mr. Bailey fo....
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....ng the law that C is in criminal contempt if he is party to a breach of the Order is that the court will not allow its order to be knowingly flouted, thwarted or frustrated by any person even though he be a stranger to the action." This is quite correct but, I think, nihil ad rem. The three newspapers were not parties to breaches of the actual orders in the Guardian and Observer actions which prohibited publication by those newspapers. In publishing as they did, they were intending to serve their own interests or their view of the public interest and certainly not the interests of the Guardian and Observer. Based on these propositions of law, Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.C. said that it seemed to him that the Attorney-General was seeking to widen the application of the law of criminal contempt, albeit in accordance with established principle. This I am unable to accept. The law of contempt is based upon the broadest of principles, namely, that the courts cannot and will not permit interference with the due administration of justice. Its application is universal. The fact that it is applied in novel circumstances, for example to the punishment of a witness after he had given....
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....the order. It was effective in fact and I am wholly satisfied that it was also effective in law. What is interesting is why it was effective in law. personam. As Sir Nicols as Browne-Wilkinson V.C. pointed out, English civil courts not in personam. They adjudicate disputes between the parties to an action and make orders against those parties only. This is true even in proceedings under R.S.C. Ord. 113, which permits proceedings against "Persons unknown." They become parties. What is not permissible is to make an order against a stranger to the action. In Ivason v. Harris, (1802) 7 Vas. Jum. 251 Lord Eldon L.C. said: "I have no conception, that it is competent to this court to hold a man bound by an injunction, who is not a party in the cause for the purpose of the cause." Yet that is what Balcombe, J. purported to do. To say that the jurisdiction of the court in ward ship involves a peculiar parental or administrative responsibility to which the disposal of controverted questions is only incidental is no explanation. This only means that this jurisdiction is unusual in the extent to which it involves extended judicial sup....
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....erson 1897 1 Ch 545 and other cases, learned Judge held, . . . "Although there are dicta in Sweaward v. Paterson, (1897) 1 Ch. 545 and Lord Wellesley v. Earl of Morning ton ,11 Beav. 180 which may be said to support a wider principle, I regard those cases and having decided, and decided only that a person may be liable in contempt if, with knowledge of the order, the aids and abets a breach of the order by the person enjoined. The same is true of Z Ltd. v. A-Z and AA-LL, (1982) QB 558. It was held in that case that the bank would be liable for contempt if, with knowledge of the Mareva injunction, it enabled its customer to act in breach of the terms of the injunction, even though the injunction had not been served on the customer. The customer could not, of course, be liable in contempt himself until notice of the injunction had been properly served. But he could breach the injunction as soon as it was granted, and the bank could therefore be liable in contempt for aiding and abetting that breach....I would only add, before leaving the cases, that it would be an improvement of this branch of the law if aiding and abetting a breach of a court order were re-cl....
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....urely not be a defence to a charge of contempt that he was not a party to the order. His conduct amounts to a contempt of court independently of any order made in the proceedings. Nor would holding such a man liable for contempt create any undesirable uncertainty or injustice. He is assumed to know that abusing the judge is a contempt of court. Ignorance of the law will afford him no more excuse in this than in any other branch of the criminal law. It may be said that abusing the judge is an obvious contempt, whereas interfering with the course of justice, in particular proceedings is much less precise. This is true, Moreover I would accept that not all acts which are calculated to interfere with the course of justice will necessarily ground a charge of contempt. The act must be sufficiently serious and sufficiently closely connected with the particular proceedings. But in the present case the conduct relied on by the Attorney-General is not marginal. It is not a mere prejudging of the issue to be decided in the particular proceedings. It is not a mere usurpation of the court's function. It is the destruction, in whole or in part, of the subject matter of the act....
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....te in order to obtain subrogation to the executor's right of indemnity). But the courts have no jurisdiction to make orders against persons not so before them merely because an order made, or to be made, any or will be ineffectual without it. Even in the case of an injunction Lord Eldon says in Inveson v. Harris, (1802) 7 Vcs. Jun. 251,: I have no conception, that it is competent to this court to hold a man bound by an injunction, who is not a party in the cause for f he purpose of the cause. The old practice was that he must be brought into court, so as according to the ancient laws and usages of the country to be made a subject matter of the writ". See also Ranson v. Platt, (1911) 2 KB 291 and Marango v. Daily Sketch and Sunday Graphic Ltd. (1948) 1 All ER 406. The last case, being a decision of the House of Lords, is clearly binding on this court, unless there is any relevant exception to the general rule. That there is at least one exception appears from a case of my own at first instance, In re X (A Minor)( Ward ship :Injunction) (1984) 1 WLR 1422. In that case I held that, in the exercise of the ward ship jurisdiction, there was power to make an order (proh....
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....stinction between the two categories is that in general conduct which involves a breach, or assisting in the breach, of a court order is treated as a matter for the parties to raise by complaint to the court, whereas other forms of contempt are in general considered to be a matter for the Attorney Advocate General to raise. In doing so, he acts not as a government minister or legal adviser, but as the guardian of the public interest in the due administration of justice, In the case of the former, the Courts do not only intend to punish in the form of committal, attachment or fine, but also strike out all or part of a claim or refuse to entertain the whole or part of a defence. Courts in United Kingdom also maintain that an injunction can only restrain a part of a proceeding from doing an act although it may restrain him from doing the act from himself or his servants or agents and a third party is not held to be in contempt of an order restraining a named person except that person, who aids and abets the commission of the breach. Rarely, any exception was made like in the case of Mareva injunction. They however took notice of the violation at the hands of the third party as a condu....
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....sting in his mere discretion as to what is expedient. The latter must trust it as one of principle, and as turning, not on convenience, but on necessity." 39. In the case of S. N. Bannerjee v. Kuchwar Lime and Stone Company Ltd., the Privy Council in an appeal from a decision of the High Court, Patna applied the rule of law as stated in Seaward v. Paterson 1897 1 Ch 545 (supra) and stated. "The respondents, however, contended that even if the Secretary of State was not himself guilty of direct disobedience to the injunction which had been granted, yet the other two appellants were guilty of contempt upon the principles set out in Avery v. Andirews, (1882) 51 U Ch 414 and Seaward v. Pa'terson, (1897) 1 Ch. 545. In terms, however, those cases limit the offence of contempt by a person not a party to the injunction to cases where they aid and abet the party enjoined in its breach. Where, as here, that party has not broken the injunction it is impossible to hold that anyone has aided or abetted them in breaking it. The respondents sought to avoid this difficulty by maintaining that the doing by anyone of an act which was forbidden by the injunction w....
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....l disobedience to an order of a court requiring a person to do an act, other than the payment of money is a contempt : Halsbury's Laws of England (2nd Ed.) Vol. VII p. 30 Art. 42. But that rule does not, in our view, help the petitioner in the present case, and this for two reasons. First, in order that the rule may apply there must be an order on a person to do an act and in this case there is no such order. All that the order of Rexburg ,J. does is to direct the bailiff to deliver possession : it does not direct any other person to do any act. There is no question here, therefore, of any person disobeying an order, unless it is the bailiff. The case of Iberian Trust Ltd. v. Founders Trust & Investment Co. Ltd., (1932) LR 2 KB 87, may be usefully compared with the case in hand. That was also a case of contempt for not carrying out an order of the court and it failed on the ground that there was no order on the defendant, the alleged contemnor. Luxmoore, J. Said: Now, turning back to Rowlatt, J.'s order, what is it that the defendant company have been ordered to do which the company and its directors have failed to do? In terms, the order does ....
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....herefore there was in this case in any event, no obstruction to the course of justice whatever other offence or civil wrong the retaking might have amounted to. On that facts of the present case it does not seem to us that the argument is tenable. What happened was that the opposite party No. 2 was present all along when the plaintiff was delivering possession to the petitioner and he offered no resistance then nor attempted to retake possession till the bailiff had turned his back. It is quite obvious that the opposite party No, 2 only lay by so as to mislead the bailiff into believing that there was no opposition to possession being delivered to the petitioner. The retaking of possession followed so soon after the delivery of possession as in reality and substance to amount to being part of the delivery of possession and therefore to obstructing the bailiff in carrying out the order. A person who retakes possession of land from a party who had recently obtained possession of it by a writ has been held to be guilty of contempt ; Oswald on Contempt (34d Ed. p. 88, relying on In re Higg's Mortgage, Goddard v. Higg, 1894 WN 73. Again in Lacon v. De Groat, 1893 10 TLR 24 it appear....
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....s limited to case a where he aids and abets the party enjoined in the breach and on the facts of the case, held (Para 10): "Admittedly, the appellant Sarpanch was not a party to the order of injunction passed by the Subordinate Judge on April 8, 1962 in Miscellaneous Case No. 33 of 1962 in Connection with the arbitration case against the Union of India and the State of Orissa, who alone were parties in the said proceedings. The question is can it be said that the appellant Sarpanch had in any way aided or abetted the persons so inhibited in breaking the injunction? Our answer is 'No'. The name of the appellant Sarpanch was not mentioned in the order of injunction. In view of the position that the injunction was issued by the Court against the Union of India and the State of Orissa alone in respect of the plots in dispute and further that the injunction order made no mention of their servants and agents, the appellant Sarpanch cannot be found guilty for disobeying the injunction." 43. One of the earlier judgments of the Calcutta High Court in Kailas Chandra v. Sadar Munsif, Silchar AIR1925Cal817 , considered a case of an injunction with respect to a meeting....
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....eferred to 12 Amn. Jur. para 26 which states, "The violation or disobedience of an injunction order issued by a Court having jurisdiction in the matter, when committed by a party to the injunction suit or by a third party having actual notice is a contempt of court. This rule is not confined to parties to the injunction. One who is not a party to the injunction suit, but who is within the class of persons whose conduct is intended to be restrained or who acts in concert with a party litigant or with a third party is guilty of contempt. Persons who act as agents, servants, associates or confederates of parties to the injunction suit may be held guilty of contempt in doing acts forbidden by the injunction order." 45. A Division Bench of this Court in N. Senapathi v. Sri Ambal Mills AIR1966Mad53 has stated the law in a case wherein an objection was taken to the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of District Munsif, Coimbatore in issuing an order of injunction against the first respondent company. Under the said order, holding an extraordinary general meeting of the company was inhibited. However, several persons were brought in the contempt proceedings including t....
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....ects, and a lack of jurisdiction which is basic to the very organisation of Court, or to the scope of its powers. Authorities are available for the view that a mere absence of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction does not proceed to the root of the matter of jurisdiction and is capable of cure by acquiescence by order of Court, or in other respects as provided for by law... An order irregularly obtained cannot be treated as a nullity, but must be implicitly obeyed until by a proper application, it is discharged... It is sufficient to refer here to Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Volume 8 part I Sec. 3, sub-section 39 (also see Oswald on Contempt 1910 Edition 106 which runs thus): "A stranger to an action who aids and abets the breach of a prohibitory order obstructs the course of justice and this contempt is punishable by committal or attachment." There are several English cases cited in the books in support of this authority. Hence as far as these other respondents are concerned, they are undoubtedly guilty of contempt, whether they were parties to the order or otherwise so long as it was brought to their notice that the meeting was prohibited and n....
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....he Code of Civil Procedure, Courts have found another source of power in Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and if that is also ignored for a moment, this Court's power as a Court of Record and a Court of Special jurisdiction is preserved under Articles 215 and 225 of the Constitution of India. There have been cases before several Courts in which when faced with situations that some order or direction was violated and the violation resulted in grave and serious injury, the Courts took the view that the Code of Civil Procedure is not exhaustive. There are cases which say that if remedy to do justice is not provided for in the Code or any other Act, the High Court must not fold its hands and allow injustice to be done. 47. In Bhagat Singh v. Dewan Jagbir Sawhney AIR1941Cal670 , a learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court observed that the law cannot make express provisions against all inconveniences and that the Court had, therefore, in many cases where the circumstances warranted it, and the necessities of the case required it, acted upon the assumption of the possession of an inherent power to act ex debito justitiae and to do that real and substantial justice for the....
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....them except that in the case of a stay order, it is addressed to the Court concerned and in the order, to the person inhibited from doing a certain thing. There is also no difference that so far as Order XXXIX, C.P.C. is concerned, it confers only limited powers and would not be of assistance in circumstances as in the present case.... In our opinion, the inherent powers of this Court under Section 151, C.P.C. are wide and are not subject to any limitation. Where in violation of a stay order or injunction against a party, something has been done in disobedience, it will be the duty of the Court as a policy to set the wrong right and not to allow the perpetration of the wrong doing. In our view, the inherent power will not only be available in such a case, but it is bound to be exercised in that manner in the interests of justice. Even apart from S. 151, we should observe that as a matter of judicial policy, the Court should guard against itself being stultified in circumstances like this by holding that it is powerless to undo a wrong done in disobedience of the Court's order. But in this case it is not necessary to go to that extent as we held that the power is available under....
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....ions 97, 98 and 99 of the Representation of People Act and said (at pp. 884-885 of AIR), "If a candidate whose return is challenged, has a case invalidating the challenger's election, he may set it up subject to the provisions in Section 97. Then comes the finale in Section 98. The High Court has three options by way of conclusive determination. It may (a) dismiss the petition (b) declare the election void and (c) go further to declare the petitioner duly elected. Side-stepping certain species of orders that may be passed under Section 99, we have to explore the gamut of implied powers when the grant of power is wide but needs incidental exercises to execute the substantive power... Everything necessary to resurrect, reconstruct and lead on to a consummation of the original process. May be, to give effective relief by way of complaint of the broken election, the Commissioner may have to be directed to hold fresh poll and report back together with the ballots. A recount of all or some may perhaps be required. Other steps suggested by other developments may be desired. If anything integrally linked up with and necessitated by the obligation to grant full relief has....
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....lant which were necessary for the proper working of the sewer, but were essential to public health. A country school superintendent, who was by statute given general supervisory power over a special election, was permitted to issue absentee ballots. The power to arrest has been held to include the power to take finger prints and take into custody non-residents who were exempted from the provisions of a licensing statute." 54. Confronted with the provisions in Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides for grant of maintenance after adjudication the Supreme Court in Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat 1986CriLJ41 said, "In the absence of any express prohibition it is appropriate to construe the provisions in Chapter IX as conferring an implied power on the Magistrate to direct the person against whom an application is made under Section 125 of the Code to pay some reasonable sum by way of maintenance to the appellant pending final disposal of the application. It is quite common that applications made under Section 125 of the Code also takes several months for being disposed of finally. In order to enjoy the fruits of the proceedings under Section 125, t....
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....the power to entertain a suit and pass final orders therein. 55. There are three possible stages, where to redress damage or injury, the Court may decide to grant a mandatory injunction in a case in which a certain injunction is violated. (1) there can be an injunction apprehending further contempt, unless further order is not made to stop, the violation will continue or perpetrate. (2) Final adjudication of the damage is postponed and a temporary but mandatory order is made, and (3) Damage or injury is finally determined, and steps taken to effectuate the order. The Supreme Court has said in R. P. Ltd. v. Proprietors, Indian Express Newspapers, Bombay Pvt. Ltd. AIR1989SC190 . "We must see whether there is a present and imminent danger for the continuance of the injunction. It is difficult to lay down a fixed standard to judge as to how clear, remote or imminent the danger is.... It is necessary to reiterate that the continuance of this injunction would amount to interference with the freedom of press in the form of preventive injunction and it must, therefore, be based on reasonable grounds for the sole purpose of k....
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....ontempt proceeding that the Court will also have the power to make an interim mandatory injunction. A question may legitimately arise as to what consideration may prompt the Court to ignore or overlook the contempt proceeding or postpone the contempt proceeding or order for a mandatory injunction pending a final adjudication. Here one may Bear in mind that merely because the Court's special jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction is invoked at a stage when a petition for contempt is filed, it will be wrong to say that such jurisdiction of the Court is invoked in the contempt proceeding, it is a jurisdiction a special or inherent designed to effect the enforcement or the execution of the order. Where the injury is of so serious or material a character, that the restoring things to their former condition is the only remedy which will meet the requirements of the case or the defendant has been guilty of sharp practices or unfair conduct or has shown a desire to steal a march upon the plaintiff or to evade the jurisdiction of the Court, a jurisdiction of this kind can be exercised in a pending proceeding, a suit, a contempt proceeding, or even an independent proceeding after the fina....
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....a consequence, the Court may suitably modulate the relief or permit the plaintiffs to amend the relief. Besides this the trial Court will have jurisdiction to consider the grant of a mandatory injunction even in a suit which stood disposed of if its decree is found to have been violated or frustrated. The trial Court being a Court of Record will have special jurisdiction/inherent power to pass such orders as are deemed necessary to meet the ends of justice since this power is saved for it under Sections 4 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Articles 215 and 225 of the Constitution. The instant suit which is still pending, shall give to the Court power to consider the desirability to grant a mandatory injunction, for the reason of its interim injunction having been violated, to remove the violation and until the suit is finally decided to preserve the property in dispute in Status Quo. 58- Our attention has been drawn to several provisions of the Memorandum of Association including Clause (c) of Article XXVII thereof which states, "The Association may sue or be sued in the name of the Secretary General, 10A -- A law suit can only he filed at New Delhi, the h....
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....y for the Court before finding out whether Sri Shukla is guilty of civil contempt, to decide whether defendants 1 and 2 were implicated in their individual capacity or defendant No. 2 as alleged represented the Association and thus the order/direction of the Court was addressed to the Association and if it was addressed to the Association it was also addressed to Sri Shukla. In other words, since the Association was a party, Sri Shukla was also a party at the time of the order/direction which has allegedly been violated. If it is not so found, the Court shall have then to consider whether there are any materials to show that Sri Shukla aided and abetted the violation of the order/direction of the Court. In either case, it will be necessary to record a finding that notice of the Court had been served upon Sri Shukla or he had knowledge of the order/direction of the Court otherwise. In the event of the Court finding that the order had been addressed to Sri Shukla and he had the knowledge of the order when the violation took place, he may be found guilty of civil contempt, provided other ingredients of contempt are found to exist. Sri Shukla still may be found liable for civil contemp....
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....ed to Sri Shukla or not. whether there were/are materials to show that Sri Shukla aided and abetted in the commission of the violation of the order/direction of the Court or not and whether as a third party, Sri Shukla obstructed the due courts of justice or not. Learned trial Judge however has rightly observed that in disposing of the sub-application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was not relevant or necessary to go into the question of contempt, if he has meant to say that it was not necessary to dispose of the contempt petition finally because even for a Prima Facie determination for the purpose of removing the obstruction in the implementation of the order/direction of the Court, or for enforcing the order/ direction of the Court, it will be necessary to find that Sri Shukla violated the order of the Court or that he obstructed the execution of the order of the Court. Besides such a finding as noticed by us above, it will also be necessary to consider all aspects of inconvenience that Sri Shukla suffer on the one hand and the injury that may be caused would be of so serious or material a character that the restoring things to their former condition is the ....
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....of status quo ante or by an order to ensure that until issue of the grant of mandatory injunction and restoration of status quo ante is decided, no injury is caused to the public interest of sports. The Supreme Court has also shown its concern to the state of affairs of the Indian Olympic Association causing serious injury/damage to the interest of Sports. While it may be said that if it is found that no confidence resolution has not been adopted, the plaintiffs have a right for continuance of the status quo as it obtained before 15-6-1990 and if it is found that Sri Shukla has acquired an independent right to the office of the President of the Indian Olympic Association unaffected by the order/direction of the Court, then Sri Shukla has got a right to be the President of the Indian Olympic Association, these two conflicting interests have to be balanced with reference to the facts that may be found one way or the other. In our opinion, there shall be no injury of any kind to any of the parties to the proceeding including the plaintiffs or to Sri Shukla if all of them are asked to keep away from the Indian Olympic Association until the issue as to the grant of mandatory injunction ....