TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1952 (12) TMI 48
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.... it was also mentioned in the Under-Secretary's letter that "mutation of lands of the religious institutions belonging to the erstwhile Patiala State already stands in the name of institution itself under the mohtamimship of Mahants". The Deputy Commissioner forwarded the Under Secretary's letter to the Tehsildar Nabha for necessary action and when it got to the hands of the Patwari in due course he prepared two mutations; by virtue of the one, No. 1152 of 1951, 197 bighas. 10 biswas of land which previously stood in the revenue papers in the name of Amar Dass disciple of Jai Ram Das Sadhu Udasi of Nabha was mutated in the name of Dera Bawa Gursaran Dass and by virtue of the other, No. 1151 1951, 127 bighas 1 Biswa of land which previously stood in the name of Hari Dass disciple of Bawa Narain Dass Sadhu of Nabha was mutated in the name of Dera Sat Sahdia. The patwari's reports on the basis of which the mutations were prepared in both cases were that the changes in the entries were being made in obedience to the Government's Orders and the Tehsildar while sanctioning the mutations also observed that he did so because of the Home Department Order of 10-2-19....
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....ained, that no application for issue of any kind of writ could be made by the Petitioners, because if they were really the owners of the lands and their names had been wrongly removed from the revenue papers they could institute suits in a civil Court for the establishment of their title and right. They further maintained that action has been taken by the Government in exercise of jurisdiction vested in them by law and accordingly there is no occasion for issue of a writ. 5. In order to determine whether the Government were within their rights in issuing directions that they gave to the Deputy Commissioner and whether the Patwari and the Tehsildar were competent, the former to enter and the latter to sanction the mutation, we shall have to start with the Farman-i-Shahi. The words of the Farman go to show that it was made on a petition submitted to the Ijlas-i-Khas regarding the appointment, status and rights of Mahants of the deras and religious institutions. The first part of the Parman is to the effect that recommendations made in the petition are accepted and directions should be issued that in future no land or muafi should be entered in the name of a nuihunt before his appoin....
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....e managers or karkuns or at least they would have been described as mahants. In any case the entries in the revenue papers as they stood before the mutations were sanctioned could give no indication that the lands were not the private properties of the Petitioners and before the Farman-i-Shahi could be applied to them, it was incumbent upon the revenue authorities to hold a sort of enquiry and to satisfy themselves that the lands pertained to or were attached to the deras. It may be mentioned that the law regarding the variations of entries in the revenue records is contained in Section 37, Land Revenue Act. The section says Entries in records-of-rights ,or in annual records, except entries made in annual records by patwaris under Clause (a) of Section 35 with respect to undisputed acquisitions of interest referred to in that section, shall not be varied in subsequent' records otherwise than by (a) making entries in accordance with facts proved or admitted to have occurred; (b) making such entries as are agreed to by all the parties interested therein or are supported by a decree or order binding on those parties; (c) making new maps where it is necessary to make them. C....
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....s were illegal. 7. The question now is whether the removal of the Petitioners' names from the proprietary columns of the revenue: papers and the substitution in their places the names of the respective deras, has deprived them of a fundamental right. The Petitioners' counsel argued that Article 19 of the Constitution of India gives his clients the right inter alia to acquire, hold and dispose of property and this right has been taken away by the new mutations. The existence of the right to hold and dispose of the property cannot be denied and I also concede that this is a fundamental right, but I cannot understand how this right of the Petitioners has been violated. The revenue entries and the mutations by which the entries are varied, are no doubt evidences of title but they neither confer nor take away title. If the Petitioners were the owners of the lands in question they continued to be so in spite of the mutations. The only effect that the mutations will have upon the Petitioners' right of ownership is that if the matter goes to a civil Court and some one denies the Petitioners' title to the lands in question the onus to establish it will lie upon them, but I ....
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.... territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction in other respects they are very wide and go much beyond the powers of the High Courts of England and of those of Presidency High Courts before our country became independent. The words of the Article are: (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto & certiorari or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred on a High Court by Clause (1) shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by Clause (2) of Article 32. Now these words make it clear (i) that powers of the High Court are not confined to the issuing of high prerogative writs but extend to the issuing of all kinds of direction and orders and (ii) that writs and directions etc, can be issued not only for the enforcement of the funda....
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....pplicant must show some peculiar grievance of his own beyond the inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public. If the applicant is unable to show particular grievance of his own, the application would be refused. (II) The application should be refused where no legal injury has been caused to the applicant. -'Lady Dinbal Petit, v. M.S. Noronha' AIR 1945 Bora 419. Even if the proceedings which have given rise to an application for a writ, etc., are not in some respects in accord with law if no injustice has been done, no writ or direction would be issued. - 'Mahabaleswarappa v. Ramehandra Row' AIR 1936 Mad 669. (IV). The application may be refused if the applicant has been guilty of laches or delay. The question whether there has been an undue delay justifying refusal of writ depends upon the circumstances of each case. It was held in - 'Muthiah Chettiar v. Commr. of Income Tax, Madras' AIR 1951 Mad 204 that though there is no period of limitation as such prescribed for application for the issue of prerogative writs, long delay can be one of the grounds for refusing to grant an application for the issue of such writs. There may, however,....
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....tta, Madras and Bombay had powers under Section 45, Specific Relief Act, to make an order requiring any specific act to be done or forborne within the local limits of their respective ordinary original civil jurisdiction by any person holding a public office or by any corporation or inferior Court of jurisdiction but before a person could invoke that jurisdiction he had to satisfy the Court among other things that he had no other specific and adequate legal remedy. The powers conferred by Article 226 upon the High Courts, as mentioned above, are much wider than given to the three High Courts by, Section 45, Specific Relief Act. With all this almost all the High Courts are agreed that when it is shown that there is open to the applicant another remedy and that remedy is specific and adequate, an application under Article 226 does not lie. In my opinion this principle logically follows from those enunciated above. In addition there is a very good reason for it and it is this that if writs are issued indiscriminately and even in cases where the applicant can protect his right and can have his grievances redressed by taking advantage of any other remedy provided to him by law, it will....
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.... the redress of grievance and it was not a case in which extraordinary procedure of writ should be adopted. This is what the learned Judges observed: In the present case the applicant complains of the infringement of her fundamental right under Article 19(1)(i) to hold her property. While we do not go to the extent of saying that in all cases in which there is an infringement of a fundamental right a relief under Article 226 should be granted necessarily nevertheless we are of the opinion that we must sec in each case whether in the circumstances it would be more convenient, effectual and beneficial to grant relief by means of a writ than to ask the applicant to seek it by a regular suit. Then they dealt with the facts of the case and after pointing oat "that the Petitioner has been living in this city from 1943 onwards to pass her old age and widowhood in piety and with a view to continue to live here she built the house which has been requisitioned added "if she is asked to file a regular suit there is bound to be a great delay. She is an old lady & one does not know whether in her lifetime the case will be finally decided. She is already 65. No alternative suitable ....
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....olved, a decision, should be given by the Court on merits on an application under Article 226. There may be cases in which the existence of an alternative remedy may be ground for the rejection of the application. The circumstances of each case should be considered and thou a decision should be taken whether or not the discretion should be exercised. As regards the merits of that case the learned Judge remarked: "In the present case a general question of some public importance has been raised It is desirable that it should be speedily decided and the parties should not remain under suspense for a long time. On the determination of the question before us, the decision of the Petitioner and others of his class whether to continue in the present avocation or to take to some other will depend." In - 'V.N. Wanchoo v. Collector of Delhi' 54 Pun LR 206 in which notice had been issued to the Petitioner by the Collector of Delhi under Section 3(3), Delhi Premises (Requisition and Eviction) Act, 1947, it was held that the remedy of appeal granted by Section 5 of the Act was not an efficacious remedy and that the High Court should not refuse the right of hearing to the appl....