2009 (2) TMI 893
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....n appellant's colony). The reason stated was that as the membership process with appellant was getting delayed and he has purchased a plot in Green Park and as per Govt. Policy there are no chances of getting more than one plot in Delhi. On 9.5.1972 late Anoop Singh filed application for transfer of his membership in favor of his daughter, the respondent No. 2. On 18.11.1973, by a letter the appellant-society informed Anoop Singh that the Managing Committee by resolution dated 05.09.1973 allowed the transfer and asked for share certificate and other documents to enable transfer. On 12.10.1978, appellant-society requested Anoop Singh to file an affidavit which was questioned by respondent No. 2 by letter dated 27.10.1978. On 26.3.1979 Anoop Singh did not file the requisite affidavit and Administrator of appellant-society by letter informed that the transfer could not be confirmed unless affidavit is filed. On 14.4.1979 Anoop Singh replied stating that it is not possible to file the affidavit as he does not know full or part of lease hold or freehold of the property. On 29.5.1979 Administrator informed Anoop Singh of his inability to t....
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....t. It was held that the Registrar, Cooperative Society had no authority in law to sit over the affidavit and not to recommend the case for allotment to Jasjit Kaur. A direction was therefore given to the Registrar, Cooperative Societies to forthwith recommend the case of Jasjit Kaur for allotment of plot in Category `C' of 125 sq. yards. A Review Petition was filed inter-alia taking the stand that after Mr. Anoop Singh had asked for refund of money, and therefore, raising the question of any transfer in law did not arise. The review petition was rejected on the ground that no case for review was made out. 4. Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court has clearly lost sight of various provisions, more particularly, Rule 25 of the Delhi Co-operative Societies Rule, 1973 (in short the `Rules') framed under Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 1972 (in short the `Act'). It was pointed out that without availing the statutory remedies available under the Act and the Rules, the respondent No. 2 Jasjit Kaur filed a writ petition. Since disputed questions were involved, the High Court ought not to have interfered in the matter. According to....
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....housing society except otherwise permitted by the Registrar. 2. Notwithstanding anything contained in the rules or the bye-laws of the co-operative society, if a member becomes, or has already become, subject to any disqualification specified in Sub-rule (1), he shall be deemed to have ceased to be a member from the date when the disqualifications were incurred. 3. A member who ceases to be a member of a co-operative society under Sub-rule (2) shall not be entitled to exercise rights of memberships or incur liability as member with effect from the date referred to in Sub-rule (2) but as from the date he becomes a creditor of the co-operative society in respect of the amount due to him on account of paid up share capital, deposit, cost of land deposited or any other amount paid by him to the co operative society as its member. As from the date of his ceasing to be a member or the society under Sub-rule (2), the amount standing to his credit shall be paid to him by the co-operative society within 3 months and when the co-operative society is already under liquidation, the amount due to him will be credited as a debt due to a third party from the co-operative society....
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....tion of a word or phrase that would not otherwise prevail. Sometimes it is used to put beyond doubt a particular construction that might otherwise be uncertain. Sometimes it is used to give a comprehensive description that includes what is obvious, what is uncertain and what is, in the ordinary sense, impossible." Per Lord Radcliffe in St. Aubyn (L.M.) v. Attorney-General (No. 2) 1951 (2) All ER 473, All ER 498 F-G. 11. "Deemed", as used in statutory definitions is meant "to extend the denotation of the defined term to things it would not in ordinary parlance denote, is often a convenient devise for reducing the verbiage of an enactment, but that does not mean that wherever it is used it has that effect; to deem means simply to judge or reach a conclusion about something, and the words `deem' and `deemed' when used in a statute thus simply state the effect or meaning which some matter or thing has - the way in which it is to be adjudged; this need not import artificiality or fiction; it may simply be the statement of an undisputable conclusion." Per Windener, J. in Hunter Douglas Australia Pty. v. Perma Blinds 1970 (44) A LJ 257. 12. When a thing is to be "deemed" ....
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