2008 (5) TMI 726
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....s to which the State Government or a Public Undertaking (wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the State Government), is a party, and for matters incidental thereto or connected therewith. The Arbitral Tribunal is constituted in terms of Section 3 of the Act for resolving all disputes and differences pertaining to works contract or arising out of or connected with execution, discharge or satisfaction of any such works contract. Section 7 provides for reference to Tribunal. Such reference may be made irrespective of the fact as to whether the agreement contains an arbitration clause or not. Section 7-A provides for the particulars on the basis whereof the reference petition is to be filed. Section 7-B provides for limitation for filing an application, which is in the following terms: -B. Limitation.- (1) The Tribunal shall not admit a reference petition unless - (a) the dispute is first referred for the decision of the final authority under the terms of the works contract; and (b) the petition to the Tribunal is made within one year from the date of communication of the decision of the final authority: Provided that if the final authority fails to decide the disput....
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....certaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this sub-section. 5. We may notice that the proviso thereto had been appended by the M.P. Act No. 19 of 2005. 6. The State of M.P. filed a revision application before the High Court. It was barred by 80 days. 7. A question as to whether the High Court could have condoned the delay or not came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the said Court in Nagarpalika Parishad, Morena v. Agrawal Construction Co. 2004 (II) MPJR 374. It was held therein that the provisions of Section 5 of the 1963 Act being not available, the delay cannot be condoned. 8. Reference was thereafter made to a Full Bench in the light of the decision rendered by this Court in Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker AIR1995SC2272 . In the meantime the decision in Nagar Palika Parishad, Morena (supra) came up for consideration before this Court. The decision of the Division Bench was affirmed by this Court stating: Heard Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioner at length. In our view there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment. The authority in the case of Nasiruddin and Ors. v....
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....d upon the High Court is akin to Section 115 of the Code of civil Procedure. It has the power to decide as to whether the Tribunal has misconducted itself or the proceedings or has made an award which is invalid in law or has been improperly procured by any party to the proceedings. 14. As noticed here to before the proviso appended to Section 19 was added by M.P. Act No. 19 of 2005. Prior thereto the High Court, even at the instance of a party, despite expiry of the period of limitation could have exercised its suo motu jurisdiction. 15. It is a trite law that provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to a Court. It has no application in regard to a Tribunal or personal designata. There exists a distinction between a Court and the Tribunal. 16. The very fact that the authorities under the Act are empowered to examine witnesses after administering oath to them clearly shows that they are 'Court' within the meaning of the Evidence Act. It is relevant to refer to the definition of 'Court' as contained in Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act which reads as follows: 'Court' includes all Judges and Magistrates, and all persons, except arbitrators, l....
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....y him must be in the nature of a civil suit: (b) the procedure for determination of such dispute must be judicial procedure ; and (c) the decision must be a binding nature. The aforementioned judgment has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Coop. Bank Ltd. 1967CriLJ1380a In Chandra Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar, a Division Bench of the Patna High Court has held the Compensation Officer acting under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, to be a court as the said officer exercises judicial power deciding civil dispute and pass an order which is final and binding between the parties. In S.K. Sarkar, Member, Board of Revenue, U. P., Lucknow v. Vinoy Chandra Misra 1981CriLJ283 the Board of Revenue has been held to be a court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of the provisions of the Contempt of Court Act. 19. However, in The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. The Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi (1950)NULLLLJ921SC it has been held that a 'Labour Court' although has all the trappings of the Court but still is not a court in technical sense. In Sakuru v. Tanaji 1985(22)ELT327(SC) , the Supreme Court has ....
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.... In this even other citizens may appear in the interest of public. In administrative adjudication, normally the decisions are final and there is a much greater scope for arbitrary decisions of the adjudicators. The administrative adjudicators may pass even cryptic non speaking orders. This is not so normally in case of Tribunals unless the law incorporating them may provide. The Tribunals are not bound by any such law and need to follow only the principles of Natural Justice. These have to apply the special policy and thus cannot view things with that `Cold neutrality of the impartial judge' (Schwarts in American Administrative Law. P. 61) Dr. Durga Das Basu in his Administrative Law, Second Edition, at page 280 has also given broad features which characterise a `Court'. However, this broad distinction may not be held to be applicable as how in India apart from the Administrative Tribunals pure and simple as in the United Kingdom or the United States of America, various special Tribunals are being constituted, and that although they are not regular `courts' and have judicial authorities but have all the trappings of the Court. The number of such Tribunals....
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....ys of deciding disputes outside the ordinary courts. It is not possible to define precisely what bodies constitute the "ordinary courts" although this expression was used in the Tribunals and Inquiries Acts 1958 and 1971. There are some bodies that might be placed under the heading either of ordinary courts or of special tribunals. Guidance cannot be found in the name of a body; the Employment Appeal Tribunal, for example, is a superior court of record. At page 576 under the Chapter "Special Tribunals" the author has stated as follows: These are independent statutory tribunals whose function is judicial. They are often called "administrative tribunals" especially those more closely related by appointment or policy to the Minister concerned, because the reasons for creating them are administrative. The tribunals are so varied in composition, method of appointment, functions and procedure, and in their relation to Ministers on the one hand and the ordinary courts on the other, that a satisfactory formal classification is impossible. It, therefore, in my opinion, logically follows that the tribunal, although not a law court in its true sense but is a....
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....etition could have been presented to the Registrar on Saturday, March 18, 1972, the question would be, does Section 5 of the Limitation Act apply to enable the petitioner to show sufficient cause for not filing it on the last day of limitation, but on a subsequent day? Whether Section 5 is applicable to election petitions filed under Section 81 of the Act will depend upon the terms of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Whether Section 5 could be invoked would also depend on the applicability of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act to election petitions. Under this sub-section where a special or local law provides for any suit, appeal or application a period different from the period prescribed therefore by the Schedule, the provisions specified therein will apply only insofar as and to the extent to which they are expressly excluded by such special or local law. Under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act of 1908 as amended in 1922, only Section 4, Sections 9 to 18 and Section 22 of that Act applied ordinarily unless excluded by a special or local law. Thus unless Section 5 was made applicable by or under any enactment the discretion of the Court to extend time there....
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....ny period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. 25. There cannot, therefore, any doubt whatsoever that if the Arbitral Tribunal in question is a Court and not a personal designate, Sub-section (2) of Section 29, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply. It is only when the limitation provided under the Special Law, is different from that prescribed in the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, Sub-section (2) of Section 29 would be attracted. 26. In Mukri Gopalan (supra) the distinction between the `Personal Designata' and `Court' was noticed. It was held that the appellate authority constituted under Section 18 of the Rent Act was a Court having all the trappings of the Courts. 27. If the Tribunal is a Court, fortiori Sub-section (2) of Section 29 would apply. As it is a Court it was not necessary for the legislature to confer power under Section 5 of the 1963 Act specifically. In that view of matter an application under Section 5 of the Lim....
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.... applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matter of deposit of rent. The said question came up for consideration in the light of the power of the Rent Controller in terms of the Rent Control Statute in the matter of depositing the rent. In other words the question was that the provision was directory or mandatory. It was in that view of the matter this Court opined :- 45. On perusal of the said section it is evident that the question of application of Section 5 would arise where any appeal or any application may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making the appeal or application within such period. Section 13(4) provides that in a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1), the tenant shall on the first date of hearing or on or before such date, the court may on the application fixed in this behalf or within such time the tenant shall deposit in court or pay to the landlord in court as determined under Sub-section (3) from the date of such determination or within such further time not exceeding three months as may be extended by the court....
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