TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2007 (2) TMI 693
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....ular the field staff thereof. The Commissioner of Revenue Department was conferred with a power of being the cadre controlling authority for non-ministerial post of the Revenue Department. He was also to be the Chairman of the Departmental Promotion Committee for non-ministerial post of the Revenue Department. 4. The Commissioner allegedly made certain appointments in the posts of Mandols, Process-Servers and Zilladars which was not within the knowledge of the State. The said appointments were made on temporary basis. Appointments were made on 11.09.1997, 22.11.1997 and 5.12.1997. A sample copy of the offer of appointment reads as under: No/ 1/14/97 - Com (Rev) : On the recommendation of D.P.C. and under the directives issued by the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court, the following persons are hereby appointed as Mandols on temporary basis in the scale of pay of Rs. 950-20-1150-EB-25-1400/- per month with usual allowances against thereto existing clear vacancies of Mandals under Revenue Department from the date of their joining on duties. 2. Further, they are posted at the places indicate against their names: * * * 3. The expenditure is debitable under Appropriate Heads of Acc....
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....re cancelled by an order dated 17.02.1998. A corrigendum thereto was, however, issued on 21.02.1998 stating: No. 2/15/93-Com(Rev) Temp-I: Please read as "August/97" in place of "October/97" occurring in the 4th line of this Government order No. 2/15/93-Com(Rev) Temp-I dated 17-2-1998. In Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 19375-19376 of 2005, the respondents were appointed on ad hoc basis for a period of six months. Their appointments were also cancelled on similar grounds. 7. The respondents herein filed writ petitions before the High Court on 4.06.1998 questioning the said order of cancellation of their appointments. The said Shri Tayeng retired on 28.02.1998. Despite the fact that he, in his UO Note dated 12.02.1998 addressed to the Minister of Revenue, denied to have made any appointment, when approached by the writ petitioners -respondents, he affirmed in their support an affidavit in the High Court stating: 3. That, while I was functioning as Revenue Commissioner, Manipur, matters relating to appointment on the recommendation of the D.P.C., transfer etc. were put-up to me in files and I used to pass order on the basis of facts presented to me in file. I also issued....
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....th law and pass necessary order after affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to them. (iii) So far as the matter relating to Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 19375-19376 of 2005 is concerned, it was directed that as the appointment of the respondents were made for a period of six months, the employees were only entitled to the salary for the said period. The writ appeals preferred there against by the appellants herein were dismissed. 9. Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, would submit that the High Court went wrong in passing the impugned judgment insofar as it failed to take into consideration that in a case of this nature it was not necessary to comply with the principles of natural justice. Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Ors. v. Ajay Kumar Das and Ors. (2002)IILLJ1057SC . It was argued that the question, as to whether appointments were made without the knowledge of the Department or for that matter whether any record was available therefore was of not much significance as in effect and substance they lead to the same inference and in that view of the matter, the ....
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....y were not issued by any authority competent therefore. 13. If the offers of appointments issued in favour of the respondents herein were forged documents, the State could not have been compelled to pay salaries to them from the State exchequer. Any action, which had not been taken by an authority competent therefore and in complete violation of the constitutional and legal framework, would not be binding on the State. In any event, having regard to the fact that the said authority himself had denied to have issued a letter, there was no reason for the State not to act pursuant thereto or in furtherance thereof. The action of the State did not, thus, lack bona fide. Moreover, it was for the respondents who had filed the writ petitions to prove existence of legal right in their favour. They had inter alia prayed for issuance of a writ of or in the nature of mandamus. It was, thus, for them to establish existence of a legal right, in their favour and a corresponding legal duty in the respondents to continue to be employed. With a view to establish their legal rights to enable the High Court to issue a writ of mandamus, the respondents were obligated to establish that the appointment....
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.... to continuance of the Law Officers. The question which arose herein was not raised. It was held: 34. In our opinion, the wide sweep of Article 14 undoubtedly takes within its fold the impugned circular issued by the State of U.P. in exercise of its executive power, irrespective of the precise nature of appointment of the Government Counsel in the districts and the other rights, contractual or statutory, which the appointees may have. It is for this reason that we base our decision on the ground that independent of any statutory right, available to the appointees, and assuming for the purpose of this case that the rights flow only from the contract of appointment, the impugned circular, issued in exercise of the executive power of the State, must satisfy Article 14 of the Constitution and if it is shown to be arbitrary, it must be struck down. However, we have referred to certain provisions relating to initial appointment, termination or renewal of tenure to indicate that the action is controlled at least by settled guidelines, followed by the State of U.P., for a long time. This too is relevant for deciding the question of arbitrariness alleged in the present case. 35. It is n....
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.... him in discharge of the work. His work is also subject to strict supervision. The shortcomings in the work are required to be brought to the notice of the Legal Remembrancer. It will thus be seen that the appointment of the two sets of officers, viz.; the Government Counsel in the High Court with whom we are concerned, and the District Government Counsel with whom the said decision was concerned, are made by dissimilar procedures. The latter are not appointed as a part of the spoils system. Having been selected on merit and for no other consideration, they are entitled to continue in their office for the period of the contract of their engagement and they can be removed only for valid reasons. The people are interested in their continuance for the period of their contracts and in their non-substitution by those who may come in through the spoils system. It is in these circumstances that this Court held that the wholesale termination of their services was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The ratio of the said decision can hardly be applied to the appointments of the law officers in the High Court whose appointment itself was arbitrary and was made in disre....
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.... of Canada (see 1975 PL, pp. 27-63) contending that Malloch and Glynn were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn., 1996, p. 323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn., p. 596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-making authority, de Smith (5th Edn., 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn., 1994, pp. 526-30) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those, relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a real likelihood of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of their discretion, r....