TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1984 (12) TMI 333
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....of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Gulbarga, claiming compensation. 3. By the present petition she seeks to invoke the general power of transfer of the High Court under S. 24 C.P.C for the transfer of her case from the Tribunal at Gulbarga, to the Tribunal at Bangalore Metropolitan area. The ground urged is that she is a chronic patient suffering from Hypoglycemia and Low-Blood-Pressure and Vertigo; that she often suffers "bouts of depression" and that in her present physical condition she is unable to stand the 400 mile journey to Gulbarga. First-respondent is the owner of the vehicle and second-respondent is the insurer. The former though served, is unrepresented. The Insurer, however, is represented by its learned counsel Sri Sowri Raju. 4. We have heard Sri S. P. Shankar and Sri V. Tarakaram, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Sowri Raju, learned counsel for respondent-2. 4A. The controversy is not whether there are grounds to grant the petitioner's prayer; but one of its permissibility in law. The contention is that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, constituted under S. 110 of the Act, is not a "Court", subordinate to the High Court ....
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.... but the converse need not necessarily be true. Their procedures may differ, but their functions are not necessarily, different. "What distinguishes them" it is said, "has never been established". Lord Stanp said that the real distinction is that the Courts have an air of detachment". But this is "more a matter of age and traditions and not of the essence". Essentially both a 'Court' and a judicial 'Tribunal' must share the characteristics and qualities arising out of the entrustment of the "judicial power". "Judicial power" in the words of Griffith C.J. in Huddart, Parker Pty. Ltd. v. Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330 (Aus) is: " ...... the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some Tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action." The distinction between a 'Court' and a judicial Tribunal is referred to by....
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....gly, it has maintained a distinction between a Civil Court and a Claims Tribunal and wherever the jurisdiction is given to a Claims Tribunal, Civil Court's jurisdiction is ousted and wherever jurisdiction is left with the Civil Court, jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal to that extent is barred. Therefore, there is a definite indication in the Act itself for, holding that Claims Tribunal constituted under the Act is a Tribunal having special jurisdiction and it cannot be regarded to be a Civil Court ............" "7.6. Thus, it is clear that merely because, an authority or a body is entrusted with the judicial powers and functions of the State and is having some of the attributes of a Civil Court by itself will not be a determining factor to hold that such a body or authority is a Court, in the strict sense of the term failing within the hierarchy of courts established under the Constitution .........." 7. However, it appears to us, the distinction between the concept of a "Court" and of a "Tribunal", neither term having been a defined one, does not purely turn on the basis of the exclusiveness of their jurisdictions. References to and the ....
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....rt of District Judge is eminently arguable. In Balakishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar, Air 1917 AIR 1917 PC 71, the Judicial Committee observed : "It appears to their Lordships to be clear that in all these matters the Civil Court exercises its powers as a Court of Law, not merely as a persona designata whose determinations are not to be treated as judgments of a legal Tribunal: ........." 9. It is not necessary to refer to the differing views to the High Courts on the point. We have now the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Bhagwati Devi v. 1. S. Goel 1983 ACJ 123 which imparts an altogether new complexion to the problem and puts the point beyond controversy. In this decision, Supreme Court referred to its earlier pronouncement in Darshan Devi's case [1979]3SCR184 which arose out of the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Smt. Darshana Devi v. Sher Singh AIR 1978 P&H 265. The question before the High Court in that case was whether a claimant before the Tribunal constituted under S. 110 of the 'Act' is entitled to the benefit of 0.33 R.I C.P.C. The Tribunal had, in that case, negatived this claim holding that 0. 33, C.P.C. was not one of those p....
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.... outside the pale of controversy. The matter arose in the context of the power of the Supreme Court: under S. 25 to transfer suits and other proceedings, inter alia, from one "Civil Court" in one State to the other "Civil Court" in any, other State. There is no distinction in the concept of a Court between S. 24 and S. 25 C.P.C; However, the requirement of the element of subordination envisaged in S. 24 so as to render the power under S. 24 exercisable, is, understandably, not in S. 25. If, for purposes of S. 25 a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a "Civil Court", it follows, a, fortiori, that the Tribunal is a "Court", for the purpose of S. 24 as well. It is in this context that the pronouncement in Bhagwati Devi's" case is instructive on the aspect now under consideration. Supreme Court said: "In view of the observations of this Court in State of Haryana v. Dharshan Devi, we are of the view that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under the A V. Act is a Civil Court for the purposes of S. 25 of the Civil P.C. We are satisfied that the cases before us are fit cases for being transferred from the file of the Motor....
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.... to the High Court. There can be no category of "Civil Courts" which are not subordinate to the High Court in relation to the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Court has appellate jurisdiction over the Tribunals also. In T. V. Subba Rao v. T. Koteswara. Rao, AIR1963AP37 , referring to the subordination of courts to the High Court it was observed (at pp. 40-41): "13 ...... that the High Court of a State exercising jurisdiction over the territory of the State is the highest court in that State and all other Courts exercising civil jurisdiction as contemplated by the Civil P.C. are subordinate to the High Court, and hence the employment of the expression 'any Court subordinate to such High Court' is not intended to refer to a special category of Courts which alone can be regarded as subordinate and recognise another category of Courts within the territory in which the High Court exercises jurisdiction which are not subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court ................" xxx xxx xxx " .......... Hence every Court exercising jurisdiction within the territorial limits over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction is s....