TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1984 (12) TMI 333
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....he file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Gulbarga, claiming compensation. 3. By the present petition she seeks to invoke the general power of transfer of the High Court under S. 24 C.P.C for the transfer of her case from the Tribunal at Gulbarga, to the Tribunal at Bangalore Metropolitan area. The ground urged is that she is a chronic patient suffering from Hypoglycemia and Low-Blood-Pressure and Vertigo; that she often suffers "bouts of depression" and that in her present physical condition she is unable to stand the 400 mile journey to Gulbarga. First-respondent is the owner of the vehicle and second-respondent is the insurer. The former though served, is unrepresented. The Insurer, however, is represented by its learned counsel Sri Sowri Raju. 4. We have heard Sri S. P. Shankar and Sri V. Tarakaram, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Sowri Raju, learned counsel for respondent-2. 4A. The controversy is not whether there are grounds to grant the petitioner's prayer; but one of its permissibility in law. The contention is that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, constituted under S. 110 of the Act, is not a "Court", subordinate to the High Court with....
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....is said, "has never been established". Lord Stanp said that the real distinction is that the Courts have an air of detachment". But this is "more a matter of age and traditions and not of the essence". Essentially both a 'Court' and a judicial 'Tribunal' must share the characteristics and qualities arising out of the entrustment of the "judicial power". "Judicial power" in the words of Griffith C.J. in Huddart, Parker Pty. Ltd. v. Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330 (Aus) is: " ...... the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some Tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action." The distinction between a 'Court' and a judicial Tribunal is referred to by Lord Sankey L.C. in Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1931) AC 275 (296), thus: "The authorities are clear to show that there are Tribunals with many of the trappings of a Cour....
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....urt, jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal to that extent is barred. Therefore, there is a definite indication in the Act itself for, holding that Claims Tribunal constituted under the Act is a Tribunal having special jurisdiction and it cannot be regarded to be a Civil Court ............" "7.6. Thus, it is clear that merely because, an authority or a body is entrusted with the judicial powers and functions of the State and is having some of the attributes of a Civil Court by itself will not be a determining factor to hold that such a body or authority is a Court, in the strict sense of the term failing within the hierarchy of courts established under the Constitution .........." 7. However, it appears to us, the distinction between the concept of a "Court" and of a "Tribunal", neither term having been a defined one, does not purely turn on the basis of the exclusiveness of their jurisdictions. References to and the recognition of "Civil Courts" in the statute need not necessarily detract from the adjudicatory forum set-up by the statute being, itself, a "Court". Indeed in Rajah Nilmoni Singh Deo Bahadoor v. Taranath Mookerjee (1881) 9 Ind App 174 (PC) the question was wh....
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....s are not to be treated as judgments of a legal Tribunal: ........." 9. It is not necessary to refer to the differing views to the High Courts on the point. We have now the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Bhagwati Devi v. 1. S. Goel 1983 ACJ 123 which imparts an altogether new complexion to the problem and puts the point beyond controversy. In this decision, Supreme Court referred to its earlier pronouncement in Darshan Devi's case [1979]3SCR184 which arose out of the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Smt. Darshana Devi v. Sher Singh AIR 1978 P&H 265. The question before the High Court in that case was whether a claimant before the Tribunal constituted under S. 110 of the 'Act' is entitled to the benefit of 0.33 R.I C.P.C. The Tribunal had, in that case, negatived this claim holding that 0. 33, C.P.C. was not one of those provisions which had expressly been made applicable by the Punjab Motor Accidents Claims Rules, 1964. In support of its view the Tribunal had relied upon an earlier opinion expressed by Dua, J. that S.110-C of the M.V.Act by no means clothed the Tribunal with all the characteristics of a Civil Court. But in Darshana Devi's cas....
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....S. 25 C.P.C; However, the requirement of the element of subordination envisaged in S. 24 so as to render the power under S. 24 exercisable, is, understandably, not in S. 25. If, for purposes of S. 25 a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a "Civil Court", it follows, a, fortiori, that the Tribunal is a "Court", for the purpose of S. 24 as well. It is in this context that the pronouncement in Bhagwati Devi's" case is instructive on the aspect now under consideration. Supreme Court said: "In view of the observations of this Court in State of Haryana v. Dharshan Devi, we are of the view that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under the A V. Act is a Civil Court for the purposes of S. 25 of the Civil P.C. We are satisfied that the cases before us are fit cases for being transferred from the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Moradabad to the file of the Motor Accident's J Claims Tribunal, Delhi ..............." This pronouncement of the Supreme Court, should now serve to put the controversy at rest. In view of this pronouncement, the view taken in State of Karnataka v. Subbanna AIR 1974 Kant 109 and in Revanappas case AIR 983 Kant 164 that such ....
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....ourt of a State exercising jurisdiction over the territory of the State is the highest court in that State and all other Courts exercising civil jurisdiction as contemplated by the Civil P.C. are subordinate to the High Court, and hence the employment of the expression 'any Court subordinate to such High Court' is not intended to refer to a special category of Courts which alone can be regarded as subordinate and recognise another category of Courts within the territory in which the High Court exercises jurisdiction which are not subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court ................" xxx xxx xxx " .......... Hence every Court exercising jurisdiction within the territorial limits over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction is subordinate to the High Court. It is subordinate to the High Court if it is exercising its criminal jurisdiction on its criminal side. It is subordinate to the High Court on the civil side if the Court or Tribunal is exercising jurisdiction on its civil side, so that any Civil Court exercising civil functions is a Court subordinate to the High Court ............." The observations of the Supreme Court in Thakur Das cas....