TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2012 (1) TMI 340
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.... 05.03.2010 was issued for auction of leasehold rights to conduct sand quarry operations in respect of Amaravathi sand reach. The notification listed six ramps, i.e., (1) Vykunthapuram, (2) Amaravathi, (3) Dharanikota, (4) Didugu, (5) Malladi and (6) Munugodu, as the notified ramps to be utilized by the auction purchaser. In the auction, the Society was declared as the highest bidder for one year commencing from 01.04.2010. A lease agreement, as stipulated under Rule 9-I of the Rules, was entered into between the Society and the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur. The said lease agreement dated 31.03.2010 detailed the limits of the Amaravathi reach as the revenue limits of Amaravathi Mandal. The River Conservator-cum-Executive Engineer, Krishna Central Division, Vijayawada, vide letter dated 29.01.2010 addressed to the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur, permitted use of the aforementioned six ramps. Subsequently, vide proceedings dated 13.04.2010, the River Conservator informed the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur that he had no objection, and was according permission, for utilizing the existing ramps for transportation of sand which includ....
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....ur District, the route for transport was through Krishna District; the public representatives in Krishna District had objected as the ramps would be used for illegal quarrying in the sand reaches in Krishna District; use of these ramps would result in damage of roads, pollution and other problems in Krishna District; and the local bodies would not be getting part of the seniorage fee. The River Conservator was instructed to withdraw the ramp permission until fool-proof mechanism for controlling illegal sand quarrying, and revenue sharing, was worked out by the District Level Committee. 5. The River Conservator, vide letter dated 01.06.2010, informed the Joint Collector-cum-Chairman, District Level Sand Committee, Krishna that the Vigilance and Enforcement authorities had inspected the sand bearing areas of Guntur, and had found six proclains which were handed over to the Tahsildar, Amaravathi. He opined that sand quarrying by the lease holder was in violation of the River Conservancy Act, and the permission of three additional ramps in Krishna District granted to the lessee was required to be withdrawn as the lease holder had violated the terms and conditions of the River Conser....
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....Assistant Director of Mines and Geology having territorial jurisdiction over the ramps either existing or new; and he alone was competent to exercise discretion to issue permission in terms of Rule 9-N of the Rules. Consequent thereto the Principal Secretary called upon the Society, vide memo No.9337/SPIU & SAND/2011-2 dated 20.06.2011, to show cause within ten days why the Government, in exercise of its powers of suo motu revision under Rule 35-A, should not cancel the earlier order of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur vide letter dated 01.05.2010 permitting the Society to use the additional ramps located on the left bank of the Krishna river falling in the limits of Krishna District which was within the territorial jurisdiction of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Nandigama. By memo No.9337/SPIU & SAND/2011-3 dated 20.06.2011 the Principal Secretary requested the Director of Mines and Geology to consider if orders under Rule 11(2)(c) need to be issued at his level regulating quarrying operations of the Society, and to ensure that the Society did not transport sand through the three additional ramps located in Krishna District. 8. By proceedings No.....
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....n W.P. No.12239 of 2010 dated 02.06.2010), W.P. No.14473 of 2010, W.P. No. 13182 of 2010, W.P. No.11943 of 2010 and W.P. No.11009 of 2010 before the Division Bench and, by order dated 23.11.2010, the Division Bench directed deletion of W.P. No.25583 of 2010 from the batch of cases and for listing the said Writ Petition before the single judge on 24.11.2010. 13. W.P. No.25583 of 2010 and W.P.No.1708 of 2011 were heard by this Court in the last week of April, 2011 and, at the request of the Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Society, were posted after summer vacation. On 08.07.2011 it was brought to the notice of this Court that the Society had filed W.P. Nos.17915, 17922 and 17930 of 2011 and that interim orders had been passed therein. On being informed that vacate stay petitions had already been filed, the Registry was asked to place the matter before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders for listing of all the five Writ Petitions before the appropriate Bench. The Hon'ble the Chief Justice, by proceedings dated 27.07.2011, directed all the five Writ Petitions to be listed before this Court. 14. The Chief Justice is the master of the rost....
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....d territorial jurisdiction of officials were clearly demarcated therein; the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Nandigama, Krishna District is the concerned Assistant Director as these three additional ramps were located within his territorial jurisdiction in Krishna District; and the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur lacks jurisdiction, under Rule 9-N read with Rule 4(a) of the Rules, to permit use of additional ramps located in Krishna District. 18. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that granting permission to use new ramps was different from granting permission for use of existing ramps as additional ramps; Poppuru, Chevitikallu and Kunikinapadu were existing notified ramps and not new ramps; Rule 9-N postulates that new ramps could be permitted for transportation of sand from the quarry, and the same should be within the leased area; if the construction placed by the Society on Rule 9-N is accepted it would mean that the MRO, Amaravathi in Guntur District could certify in respect of reaches and ramps notified in Krishna District also, and not the MRO, Chandarlapadu Mandal, Krishna District; such a construction could not be accepte....
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....It is thus evident that the source for quarrying of sand is divided reach/mandal-wise both of which fall within a District. 20. Since the question which arises for consideration is whether Rule 9-N confers power on the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology of a particular District to permit use of existing ramps located in another District, it is necessary to examine the scope and ambit of Rule 9-N. 21. Rule 9-N relates to the use of authorized ramps and requires the lessee to make use of authorized ramps and paths only for transportation of sand from the quarry, and not open any new ramps or paths. The said Rule, however, enables the concerned Assistant Director of Mines & Geology to permit new ramps only with the consent of the concerned Mandal Revenue Officer in case of government lands, and the River Conservator where the River Conservancy Act applies and in case of patta lands with the consent of the pattadar duly verifying the claims supported by certification issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer concerned. 22. Rule 9-N is in two parts. The first part again contains two limbs. The first limb requires the lessee to make use of only the authorized ramps and paths for....
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.... new ramps by the lessee. In other words the lessee can begin laying a fresh slope or incline, for transportation of the sand quarried by him, only with the permission of the concerned Assistant Director of Mines and Geology. If the new ramps are to be laid or formed over government lands, Rule 9-N requires the lessee to obtain the consent of the concerned Mandal Revenue Officer and, in case the new slope or incline is to be laid on patta lands, the consent of the pattadar is required to be obtained. The stipulation of certification by the Mandal Revenue Officer concerned is only to enable him to ascertain and satisfy himself whether the area, where the slope or incline is to be laid or the new ramp is to be formed, is on government land or on patta land. It is only the Mandal Revenue Officer in charge of the area, where the new ramps are to be opened, who would be in a position to determine whether the ramps in question are sought to be laid on government lands or patta lands. Existing ramps, more so those which are notified/authorised ramps for other reaches, would not constitute "new" ramps. Neither Rule 9-N nor clause (xvii) of Form G-1 confer jurisdiction on the Assistant Dire....
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....ict, would become redundant for the Assistant Director incharge of the District, where the leased area is located, would alone be the concerned Assistant Director competent to exercise powers under different sub-rules of Rule 9. Such a construction would not only be contrary to the plain language of Rule 4(a), but would also require the definition of "Assistant Director" in Rule 4(a) to be read as the Assistant Director in charge of the area in relation to which the quarry lease is granted. 28.It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning. (Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra [7] ). The legislature may be safely presumed to have intended what the words plainly say. (Bhaiji v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla [8] ). What is to be borne in mind is what has been said in the statute and what has not been said. A construction which requires, for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words, has to be avoided. (Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested For....
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.... their own terms, ambivalent and do not manifest the intention of the legislature. (ITC Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi [24] ). A Statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. (Raghunath Rai Bareja v. Punjab National Bank [25] ; Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers [26] ). Statutory language must always be given presumptively the most natural and ordinary meaning which is appropriate in the circumstances, (Chertsey Urban District Council v. Mixnam's Properties Ltd [27] ), and must be construed according to the rules of grammar. In construing a statutory provision, the first and foremost rule of construction is the literal construction. If the provision is unambiguous and, if from that provision, the legislative intent is clear, the Court need not call into aid other rules of construction of statutes. (Raghunath Rai Bareja25; Hiralal Ratanlal v. STO [28]). A provision is not ambiguous merely because it contains a word which, in different contexts, is capable of different meanings. It would be hard to find anywhere a sentence of any length which does not contain suc....
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....n of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Krishna-II at Nandigama, Krishna District. Even if the words "new ramps" in Rule 9-N were presumed to bring within its ambit existing ramps also, the competent authority to grant permission under Rule 9-N, to use the three additional ramps located in Krishna District, would only be the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Nandigama, Krishna District as there are two Assistant Directors for Krishna District and the additional ramps are located in mandals which fall within the jurisdiction of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Nandigama. It is also evident that the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur lacks jurisdiction to grant permission for use of these additional three ramps. 33. It is relevant to note that, by notification dated 07.03.2008, the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Nandigama invited tenders for grant of lease for quarrying of sand in the sources mentioned in the schedule to the notification. The said notification includes Chevitikalli and Poppuru reaches. Subsequently, by proceedings dated 05.05.2009, the quarry lease for Chevitikallu was granted for excavation of ordinary sand from....
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....st sight of in this mindless pursuit of voluminous extraction of sand. By using the track on the river bed, instead of taking the circuitous route from Guntur to Krishna, the larger public interest, involved in protecting the River bed, has yielded to crass private commercial interests. 36. Ensuring strict compliance with the regulatory provisions of the A.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966, more particularly those relating to quarrying of sand in River beds, is in larger public interest. Excessive instream sand mining causes degradation of rivers. Instream mining lowers the stream bottom, which may lead to erosion of river banks. Depletion of sand in the streambed, and along coastal areas, causes the deepening of rivers and the enlargement of river mouths and coastal inlets. It may also lead to saline-water intrusion from the nearby sea. The effect of mining is compounded by the effect of sea level rise. Any volume of sand exported from streambeds and coastal areas is a loss to the system. Excessive instream sand mining is also a threat to bridges, river banks and nearby structures. Sand mining also affects the adjoining groundwater system and the uses that local people ma....
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....onance with law. The principle must be equally true even where the 'brand of invalidity' is plainly visible: for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the court. (Pune Municipal Corpn.36). If an order is void or ultra vires it is enough for the court to declare it so and it collapses automatically. The aggrieved party can simply seek a declaration that it is void and not binding upon him. A declaration merely declares the existing state of affairs and does not 'quash' so as to produce a new state of affairs. (Pune Municipal Corpn.36; State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh [38] ) . The impugned order of the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, dated 01.05.2010 is null and void and is declared as such. 39. The relief sought for in W.P. No.25583 of 2010 is to declare the action of the respondents in permitting the Society to use the additional ramps at Chevitikallu, Kunikinapadu and Poppuru, which are located beyond the leased area, and their failure to withdraw the permissions granted vide proceedings No.DB/JTO-4/457 dated 13.04.2010 as arbitrary and illegal. As noted herein above by proceedings dated 13.04.2010 the River Conservato....
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....Senior Counsel, would submit that W.P. No.12239 of 2010 came up for admission on 02.06.2010, and this Court dismissed the Writ Petition on the same day without a counter-affidavit being filed by the official respondents; this Court had no occasion to know the stand of the government on the construction of the aforesaid Rules; neither Rule 4(a), (which defines the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned Assistant Director of Mines and Geology), nor Rule 9-N, (which relates to grant of permission to open "new ramps"), was brought to the notice of the Court by the counsel therein; the said Rule was not interpreted by this Court in the said order/judgment; passing observations therein neither constitutes the ratio nor did it amount to laying down the law relating to jurisdiction/authority of the ADM&G, Guntur; and a general observation made, without interpreting the Rules, could not be treated as a precedent binding on a coordinate bench. Learned Senior counsel would submit that, in the present writ petition, the sole question was regarding the jurisdiction of the ADM&G, Guntur, and the clarification given by the Government in the impugned Memo; hence the scope and ambit and controve....
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....ingle judge cannot differ from a decision of a Division Bench except when that decision or a judgment relied upon in that decision is overruled by a Full Bench or the Supreme Court, or when the law laid down by a Full Bench or the Supreme Court is inconsistent with the decision. (B.R. Constructions40). 45. I n State of Bihar v. Kalika Kuer [45] the Supreme Court observed:- "......Whatever has been held or observed in the case of Ramkrit Singh1 may not appear to be correct or may seem to be against the provisions of the Act but that would not be a valid ground to hold that the earlier judgment was rendered per incuriam or that decision would not be binding on the Bench of a coordinate jurisdiction. ....... ......An earlier decision may seem to be incorrect to a Bench of a coordinate jurisdiction considering the question later, on the ground that a possible aspect of the matter was not considered or not raised before the court or more aspects should have been gone into by the court deciding the matter earlier but it would not be a reason to say that the decision was rendered per incuriam and liable to be ignored. The earlier judgment may seem to be not correct ye....
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.... of precedents as a matter of law. (Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd.,41). The Latin expression per incuriam means through inadvertence. A decision can be said generally to be given per incuriam when this Court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or when this Court has acted in ignorance of a decision of the Supreme Court. (Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd.39). 48. If, however, the provisions of the Act were noticed and considered before the conclusion was arrived at, the judgment cannot be ignored as being per incuriam merely on the ground that it has erroneously reached the conclusion. (B.R. Constructions40). The mere fact that the earlier Court misconstrued a statute, or ignored a rule of construction, is no ground for impugning the authority of the precedent. A precedent on the construction of a statute is as much binding as any other, and the fact that it was mistaken in its reasoning does not destroy its binding force. (B.R. Constructions40; Salmond on jurisprudence, Twelfth Edition, at page 151). Only because the conclusion arrived at, on construing the provisions of the Section, did not have the concurrence of the latter Bench, the earl....
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.... by permitting the Society in whose favour the lease had been granted to transport sand through the additional ramps situated in Krishna District, their interests were adversely affected. The petitioner contended that, as against the six ramps through which the Society was entitled to transport sand, the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur had granted permission for use of these additional ramps; and had they known that such a facility would be made available to a lessee after finalization of the tender process they would have offered more amounts. This Writ Petition was dismissed at the admission stage by order dated 02.06.2010 without either Rule Nisi being issued or a counter affidavit being filed by the official respondents. 51. It was brought to the notice of this Court, in W.P. No.12239 of 2010, that the additional ramps were situated in Krishna District, while the lease was granted in favour of the Society for quarrying sand in Amaravathi Mandal of Guntur District. Rule 4(a), which defines the "Assistant Director" to mean the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology incharge of the District, was not noticed in the said judgment. The conclusion arrived at by thi....
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.... been passed subsilentio. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement, having the weight of authority (Gurnam Kaur51; Bengal Club Ltd. v. Susanta Kumar Chowdhury [55] ). It is not everything said by a Judge, while giving judgment, that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio, and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case, or is put in issue, would constitute a precedent. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi. (Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi [56] ; State of Orissa v. Mohd. Illiyas [57]....
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....consequence in view of the declaration by this Court, in the present batch of Writ Petitions, that the impugned order of the Assistant Director of Mines Geology, Guntur dated 01.05.2010, in according permission for use of the additional ramps, is without jurisdiction, null and void. Once an order is declared to be a nullity, it ceases to have any effect and all that the authorities concerned are required to do is to ensure that the three additional ramps in Krishna District are not used by the Society for transportation of the sand extracted from the Amaravati Reach in Guntur District. 56. The conclusion that the impugned order of the Assistant Director of Mines & Geology, Guntur dated 01.05.2010 is without jurisdiction, null and void would suffice to dispose of this batch of Writ Petitions. I consider it appropriate, however, to examine the contentions urged by Sri E. Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the Society, in the four Writ Petitions filed by it questioning the various orders passed by the Government and the Director of Mines & Geology. D. IS THE CLARIFICATORY MEMO CONFERRING JURISDICTION ON THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF MINES, KRISHNA ULTRA VIRES RULE-N? 57....
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....n over any reach in Guntur District; the River Conservator is concerned about the safety of the river, its course and river bed, and exercises power under the A.P. (Andhra Area) River Conservancy Act, 1884; he has jurisdiction over both the left and right banks of the Krishna river, and at the KC Canal area etc; the power to permit opening of new ramps is conferred on the concerned Assistant Director of Mines and Geology having territorial jurisdiction under the Rules, with the consent of River Conservator who is concerned only with the course of the river, and the safety of the river banks; the impugned memo has been issued by way of a clarification explaining the jurisdiction of the concerned authority as per the Rule itself; the petitioners do not have any right much less a vested right to use additional notified ramps situated in different reaches, beyond the leased area and outside the jurisdiction of the concerned authority; the petitioners have a right to use the six ramps within Amaravathi Mandal limits which the impugned order does not nullify; if the claim of the petitioners is accepted, the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur (the concerned authority) could g....
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.... the competent Assistant Director of Mines and Geology is, has been issued by the Government only to implement the Rules it cannot be said to be ultravires Rule 9-K(3). 62. In M.V. Siva Prasad66 the issue which arose for consideration was regarding exercise of power by the Government in granting extension of lease to the lessees after expiry of the lease period. Since Rule 9-L postulated that extension of lease should not be granted under any circumstances the Division Bench held that the Government could not exercise power under Rule 9-K(3) of the Rules to extend the lease period. Reliance placed on the judgment of the Division Bench in M.V. Siva Prasad66 is, therefore, misplaced. 63. In Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.65, the Supreme Court held that while circulars or instructions are no doubt binding in law on the authorities under the Act, but when the Supreme Court or the High Court has declared the law on the question arising for consideration it will not be open to a Court to direct that a circular should be given effect to, and not the view expressed in a decision of the Supreme Court or the High Court. As the judgment of this Court in W.P. No.12239 of 2010 dated 02.06.2010....
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....d by Rules 55 and 56. Learned Senior Counsel would rely on MRF Ltd v. Manohar Parrikar [70] to contend that failure to comply with the Business Rules would render the impugned memo issued by the Government void abinitio, and all actions consequent thereto a nullity. 66. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that there are no pleadings in the writ petition regarding violation of Article 166 of the Constitution of India; without there being a challenge thereto, this Court should not permit the petitioners to raise such a contention; and any argument based on violation of Article 166 (3) was, therefore, liable to be rejected. It is no doubt true that foundational facts are required to be pleaded enabling the Court to scrutinise the nature and content of the right alleged to have been violated by the authority. (Raj Kumar Soni68). In the present batch of Writ Petitions, however, Counsel on either side have not strictly adhered to the pleadings, and documents which have not been filed earlier have been passed across the bar. I see no justification, therefore, not to examine these contentions. 67. Learned Additional Advocate General would submit that the clarifica....
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....the executive power of the State is vested, and it shall further be authenticated in the manner specified in the rules framed by the Governor. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166 are to be read together. While clause (1) relates to the mode of expression of an executive order or instrument, clause (2) lays down the way in which such order is to be authenticated, and when both these forms are complied with, an order or instrument would be immune from challenge in a court of law on the ground that it has not been made or executed by the Governor of the State. (Dattatraya Moreshwar v. State of Bombay [72] ; J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Company Limited v. King Emperor [73] ). 70. Non-compliance with the provisions of either clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166 would result in the order losing the protection which it would otherwise enjoy, had the proper mode for expression and authentication been adopted. It could be challenged in any Court of law even on the ground that it was not made by the Governor of the State and, in case of such challenge, the onus would be upon the State authorities to show affirmatively that the order was in fact made by the Governor in accordance with the rul....
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....d 20.06.2011 issued. 74. It is only if the case involves questions of policy or of administrative importance is the approval of the Chief Minister required to be obtained in terms of Rule 32(1)(d) of the A.P. Government Business Rules. It is, therefore, necessary to determine whether the clarificatory memo dated 20.06.2011 gives rise to a question of policy. Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition defines "policy" to mean the general principles by which a government is guided in its management of public affairs, or the legislature in its measures. A policy is typically described as a principle or rule to guide decisions and achieve rational outcome(s). Policy differs from rules or law. While law can compel or prohibit behavior, policy merely guides actions toward those that are most likely to achieve a desired outcome. "Policy" may also refer to the process of making important organizational decisions, including the identification of different alternatives such as programs or spending priorities, and choosing among them on the basis of the impact they will have. Policies can be understood as political, management, financial, and administrative mechanisms arranged to reach explicit g....
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....ld not result in the impugned clarificatory memo dated 20.06.2011 being rendered invalid as clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166 of the Constitution of India are merely directory and not mandatory. 78. It is no doubt true that the Supreme Court, in MRF Limited70, had held that the Rules, framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution, are in aid to fulfil the constitutional mandate embodied in Chapter II of Part VI of the Constitution; therefore the decision of the State Government must meet the requirement of these Rules also; the Business Rules framed under the provisions of Article 166(3) of the Constitution are mandatory, and must be strictly adhered to; any decision by the Government in breach of these Rules will be a nullity in the eye of the law; and as the impugned circular contravenes the requirements of Article 166 of the Constitution, it must be held to be null and void. 79. The scope of Article 166 of the Constitution of India was considered by a later three judge bench of the Supreme Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan71. Following its earlier judgments in Sampat Prakash v. The State of Jammu & Kashmir [78] ; State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari [79] ; State of U.P.....
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....y as the original six ramps could still be used by them; and the clarificatory orders issued by the respondents would not effect the leasehold rights vested in the society by virtue of the lease agreement. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that the impugned memo acts in presenti, and does not take away any vested right of the petitioners. 82. The problem concerning retrospectivity of enactments depends on events occurring over a period. If the enactment comes into force during a period it only operates on events occurring then. The presumption against retrospective legislation does not necessarily apply to an enactment merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. The fact that as from a future date tax is charged on a source of income which has been arranged or provided for before the date of imposition of the tax does not mean that a tax is retrospectively imposed. (Commrs. of Customs and Excise v. Thorn Electrical Industries Ltd [83] , Dilip v. Mohd. Azizul Haq [84] ). 83. The clarification issued by the Government on 20.6.2011 was in exercise of its powers under Rule 9-K(3). It is only there....
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.... could not claim infringement of their rights as the order of the Director of Mines and Geology was corrective in nature, and was issued in exercise of his powers under Rule 11(2)(c). 86. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that the words "regulate quarrying operations" in Rule 11(2)(c) must be held to comprehend within its meaning, transportation of quarried minerals; using additional existing ramps situated in other reaches on the left bank of the River in Krishna District limits outside the jurisdiction of Guntur District, is illegal and contrary to the law in force; the Director had the power to regulate quarry operations; transportation of sand, illegally quarried by using heavy machinery, from unauthorized notified ramps amounted to violation of the law; and, as such, the Director had the power to regulate it; a narrow meaning could not be given to the power to regulate quarrying operations according to the law in force; the word "regulate" includes transportation of quarried sand; quarrying and transportation are integral to each other, and cannot be separated; and accepting the contention of the Society would mean that both the Assistant Directors ....
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....s to make such grant effective. Such powers must carry with them, by necessary implication, all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make the exercise of those powers fully effective. It is the duty of the Judges to apply the laws, not only to what appears to be regulated by their express dispositions but to all the cases where a just application of them may be made, and which appear to be comprehended within the consequences that may be gathered from it. (I.T. Officer v. Mohd. Kunhi [85] ; Southland Statutory Construction, Third Edition, Articles 5401 and 5402; Domat's Civil Law, Cushing's Edition, Vol. 1 at page 88). 90. Accepting the contention of the Society that the Director is empowered under Rule 11(2)(c) only to prohibit actual extraction of sand, and not to stop utilization of the ramps, would render the third limb of Rule 11(2)(c) i.e., "to regulate quarrying operations according to law in force" redundant, and to be treated as inapposite surpplasage. As such a construction is impermissible, the Director of Mines & Geology must be held to have the power, under Rule 11(2)(c), to prevent any lessee from using the ramps for transportation of the quarried ....
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....f the villagers of Chevitikallu and Poppuru and their public representatives are considered and examined in detail with a view to ensuring that further damage was not caused to the Krishna River in terms of implementation of River Conservancy Act, 1884, he should consider whether orders under Rule 11(2)(c) needed to be issued at his level regulating the quarrying operations of the Society, and ensure that the Society did not transport sand through the three additional ramps located on the left bank of the Krishna River in Krishna District till a decision was taken by the Government on the show cause notice issued to the Society on 20.06.2011. 93. In his proceedings dated 20.06.2011 the Director took note of the Government memo requesting him to examine the issue and take necessary steps in the matter. He further noted that there were several representations made by the villagers of Chevitikallu and Poppuru that the revenues legally eligible to them was being deprived, and that steps should be taken to put the leasehold rights of the sand reaches in the villages to auction at an early date. The Director also noted that several representations were received from the residents of C....
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....2010 is a mere request to the Director to consider the issue whether he should exercise the powers vested in him under 11(2)(c) to ensure that the Society did not transport sand through the three additional ramps till a decision was taken by the Government. It is not a direction to the Director of Mines and Geology. Neither Rule 35 nor Rule 35-A have any application as the Government did not issue any direction to the Director to exercise his power in a particular manner, but had merely requested him to consider whether orders, under the relevant Rule, need to be issued at his level regulating quarry operations in respect of the three additional ramps. The impugned order is merely a request, and not a direction. 95. Further, the Director of Mines and Geology has passed a detailed order assigning reasons why he had decided to order the Society not to utilize the three additional ramps. The aforementioned reasons given in the proceedings of the Director clearly show that he had exercised his mind to the issues under consideration independently, and had not passed the order at the dictates of the Government. This contention urged on behalf of the Society also necessitates rejection....