TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1983 (4) TMI 294
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....Mill situated at Plot No. 46 and 53, Lathur Industrial State Co-operative Society Ltd., Lathur. The petitioner states that it has capital investment in the industry to the tune of Rs. 19 lakhs, out of which the contribution by the partners is to the tune of Rs. 5,85,000/- and the rest of the capital is raised by the firm by taking loans from the Bank. 3. It is alleged that the reports were available to show that there is enough agricultural produce of raw material available for starting oil industry at Latur. It was stated that the climate is also very suitable in this part of the State, that is, Marathwada region, and this region, being backward has several disadvantages such as absence of skilled labour, lack of assured market and want of transport facilities. As the existing units in Lathur could not process the full arrival of the raw material, the petitioner states that they wanted to establish the said industry and conduct their business in this area. 4. It is stated that respondent No. 1 introduced a scheme named as "Package Scheme of Incentives 1979". This scheme is in continuation of the scheme earlier introduced by respondent No. 1 in 1964. The important grievance o....
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.... that it has applied in the prescribed Form No. 1 for eligibility certificate to the respondent on 18th of February, 1981. It is also stated that it has given the relevant details such as, possession of land, date of taking possession of the land, which is 31st July, 1980, and it has also obtained a no objection certificate on the same day. The petitioner has also obtained a provisional registration of small scale industry from the Director of Small Scale Industries on 19-4-1980. It is further stated that the registration of the petitioner has been made final on 17th May, 1982. The petitioner states that thereafter on 16th May, 1981, he obtained a sales tax registration certificate under the Central Sales Tax Act and further obtained a sales tax registration certificate under the Bombay Sales Tax Act on 29-5-1981. The petitioner states that thereafter a letter by respondent No. 2 came to be addressed to the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Osmanabad, calling upon him to send necessary papers to forward them to the Government. Then the petitioner has referred to a letter issued by the district Industries Centre, Osmanabad, dated 21-9-1981, wherein it is stated that there....
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....in his petition that his unit was completed all effective steps before 10th January, 1983, when the industry of the petitioner has already started its production. It is the case of the petitioner that he has submitted all documents necessary for the purpose of grant of eligibility certificate. However, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have been in different and somehow or the other hostile to the petitioner and have not cared to process his application and have kept his application pending since January despite several reminders. 9. The petitioner further states that to his surprise, on 25th October, 1982, respondent No. 1 issued a letter by which respondent No. 1 asked all the General Managers of the District Industries Centres to scrutinise the proposals for setting upon the oil mills rigorously and directed them, especially by direction No. (3) that they should not issue the registration and eligibility certificate a matter of course unless they are satisfied that the conditions are fulfilled and there is scope for another oil mill in that area. Respondent No. 1 further directed that if it is revealed that there is no such scope, no registration should be made and in case of doubt, a....
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....ations and all district Industries Centres certain instructions. In this letter, the Government has declared its policy to encourage setting up to edible oil mills only on co-operative basis and that no new oil mills should be set up in the private sector unless and until a clearance certificate from respondent No. 3 is obtained. It is stated in this letter that in future the Regional Development Corporations and the General Managers of the District Industries Centre will refer the individual cases of oil mills pending with them and fresh applications for grant of final S.S.I. registration/eligibility certificate under the Package Scheme of incentives to the Corporation, that is, respondent No. 3, for getting clearance from it. By this letter, respondent No. 3 was directed to communicate its recommendations to the respective District Industries Centres/Regional Development Corporation after examining the case from the point of view of availability of raw material, market for oil and feasibility of installing additional capacity vis-a-vis existing capacity in the area. A copy of this letter was also endorsed to the respective Regional Development Corporations including Marathwada De....
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....e Clause 2.3 of the Scheme does not refer to this agency at all; and 2) The petitioner having completed all the initial, final and effective steps and commenced his production on 26th January, 1982 and obtained registration certificate on 17-3-1982, asking him now to bring again a no objection certificate is also an instance of mala fide. Then the petitioner, in one of the grounds, has specifically stated as follows :--- 3) That by imposing the new conditions by its letter dated 25-10-1982, respondent No. 1 is seeking to create hurdles and difficulties with a view to avoid granting of eligibility certificate under the unamended scheme. In this behalf, it i submitted that the petitioner has acted on the promise held out by respondent No. 1 in the unamended package scheme and further that the Petitioner had acted to its detriment by making large investments, by way of property, machinery, labour and raw materials. It is, therefore, submitted that the acts of respondent No. 1 amount to breach of its promise and that respondent No. 1 is barred by the principle of promissory estoppel from going back on its promise and committing a breach thereof. We have sp....
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..... It if further specifically stated that the package scheme, popularly known as the package scheme of 1979, does not create any right whatsoever in favour of the petitioner. It is stated that according to Clause 4.6 of the said scheme, no right or claim for any incentive under the scheme is deemed to have been conferred by the scheme merely by virtue of the fact that the unit has fulfilled on its part conditions of the scheme. The incentives under the scheme cannot be claimed as a matter of right unless the letter of intent/eligibility certificate has been issued under the scheme by the implementing agency concerned and the unit has complied with the stipulations/conditions of the letter of intent/eligibility certificate. The return further states that in view of this position, the condition raised in paragraph 2 of the petition is incorrect and it is stated that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. 19. Then in paragraph 5 of the return, admitting the other contentions as being relating to the other respondents, it is further stated that apart from the sovereign function, the state Government is required to promote healthy industrial growth to the State and after the im....
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.... dated 3-12-1982 declined and expressed its inability to process the applications, which were received by it, and returned them with the remarks that neither the Government was competent under the law to delegate its functions to it nor were they competent to process the applications. In the result, it appears that the directions issued by respondent No. 1 in letter dated 1st December, 1982 to respondent No. 3 to process the applications after scrutinising the various proposals given by units seems to have been frustrated by the very reply letter dated 30-12-1982 of respondent No. 3. Therefore, in the return the Government had to concede that the policy of procedure will be adopted after its revision in respect of disbursement of incentives to oil industry and that respondent No. 3 has no connection with the policy which was underlined in letter of respondent No. 1 dated 1-12-1982. 21. Then the return goes on to State that it was not the mala fide intention of the Government and the allegations in that behalf were denied by saying that the State had no intention to delay the issue of the eligibility certificate, but the bona fide intention was to ensure that the benefits are con....
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....crued to the petitioner to claim the eligibility certificate under Clause 4.5 of the said scheme, is wrongly denied and the rejoinder also refers to certain defects in the affidavit filed by respondent No. 1 to which we will refer later. 25. In short, in rejoinder the petitioner has repeated his own grievance which is already stated in the petition. There is a further affidavit filed by the petitioner in reply to the affidavit of respondent No. 2. This is also by way of repeating his own grievance earlier stated and it is not necessary to set out the details of this affidavit. There is a formal affidavit on record replying tot he affidavit of respondent No. 3, which also need not be considered. 26. During the hearing of this petition, again respondent No. 2 filed an affidavit dated 28th March, 1983. In this affidavit, respondent No. 2 explained as to in what manner there was some delay in filing the documents by the petitioner' especially with regard to the filing of the extract of the production register, which was filed on 8th April, 1982. Respondent No. 2 in his affidavit says that the petitioner has filed the extract of the production register relating to dal mill and....
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....ion of the petition and its replies, we now propose to deal with the exact wording of the scheme, which is the foundation of the right claimed by the petitioner in this petition. 28. The scheme is called "Dispersal of Industries-Package Scheme of Incentive...." and the Government of Maharashtra in Industries, Energy and Labour Department by its resolution dated 5th January, 1980, has introduced this scheme. The Preamble of the scheme is as follows :--- "In order to achieve dispersal of industries outside the Bombay-Thana-Pune belt, Government has been giving, since 1964, to the industrial units coming up in the developing areas of the State, a package of incentives comprising mainly the refund of sales tax, relief in electricity tariff, octroi, etc. The scheme was reviewed by the Government from time to time and with effect from August 1, 1976, a package Scheme of Graded Incentives (hereinafter referred to as "the 1976, Scheme"), was sanctioned by Government Resolution, Industries. Energy and Labour Department No. IDL 7076/6212(5)/IND. 8, dated the 18th January, 1977. The period of the 1976 Scheme expired on July 31, 1979... Government had under consideration t....
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....duction Register, etc. "(iii) The decision of the Implementing Agency subject to such directions as Government may issue from time to time, in this regard will be final and binding on the eligible unit. The last Clause 2.1(iii) is actually mentioned in the Scheme as 2.1(ii), but since the Counsel for the petitioner stated that it is (iii), we have taken it to be (iii). Clause 2.2, is not necessary for our purpose. Thereafter, there is Clause 2.3 under the heading "Effective Steps", and it runs as under: "2.3. For the purposes of the 1979, Scheme, "effective steps" will comprise initial effective steps and final effective steps." Thereafter, there is recital as to which shall be the initial effective steps and which shall be the final effective steps, followed by some explanations. We have here to state that there now is another explanation which runs in the following terms :--- "II. Based on the documentary evidence led by the eligible unit in this regard, the Implementing Agency shall determine the date on which all the effective steps, both initial and the final, are completed. The decision of the Implementing Agency in this regard shall be final and bindi....
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....teps (i.e. both the initial and the final effective steps) on or before 31st March, 1983." However, in this case, the date on which the effective steps, both initial and final, were completed is 10th January, 1983. Thereafter, Clause 4.6 provides as follows : 4.6. No right or claim for any incentive under this Scheme shall be deemed to have been conferred by the Scheme merely by virtue of the fact that the unit has fulfilled on its part the conditions of the Scheme. The incentives under the Scheme cannot be claimed unless the Letter of Intent/Eligibility Certificate has been issued under the Scheme by the Implementing Agency concerned and the unit has complied with the stipulations/conditions of the Letter of Intent/Eligibility Certificate." 30. Part 5 of the said Scheme details the benefits, which are available to the petitioner and other similarly situated persons, who follow the Scheme and fulfil the conditions of the Scheme. As the petitioner falls in Group D mentioned in Clause 5.3, the period of eligibility to have the benefits will be of nine years. We are not referring to the benefits given under the Scheme, because it is undisputed that the benefits are in the for....
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....acted in this case and how learned Counsel has based his arguments on the principle of promissory estoppel. 32. This principle of promissory estoppel is not defined in any law. However, it would be useful to refer to Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 16, to have an authenticated definition of the principle of promissory estoppel. It is stated at page 1017 of the said Book as under in respect of the principle of promissory estoppel :--- "1514. Promissory estoppel. When on party has, by his words or conduct, made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise or assurance which was intended do affect the legal relations between them and to be acted on accordingly, then, once the other party has taken him at his word and acted on it, the one who gave the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to heir previous legal relations as if no such promise or assurance had been made by him, but the must accept their legal relations subject to the qualification which he himself has so introduced. This doctrine, which is derived form a principle of equity enunciated in 1877, has been the subject of considerable recent development and is....
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.... the exporters will be entitled to import raw materials of the total amount equal to 100 per cent of the f.o.b. value of exports. The respondents firm exported woollen goods of the f.o.b. value of Rs. 5,03,471.73 np., but the Deputy Director in the office of the Textile Commissioner, Bombay, issued to the respondents an Import Entitlement Certificate for Rs. 1,99,459 only. The respondents under Article 226 of the Constitution moved a petition before the High Court of Punjab praying for a writ or an order directing the Union of India and other concerned officers to issue a licence permitting import of certain raw materials of value of Rs. 3,04,012.73 np. The High Court held that the respondents were entitled to the issue of licence as prayed for. In appeal by the Union of India and others to the Supreme Court , J.C., Shah, J., (as he then was), observed as follows (at page 726) :--- "We hold that the claim of respondents is appropriately founded upon the equity which arises in their favour as a result of the representation made on behalf of the Union of India in the Export Promotion Scheme, and the action taken by the respondents acting upon that representation under the be....
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....d by a person who acts upon the promise; when the law requires that a contract enforceable at law against a public body shall be executed in the manner prescribed by statute, the obligation if the contract be not in that form may be enforced against it in appropriate cases in equity....." In this case, learned Counsel for the petitioner also faintly suggested that this case is also an authority to hold that the petitioner may not be restrained from substantiating his right to obtain the eligibility certificate and his right in equity can be granted by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, although there is no direct discussion on this point in both the judgment of the Supreme Court. 34. The third case which was relied upon by learned Counsel for the petitioner was (M/s. Motilal Pandampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, . This was a judgment delivered by the Division Bench of the Supreme Court and in this case the Supreme Court has enunciated the principle of promissory estoppel. We will not burden this judgment with the detailed narration given by the Supreme Court. Suffice it to say that the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been ....
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....ng of the promise and is further able to show that the public interest would be prejudiced where the Government held by the promise made by it, and if it brings all the facts before the Court, the Court will have to balance the public interest in the Government (sic) and cannot hold it liable for carrying out the promise made by it to the citizen. If the public interest suffers or, is likely to suffer, by carrying out the promise, then the Court will have to decide which way the equity lies. However, it has also been observed by the Supreme Court that the Court would not act on the mere ipse dixit of the Government, for it is the Court which has to decide and not the Government whether the Government should be held exempt from liability. It is also stated that ex parte appraisement of the circumstances of the Government alone will not be a sufficient answer for the Court to hold Government exempt from the applicability of the principle promissory estoppel, that is to say, the Government is not the sole judge of its own case in repudiating the promise. The Government cannot claim to be exempt from the liability to carry out promise of some indefinite and undisclosed ground of necess....
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....mere whim and ignore his promise on some underlined and undisclosed grounds of necessity or change the conditions to the prejudice of the person who had acted upon such representation and put himself in a disadvantageous position. (5) The officer would be justified in changing the terms of the agreement to the prejudice of the other party on special considerations such as difficult foreign exchange position or other matters which have a bearing on general interest of the State." 37. Then, in paragraph 40 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has examined the case of Moti Lal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. (P) Ltd. cited (supra) and it is especially stated that in that case, the question as to when the doctrine of promissory estoppel would be attracted against the Government validly confirming what has been consistently stated by the Supreme Court with some qualifications. It is stated thus : "....there can be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power and the legislature cannot be precluded from exercising its legislative functions by resort to the doctrine of promissory estoppel... When the Government owes a duty to the public to act differen....
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....es of the Gujarat High Court culled out the paragraph relying on the judgment in Jit Ram's case, , and have upheld the plea of the petitioner in that case and they have granted the necessary relief to the petitioner and they have applied the principle of promissory estoppel in that case. Learned Counsel for the petitioner heavily relied on this case, because in this case, large sums of money were invested relying on the assurance of the Government and benefits under the scheme were also given in 1977. It was represented that doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable and, therefore the Government was directed not to apply certain resolutions, which were passed in the year 1979. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, relying on all these cases, contended, bearing the observations of the Supreme Court and to the Gujarat High Court, in mind that in the present case also the petitioner stands in the similar position, like the one, which is disclosed by the judgments, which are cited above. In our opinion, after having gone carefully through all the judgments, including the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jit Ram's case, it is not possible to hold that these cases have gone int....
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.... respondent who was not only the Chief Secretary, but also the Advisor to the Governor functioning under the President's rule, the appellant went ahead with the setting up of the Vanaspati factory. The appellant by its letter dated 25th April, 1979 advised the 4th respondent that the U.P. Finance Corporation being convinced by the clear and categorical assurance given by the 4th respondent that the Vanaspati factory of the appellant would be entitled to exemption from sales tax for a period of three years from the date of commencement of production, had sanctioned financial assistance to the appellant and the appellant was going ahead with the project in full speed to enable it to start production at the earliest. It is against this background that this principle came to be enunciated by the Supreme Court and it is borne out by the facts in this case appearing in paragraph 3 where there is a specific reference to the fact that the 4th respondent by his letter, on behalf of the State Government, gave an assurance that the appellant would be exempt from liability of payment of sales tax for a period of three years. It is relying on this specific assurance given by a responsible o....
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....rnment acting in its executive capacity. It was stated by the learned Government Pleader that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jit Ram's case, itself mentions this fact in paragraph 12, wherein the Supreme Court has observed as follows :--- "A Bench of Four Judges of this Court in a decision (Excise Commr. U.P. Allahabad v. Ram Kumar, , after examining the case-law on the subject observed that 'it is now well settled by a catena of decisions that there can be no question of estoppel against the Govt. in exercise of its legislative, sovereign or executive powers'. The earlier decisions of this Court in N. Ramanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala, ..... A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2V41, and (State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Ltd.,.... were followed. It may, therefore, be stated that the view of this Court has been that the principle of estoppel is not available against the Government in exercise of legislative, sovereign or executive power." 42. Then the learned Government Pleader relied on the judgement of the Supreme Court in Excise Commissioner, U.P. Allahabad, etc. etc. v. Ram Kumar etc. etc., . It is true that all these cases have been fo....
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....nsel for the petitioner, during the course of the arguments, whether he is able to show us that any provisions of the scheme presently under consideration were also similarly termed and considered in the judgments relied by him, but the learned Counsel was unable to show any direct provision of the scheme referred to in 1968 S.C. 718. In our opinion, the provisions of the scheme considered in A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 718 are jumble of provisions and they are of legislative character and they are not of executive character. They contained such unequivocal assurances which can be even enforceable on the ground of violation of Constitution if not adhered to and this fact has been also stated in the judgment. In view of the absence of the particulars of the schemes, which were discussed in the various judgments, cited before us, we have no alternative but to look at the provisions of the scheme under consideration and to interpret them in this particular case. 44. In this connection learned Counsel for the petitioner, first of all relied on the provisions of the scheme as a whole stating that the definition clause appearing at Clause II itself gives a right to the petitioner to claim the el....
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....o. IDL/1082 (4094) IND-8 dtd. 1-12-1982, the case of this unit being referred to Oil-seeds Corporation, Bombay for issue of N.O.C." The reference made in this letter to the Government letter dated 25-10-1982 is the one to which we have earlier referred. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on this letter to show that the petitioner has completed all initial and final steps under the scheme and nothing remains to be done by the petitioner in order to be entitled to the issue of the eligibility certificate. However, respondent No. 1 has further created an obstacle in the way of the Petitioner and that obstacle is in the form of the letter dated 25-10-1982, as we have shown earlier, which contains direction to respondent No. 3 and demands further clearance certificate from respondent No. 3 and learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that in view of the clear reply of respondent No. 3 in this case that the said Corporation is unable to process the application received by it, now, the Government's stand that clearance certificate at the hands of respondent No. 3 is necessary may amount to dishonesty and hostility to the petitioner. Therefore, in view of this clear p....
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....dent) held out certain specific promise as an inducement for the appellants to move into a new Department (Agricultural Department). After they had gone over to the Agricultural Department, the State, by virtue of its EX. P. 3, sought to go back upon the earlier promise made in EX. P. 1. The appellants having believed the representation made by the State and having further acted thereon cannot now be defeated to their hopes which have crystallised into rights, thanks to the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Therefore, it is not open to the State, according to the law laid down by this Court, to back-track. We, therefore, direct the State to implement EX. P-1, and confer such rights and benefits as are promised thereunder in entirety....." Relying on these observations, it was contended that it would be inequitable and almost contrary to the said judgment of the Supreme Court if the petitioner is not given the relief claimed by him in this petition. 45. It is true that the judgment of the Supreme Court was dealing with the transfer of the departmental employees to another department, which was created under a scheme sponsored by the Government and it containe....
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....right in the implementing agency to deny the certificate as claimed by him. In this connection, learned Counsel invited our attention to a judgment of the Privy Council in (Alcock Ashdown and Company, Limited v. The Chief Revenue Authority, Bombay, A.I.R. 1923 P.C. 138. It was contended by learned Counsel that the word 'may' used in Rule 2.2 Chapter II of the said rules must be taken to mean that if the unit has completed all the stipulated requirements and has gone in production, the authority under the scheme is bound of follow the scheme and give the eligibility certificate forthwith. It was also contended by him that the word 'may' must be interpreted as 'shall' and the implementing agency, instead of 'may', must be taken to be under an obligation that it 'shall' grant the eligibility certificate on fulfilment of all the requirements. And, for this purpose, learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment of the Privy Counsel, cited (supra), and especially on the observations made by the learned Lords of the Privy Council at page 144, which are as follows :--- "...When a capacity or power is given to a public authority, ....
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.... learned Counsel for the petitioner on the case of Privy Council, therefore, is of no assistance to him in this particular case. 47. Now, coming to the merits of the scheme, the learned Government Pleader in this connection relied on the provisions of the scheme and specially Clause 4.6 of the same. He contended that in view of this Clause 4.6 no right or claim for any incentives under this scheme shall be deemed to have been conferred by the scheme merely by virtue of the fact that the unit has fulfilled on its part the conditions of the scheme. He further contended that the incentives under the scheme cannot be claimed unless the letter of intent/eligibility certificate has been issued under the scheme by the implementing agency concerned and the unit has complied with the stipulations/conditions of the letter of intend/eligibility certificate. Now, in order to interpret the provisions of this scheme it cannot be said that we have any assistance from any other authority and, therefore, we have to interpret this scheme unaided by any precedent. This is a scheme, which is unique in its nature, in the sense that it is a unilateral declaration under which certain assurances were g....
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.... is claiming only the eligibility certificate under Clause 4.5 and is not claiming any benefits. It is difficult to agree with this submission. He also submitted that these two provisions should be read in isolation of each other. However, on reading both these provisions, we are afraid we cannot put the same interpretation as put by learned Counsel on the provisions of Clauses 4.5 and 4.6. The provisions contained under this heading "application for eligibility" beginning from Clauses 4.4 to 4.6 will have to be read as a whole. Intention of the scheme will have to be understood not in isolation of these provisions, but by uniting these three provisions together. As we have shown above, the very concept of the scheme is that there is a unified concept throughout the scheme. If such a concept is present throughout, it is not possible to construe the provisions as done by learned Counsel as being in existence. If this concept is taken into consideration, it is not possible to separate Clauses 4.4 and 4.5 from Clause 4.6. Therefore, the contention advanced by learned Counsel for the petitioner that he is claiming only eligibility under Clause 4.5 and not claiming any benefits under Cl....
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....s regard. The fact that the unit has fulfilled on its part the conditions of the scheme does not make it eligible or gives no right to it to claim eligibility and it appears to us that by introducing this fiction, if any such right would have been imagined to have been in existence and even it if existed, the words used in Clause 4.6 in the scheme clearly show that no right or claim will be conferred on any unit even if such a right came into existence. Even if a right is accrued, the import of the words seems to be that fulfilling of the conditions will not entitle the unit to claim any right whatsoever including the right to claim the incentive or any claim for incentive. If these words are taken to mean as has been held by us, then it is clear that the fiction as introduced by Clause 4.6 introduced only with a purpose that no such existence or accrual of a right to any person is contemplated and this is indicated by the clear words in the scheme in this case. In view of this clear position, though learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended that all the things, which are required to be under the scheme, have been fulfilled by him, we are unable to grant any assistance on the b....
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....inuance of the effective steps is also dependent on the determination of the date by the implementing agency under this scheme, we find it difficult to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the implementing agency has to grant the eligibility the moment the unit satisfies or fulfils all the requirements. The very fact that the determination of date is to be done by the implementing agency is indicative of the fact that the power vested in the implementing agency is given by the terms of the scheme, which it has to follow in all the cases. The power which is given by the terms of the scheme cannot be said to be exercised depending on the facts of each case, but it is unilateral power. If the implementing agency is to act differently in respect of different units, this will lead to a very anomalous situation, in that, there will be several units, which units will be able to satisfy the requirements at a particular date or different dates, which cannot be said to be the intention at all. The very fact that the implementing agency is to determine the date is applicable to all units and in view of this uniformity, which is apparent from Clause 2.3. Explana....
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....rued. In this connection, we may refer to the factual position about the basic requirement of the doctrine of promissory estoppel in this regard. Having examined the provisions of the scheme from various angles and points, we are of the opinion that this discretion and power conferred on the implementing agency under this scheme cannot be said to be qualified or cannot be said to be conditioned by the provisions of the scheme and, therefore, it is not possible to say that the moment a unit fulfils certain requirements, the eligibility certificate must be issued. This will lead to a very anomalous situation, in that, the scheme will be nothing but a slot machine, out of which, once a unit completes its final and effective steps, a certificate in the form of an eligibility certificate will come forth for that unit. 52. There is another reason, which is to be taken into consideration while interpreting Clause 4.6. The beginning of this cause is "no right or claim for any incentive". The words "no right or claim for any incentive" are used. Word 'no' is an adjective here. It means not any. If we read this clause in this fashion, it will mean that not any right or claim shall....
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....ority to act has arisen or not. It is inherent in the scheme that two three steps are required to be taken. They are mentioned as letter of intent, eligibility certificate and a certificate of entitlement. In this connection, it would be useful to refer to the rules, which have been filed by respondent No. 2 along with its counter. The rules mention the procedure for grant of this eligibility certificate and entitlement certificate. At Rule 2.5 of the rules, we find that prior to the grant of an eligibility certificate under the 1979 scheme, the eligible unit has to execute an agreement to the satisfaction of the implementing agency which may be deemed necessary covering the covenants, conditions, stipulations, and in conformity with the requirements of the 1979 scheme. From the above provisions, it appears that the implementing agency is yet to function till it grants eligibility certificate after scrutinising various documents and after satisfying itself that the unit has competed not only the initial and final steps under the heading "effective steps" but has also performed all the formalities and conditions, such as production of documents as provided by Clause 2.5 of the rules....
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....estrictions on the right of the petitioner to practise any trade or business and which is beyond the scope of the constitutional provision. Therefore, it is not possible to say that any challenge to the scheme under Article 19(1)(g) can be given. It was contented by learned Counsel that in view of the letter dated 25th October, 1982, which puts a restriction and puts a condition to bring a certificate on the petitioner unit, it should be held that the said letter had denied the petitioner a claim to get the eligibility certificate and therefore, there is violation of Article 19(1)(g). We may immediately refer to (C.K. Chutan v. The State of Kerala and others, . The case deals with a permission to be given to a contractor. The contractor, who was milk supplier to the Government, had been supplying milk for twenty years and after twenty years, he claimed a renewal of that contract. The Supreme Court, while considering the case has, while disposing of both the arguments under Articles 19 and 14 which were raised before it said :--- "....The breach of the contract, if any, may entitle the person aggrieved to sue for damages or in appropriate cases, even specific performance, b....
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....straining the authorities to grant the certificate. Even if these certificate are granted despite the letter dated 25th October, 1982, we do not think that any sufficient material has been placed before the Court to show that any exact extent of the discrimination can be spelled out at this juncture. The fact that certain units have been granted the eligibility certificate is of no significance when it cannot be said that the Government is acting under any law. Article 14 also protects the citizens from discrimination. In a case like this where certain units are granted entitlement certificate relying on the general representations contained in a scheme, it would be impossible to contend that because certain other units are denied those certificates, a discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 arises. The facts, which are required to be proved for basing a case under Article 14 are necessary to be first set out in the petition. Except the fact that certain units have been granted the certificate and in the same region they have been granted the eligibility certificate, no other facts are brought out to make out a case of arbitrary action on the part of the Government so as to....