TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2001 (10) TMI 1159
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....ibunal'). The Tribunal affirmed the view taken by the Deputy Commissioner. Hence these TRCs against that opinion. Sri Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner would strenuously contended that that since there is no 'comma between the words 'Lithographic; and 'Printing' in Entry 45, a reasonable construction would be that Entry 45 embraces only two kinds of goods viz., 'Lithographic Printing Ink' and 'Duplicating ink' and the view taken by the Tribunal that Entry 45 comprehends three kinds of goods viz., 'Lithographic Ink', 'Printing Ink', and 'Duplicating Ink' is totally erroneous and against the well-settled principles of interpretation of statutes. In support of this submission, the learned Counsel for the petitioner placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gurusahai Saigal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1062, would maintain that the opinion of the Tribunal tantamounts to amending Entry 45 of the APGST Act. The learned Counsel would also contend that Entry 45 of First Schedule as amended by Amendment Act No.49 of 1976 with effect from 1-9-1976 includes only 'lithographic printing....
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....order of the Tribunal, the original Gazette wherein Amendment Act 49 of 1976 was published, was summoned and the Tribunal after perusing the same has pointed out that there is no 'comma' after the word 'lithographic'. Therefore, we take it that there is no 'comma' after the word 'lithographic' in Entry 45. ( 4. ) AS per the Chambers Dictionary, the word 'lithography' mean ' a print produced by lithography' and the word 'lithographic' means 'a method of printing from a stone or metal plate that makes use of the immiscibility of oil and water, the image to be printed being receptive to the oil based ink, and the rest of the plate to moisture, so that when ink come into contract with dampened plate, only the image prints'. The meaning of the words 'lithography' and 'lithographic' would clearly indicate that lithography itself is a method of printing and therefore, there was absolutely no reason for the Legislature to qualify the word 'lithographic' by using the word 'printing' as an adjective after the word 'lithographic' in Entry 45. In the premise of the above meaning of the wor....
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....he pith of the rule is to make the strict letter of a statute yield to the obvious intent of the legislators. In England, before 1850, there was no punctuation in the manuscript copy of any Act which received the Royal assent, therefore, the Courts cannot have any regard to punctuation for construing the older Acts. Even as regards modern Acts, as opined by Lord Reid in IRC v. Hinchy, (1960) 1 All ER 505, it is very doubtful if punctuation can be looked at for purposes of construction. The opinion on Indian Statutes is not very much different. Dealing with the Regulation VIII of 1891, Lord Hobhouse in Maharani of Burdwan v. Krishna Kamini Dasi, ILR 14 PC 372, stated: "It is an error to reply on punctuation in construing Acts of the Legislature". Again while construing Article 48 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which read 'for specific moveable property lost or acquired by theft, or dishonest misappropriation or conversion, or for compensation for wrongfully taking or detaining the same', Lord Warrington in Levis Pung Evans Pugh v. Ashutosh Sen, AIR 1929 PC 69, rejected the contention that the word 'dishonest' qualified not only 'misappropriation....
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....ses which allow its use only when all other means have proved futile, announce the most practical rule, unless the Court can be sure that the statute was accurately punctuated when enacted. ( 5. ) The intention of the Legislature must be primarily ascertained from the language used. This obviously means, as a general rule, that the Courts have no power to add to, or to change, alter, or eliminate the words which the Legislature has incorporated in a statute, not even in order to provide for certain contingencies which the Legislature failed to meet, or to avoid hardship flowing from the language used, or to advance the remedy of the statute. It is well established rule or interpretation that full effect should be given to every word of the statute, if at all possible; that the Court should always seek to harmonise and make every part of the statute operative. In other words, no part of a statute - whether it be sentence, clause, phrase, or word - should be considered as mere surplusage or as devoid of meaning, if it can possibly be avoided. Words may be disregarded only in order to conform with or to effectuate the legislative intent, and not to alter or change it. A presumption h....
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.... left out", is quoted with approval by the Apex Court in Umed v. Rajsingh, AIR 1975 SC 43, p 63. If the contention of Sri Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner that Entry 45 covers only two kinds of inks, viz., 'lithographic ink' and 'duplicating ink', and not 'printing ink' is accepted, the word 'printing' would become surplusage and otiose and such an interpretation can never be placed on Entry 45 having due regard to the aforementioned principles. In that view of the matter, the opinion formed by the Tribunal that the absence of 'comma' after the word 'lithography' in Entry 45 seems to be an accidental slip and that Entry 45 includes not only 'lithographic ink', and 'duplicating ink', but also the 'printing ink, is well founded. It is true that 'comma' is present in between the words 'lithographic' and 'printing' in Entry 44 introduced by Act 16/63 while such comma is absent in Entry 45 as amended by Amendment Act 49/76 between those two words. But we are of the considered opinion that such absence of punctuation 'comma' in between the above two words in Entry 45 does not....
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....of inks which were earlier admittedly included in Entry 44 as well as in Entry 45 as amended by Amendment Act 5/74. ( 6. ) APART from this, the Tribunal has referred to relevant passages from the text book 'Printing Inks Manufacture' by A.K Rastogi and observed, thus: "The learned Counsel for the appellant has however tried to contend that the ink used for lithographic work is called as 'lithographic printing ink, and not merely as 'lithographic ink' and that therefore, the Legislature by omitting the comma in between the two words 'lithographic' and 'printing' meant only to include 'lithographic printing ink' and exclude 'printing ink' in Entry 45. He has also tried to rely upon the relevant passages contained at pages 1 and 2 in the text book 'Printing Inks Manufacture' by A.K. Rastogi in support of his contention. But such contention cannot be accepted and the relevant passage in the above said text book cannot be said to be of any use for such contention of the appellant. In the said book, the learned author referred to three main printing systems viz., (1) typographic method (ii) lithographic method and (iii) ....
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....hographic, printing and duplicating inks. In that view of the matter, it appears to our mind that the absence of comma after the word 'lithographic' in the new Entry 45 seems to be an accidental slip only as rightly opined by the learned Tribunal. The judgments in Mohd. Shabir v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 564, Collector of Customs and Central Excise and another v. Oriental Timber Industries, AIR 1985 SC 746, Union of India v. Godfrey Phillips India Limited, India Tobacco Company Limited, Vazir Sultan Tobacco Company Limited and others, AIR 1986 806, Gursahai Saigal (supra) and State of Tamil Nadu v. Kodaikanal Motor Union Private Limited, 62 STC 272 (SC) cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the course of argument, in our considered opinion do not advance the case the petitioner in any way. The judgments in Collector of Customs and Central Excise's case of (supra), Godfrey Phillips India Limited case (supra) have no bearing at all on the decision-making in these TRCs, whereas the judgments in Mohd. Shabir's case (supra) and Gursahai Saigal's case (supra) are distinguishable on facts. Therefore, we do not agree with the contention of the lea....