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1967 (2) TMI 102

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....lection, new members of the Board began to function from July 7, 1962. The term of the members is four years and would in the normal course have expired on July 6, 1966. On June 9, 1964, the appellant issued notice to the Board under s. 298 of the Assam Municipal Act, No. XV of 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). That section gives power to the State Government, if it is of the opinion that a Board is incompetent to perform or persistently makes. default in the performance of the duties imposed on it by or under the Act or otherwise by law, or exceeds or abuses its powers, either to dissolve the Board or to supersede it for a period not exceeding one year at a time, and where dissolution is ordered to order a fresh election as soon a....

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.... Government issued the notification superseding the Board for one year with effect from December 14, 1964 for reasons which were stated in the notification. Thereupon the Board filed a writ petition in the High Court on December 24, 1964 on various grounds. It is however unnecessary for present purposes to mention all the grounds raised in the writ petition. It is sufficient to say that three of the grounds raised therein were (i) that in passing the order of supersession the State Government had violated the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the Board had been denied the opportunity of being personally heard and of producing evidence, as the proceedings resulting in supersession were quasi-judicial proceedings, (ii) that the charge....

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....Court finally held that the State Government had already made up its mind to supersede the Board when it issued notice and therefore presumably all the proceedings subsequent to the issue of the notice were a farce. For these reasons the High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the order of December 9, 1964. It is this order of the High Court which is being challenged before us in the present appeal. I We are of opinion that the appeal must succeed. We shall take up three grounds on the basis of which the High Court has allowed the writ petition in the order indicated above. Re. (i).It is not necessary in the present appeal to decide whether the proceedings resulting in an order under s. 298 of the Act are quasi-judicial proceedings....

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....her s. 298 which merely says that the State Government should give opportunity to the Board for submitting an explanation in regard to the matter envisages production of evidence-oral or documentary-at some later stage by the Board in support of its explanation. The High Court has conceded that a personal hearing of the nature indicated above is not always a concommitant of the principles of natural justice. But it was of the view that in the present case principles of natural justice required that the Board should have been given a personal hearing and an opportunity to produce materials in support of the explanation. We should have thought that when the Board is given a notice as required by s. 298 it would naturally submit its explanatio....

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....nd that there was no difference in substance between what was charged and what was found proved. Eight charges were indicated in the notice of June 9, 1964. Six of them related to acts of omission and commission by the Board; the seventh and eighth charges were mere matters of inference from the first six charges and were not strictly speaking charges of which any explanation was necessary. In the notification superseding the Board the appellant found six charges proved. We have compared the notification of December 9, 1964 with the notice of June 9, 1964. and find that the first charge found proved in the notification is the third charge in the notice; the second charge found proved in the notification is the fifth charge in the notice; th....

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....igh Court relied on decisions under Art. 311 of the Constitution relating to removal, dismissal and reduction in rank of public servants and was apparently of the view that the State Government should first have considered the explanation and then made up its mind as to which one of the two alternatives provided in s. 298 should be used and then presumably given a second notice to the Board to show cause why one of the alternatives tentatively decided upon should not be pursued. We are of opinion that it is not correct to use the analogy of Art. 311 for the purpose of s. 298 of the Act. The issue of two notices under Art. 311 is a very special procedure depending upon the language of that Article. We find no comparable words in s. 298. We a....