2016 (1) TMI 815
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....t of the borrower and the co-borrower, to the writ petitioner. 4. There is a default, and it appears that the vehicle has changed hands. The borrower and the co-borrower are in default and the bank has proceeded to recover the same. Proceedings are pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Subsequently an application was filed to implead the writ petitioner as a respondent and by a cryptic non-reasoned order without bringing out as to why writ petitioner was a necessary or a proper party, vide order dated September 15, 2014 the Debts Recovery Tribunal impleaded writ petitioner as a respondent which order has been upheld by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal on March 20, 2015. Needless to state the said two orders are under challenge. 5. Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under:- "(2) Court may strike out or add parties: The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effe....
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....laintiff filed a suit for permanent injunction against the Municipal Corporation. Hindustan Petroleum applied for being impleaded as a defendant on the ground that it had material to show that the structure was unauthorized. The prayer was granted by the Courts below. The plaintiff approached the Supreme Court. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order, the Supreme Court held that the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation was neither necessary nor proper party to the proceedings. It was held that the person to be joined must be one whose presence is necessary as a party. The test is not whether his presence is necessary for the correct solution of the dispute before the Court but whether the order would affect him or his interest would be prejudiced. Relevant discussion is being noted herein below:- "6. Sub-rule(2) of Rule 10 gives a wide discretion to the Court to meet every case of defect of parties and is not affected by the inaction of the plaintiff to bring the necessary parties on record. The question of impleadment of a party has to be decided on the touch stone of Order I Rule 10 which provides that only a necessary or a proper party may be added. A necessary party is one....
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....ult which will affect him legally that is by curtailing his legal rights. It is difficult to say that the rule contemplates joining as a defendant a person whose only object is to prosecute his own cause of action. Similar provision was considered in Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd. (1956) 1 All E.R. 273, wherein after quoting the observations of Wynn- Parry, J. in Dollfus Mieg et Compagnie S.A. v. Bank of England (1950) 2 All E.R. 611, that the true test lies not so much in an analysis of what are the constituents of the applicants' rights, but rather in what would be the result on the subject-matter of the action if those rights could be established, Devlin, J. has stated: The test is 'May the order for which the plaintiff is asking directly affect the intervener in the enjoyment of his legal rights.' 9. The test which is to be applied, while considering an application under Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure for impleadment of a party has been summarised in the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reported as AIR 1960 MP 84 Sampatbai v Madhusingh Gambhirji as under:- "The test is not whether the joinder of the person proposed to be added as....
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....e allied armies. The custody of the gold bars was acquired by a tripartite commission, consisting of the representatives of the Government of UK, USA and France for the purposes of eventually distributing, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, the gold and treasure looted by the Germans. The gold bars were conveyed to England and deposited by the Commission with the Bank of England. The French company instituted an action against the bank claiming delivery of the gold bars. The bank applied for an order to set aside the writ on the ground that the 2 foreign Government, USA and France had declined to submit to the jurisdiction of the English Courts. The claim of the company was upheld and leave was given to the bank to appeal to the House of Lords. At that stage the two governments, USA and France applied to be added as defendant to the action. 14. It is significant to note that in the application the applicants did not assert a title to the bars but they urged that if they should establish that they have possession of control of the bars through the bank the French company would fail to obtain an order from the Court in its favour by reason of the doctrine of immunity a....
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...., they would for all practical purposes, be the owners. It seems to me that true test lies not so much in an analysis of what are the constituents of the applicant's rights but rather in what would be the result on the subject matter of the action if those rights could be established. That is the approach which I have made. Viewing the matter in this way, it is impossible, in my judgment, to say that the applicant have only an indirect interest of the nature which fell to be considered in 1892-1 Ch 487. They appear to me to have something more namely, a right which although may arise indirectly, viz. by the invocation of the doctrine of immunity and through the defendant bank as bailee nevertheless results in a direct interest in the subject matter of this action and is a right merely akin to the proprietary right which was under consideration in (1878) 9 Ch D 351. There is no authority directly bearing on the point but, on the analysis which I have made of the nature of the applicant's interest in the matter, I have come to the conclusion that I ought not to say that I have no jurisdiction to entertain the application on the short ground which counsel for the plaintiff put....
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....ainst the plaintiff relating to the subject matter of existing action the Court has power to join the intervener so as to give effect to the primary object of the order, which is to avoid multiplicity of actions. In the present case he submits that the subject matter of the dispute between the existing parties is the "ownership". If I may so put it, of an invention: the plaintiff claims that he is the owner of it and the intervener alleges that he is, and both disputes ought to be determined at the same time. This construction stresses the amplitude of the closing words of the passage which I have just cited from Order 16 Rule 11 'all the questions involved in the cause or matter.' The alternative construction treats the opening words as dominant. 'All the questions involved' is a phrase that unless it is cut down would be impossibly wide. It is cut down, the plaintiff submits by the opening words of the passage which I have cited. The intervener must be a party whose presence is necessary to enable all questions in the action to be adjudicated on and settled, but the question must be one which has to be adjudicated on in the issue between the existing parties and n....
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....for my part, I should prefer to apply a test based on that principle rather than to enquire whether the case to be determined falls into one or other of the three classes. There is not, for example any real distinction between the cases which related to specific performance and those which related to proprietary rights. As Wynn Parry, J. said in 1950-2 All ER 605 at page 611. It seems to me that the true test lies not so much in any analysis of what are the constituents of the appellant's rights, but rather in what would be the result on the subject matter of the action if those rights could be established. I respectfully agree with that. I think that the test is May the Order for which the plaintiff is asking directly affect the intervener in the enjoyment of his legal rights? It may be true as counsel for the plaintiff submits that the authorities so far have been dealing with rights to physical property, but in my judgment the principle applies equally to contractual rights. I think that in this case the test is satisfied that I have jurisdiction to make the Order and that is one which having regard to the question involved in the action, it is proper that in the ex....