TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2015 (10) TMI 1100
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....would expire on 02.09.2015. By the impugned order dated 02.09.2015, the period of six months has been extended from 04.09.2015. It is submitted that since the period expired on 02.09.2015 and the extension is from 04.09.2015, the period has lapsed and the goods are liable to be released. In support, reliance is placed on paragraph 14 of the decision of the Supreme Court in I. J. Rao, Asstt. Collector of Customs & Others versus Bibhuti Bhushan Bagh and Another: (1989) 3 SCC 202. 3. Per contra, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that under Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, the date on which the goods were confiscated, i.e., on 03.03.2015 is to be excluded for the purposes of computation of the period of six months and as such, the period would have commenced on 04.03.2015 and would have ended with the end of 03.09.2015 and the order of the Commissioner passed on 02.09.2015, thus rightly grants an extension of six months commencing from 04.09.2015. Alternatively, it is contended that since the order impugned in the petition was passed on 02.09.2015, i.e., even prior to the period as per the calculation of the petitioner, the said period under proviso to ....
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....of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of I. J. Rao, Asstt. Collector of Customs & Others (Supra) relied upon by the Counsel for the Petitioner reads as under: "14. We have said that notice must go to the person, from whose possession the goods have been seized, before the expiry of the original period of six months. It is possible that while notice is issued before the expiry of that period, service of such notice may not be effected on the person concerned in sufficient time to enable the Collector to make the order of extension before that period expires. Service of the notice may be postponed or delayed or rendered ineffective by reason of the person sought to be served attempting to avoid service of notice or for any other reason beyond the control of the customs authorities. In that event, it would be open to the Collector, if he finds that sufficient cause has been made out before him in that behalf to extend the time beyond the original period of six months, and thereafter, after notice has been served on the person concerned, to afford a post-decisional hearing to him in order to determine whether the order of extension should be cancelled or not. Having regard....
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....nning of 03.09.2015, i.e., 00 hours on 03.09.2015. The impugned order was passed on 02.09.2015, within the initial period of six months and as such, is in consonance with Section 110(2) of the Act. 12. Coming to the contention of the counsel for the Respondent that the extension from 04.09.2015, is not erroneous as the date of the seizure of the goods is to be excluded and the initial period of six months would commence from 04.03.2015 and end with 03.09.2015 and thus the extension has rightly been done from 04.09.2015. 13. In the case of Econ Antri Ltd. v. Rom Industries Ltd.: (2014) 11 SCC 769, the Supreme Court held as under: "35. In this connection we may also usefully refer to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Vasantlal Ranchhoddas Patel v. Union of India [Vasantlal Ranchhoddas Patel v. Union of India, AIR 1967 Bom 138] which is approved by this Court in Gopaldas Udhavdas Ahuja v. Union of India [(2004) 7 SCC 33 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1830], though in different context. In that case the premises of the appellants were searched by the officers of the Enforcement Directorate. Several packets containing diamonds were seized. The appellants made an appli....
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....897 was held applicable. 36. Speaking for the Bench Chainani, C.J. observed as under: (Vasantlal Ranchhoddas Patel case [Vasantlal Ranchhoddas Patel v. Union of India, AIR 1967 Bom 138], AIR pp. 141-42, para 10) "10. ... The principle underlying Section 9 has been applied even in the cases of judicial orders passed by courts, even though in terms the section is not applicable. See Ramchandra Govind Unavne v. Laxman Savleram Ronghe [AIR 1938 Bom 447], Dharamraj Mahadeo v. Commr. [AIR 1957 Bom 154],Puran Chand v. Mohd. Din [AIR 1935 Lah 291], Marakanda Sahu v. Lal Sadananda Singh [AIR 1952 Ori 279] and Official Liquidator v. N. Padmanabha Menon [(1954) 2 MLJ 44]. The material words in sub-section (2) of Section 110 are 'within six months of the seizure of the goods'. In such provisions the word 'of' has been held to be equivalent to 'from': see Williams v. Burgess [(1840) 12 Ad & El 635 : 113 ER 955]. In that case Section 1 of the relevant statute enacted that warrants of attorney shall be filed 'within twenty-one days after the execution'. Section 2 enacted that unless they were 'filed as aforesaid within the said space of twenty-one days from....