TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2004 (12) TMI 668
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....o the conclusion that the tenant had failed to make out a case for grant of leave to defend as she had failed to raise any triable issue. He, therefore, allowed the petition under Section 14D of the Act and passed an order of eviction. The appellant then moved the High Court in C.R.No.70/98 and C.M.No.298/98 impugning the order of eviction passed by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi. The High Court concurred with the view of the Additional Rent Controller and held that since the landlady was a widow, and the premises were required by her for her own residence, the conditions for the applicability of Section 14D of the Act were fulfilled and hence the learned Additional Rent Controller committed no mistake in refusing leave to defend to the appellant. When this special leave petition came up for admission before a bench consisting of two learned judges of this Court, counsel for the appellant relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Surjit Singh Kalra Vs. Union of India (1991) 2 SCC 87 which supported the contention of the appellant that the landlady who acquired the tenanted premises in question by transfer, could not avail of the remedy of eviction of a pre-existi....
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....- 233/1994 under Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 claiming that she was a widow and bona fide needed the premises for her own use. It was claimed that she had purchased the suit premises in the year 1982, and since the accommodation available to the appellant was insufficient and unsuitable, she required the suit premises for her own use and occupation. She narrated the inconveniences caused to her, including family differences, while residing in the house left behind by her husband. In the circumstances she was compelled to shift to her own house, namely the suit premises, which she had purchased from the erstwhile owner in the year 1982. The appellant applied under Section 25B(4) of the Act for leave to defend. It was contended on her behalf that the eviction petition was not maintainable under Section 14D of the Act since the premises in question had not been let out either by the respondent or her late husband. It was further asserted that the appellant had never attorned, nor paid rent to the respondent and therefore, there did not exist landlord-tenant relationship. The leave was also sought on other grounds which, it is not necessary to notice, as they are no....
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....that the premises were let out by her late husband or that the premises were let out by her and that she requires the same for her own residence. The language employed leaves no room for doubt that the widow upon whom a special right has been conferred to claim immediate possession of premises after evicting the tenant must satisfy the condition that the premises were let out by her or by her husband. Clearly, therefore, if this condition is not fulfilled Section 14D will not apply. On the other hand counsel for the respondent heavily relied on the decision of this Court in Kanta Goel (supra) and submitted that for the application of Section 14D it is not necessary that the premises must have been let out either by the petitioning widow or by her husband. For the application of this Section it is enough to prove that she was the landlord of the premises and entitled to institute proceedings qua landlord. The use of the words "let out by him" only convey the idea that the premises must be owned by him directly and the lease must be under him directly. The interpretative function of the Court is to discover the true legislative intent. It is trite that in interpreting a statute the....
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....re of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot re-write or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used. It may be true that use of the expression "shall or may" is not decisive for arriving at a finding as to whether statute is directory or mandatory. But the intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act. It is also equally well settled that when negative words are used the courts will presume that the intention of the legislature was that the provisions should be mandatory in character." Even if there exists some ambiguity in the language or the same is capable of two interpretations, it is trite the interpretation which serves the object and purport of the Act must be given effect to. In such a case the doctrine of purposive construction should be adopted. (See : : Swedish....
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....ccrue to members of the armed forces, etc. (1) Where the landlord (a) is a released or retired person from any armed forces and the premises let out by him are required for his own residence ; or (b) is a dependent of a member of any armed forces who had been killed in action and the premises let out by such member are required for the residence of the family of such member, such person or, as the case may be, the dependent may, within one year from the date of his release or retirement from such armed forces or, as the case may be, the date of death of such member, or within a period of one year from the date of commencement of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, whichever is later, apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises. (2) Where the landlord is a member of any of the armed forces and has a period of less than one year preceding the date of his retirement and the premises let out by him are required for his own residence after his retirement, he may, at any time, within a period of one year before the date of his retirement, apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises. (3) Where th....
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....ses by (i) the members of Armed Forces, (ii) the Central Government and Delhi Administration employees who have retired or who would be retiring and (iii) where the landlord is a widow. All the aforementioned provisions refer to the immediate necessity of the landlord. The provisions contained in Section 14A to 14D being in the nature of exception to the main provision, they must be construed strictly. Where the statute provides for an exemption from the rigours of a beneficial statute for tenants, the landlord with a view to obtain immediate possession thereof must plead and prove the requirements envisaged therein. In other words the conditions precedent contained therein must be complied with. In Kanta Goel (supra) the appellant was a tenant of premises which was a portion on the first floor of the building under the father of the respondent, who was the owner of the premises. After his death, the property devolved upon his three sons and a daughter who were respondents in the appeals. The first respondent, who was in occupation of premises allotted to him by the Government was required by the Government to vacate those premises and consequently he was compelled to take procee....
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....order to vacate, the first respondent had evicted a dwelling house on the first floor and is keeping it vacant. He is again using the same order to vacate passed by the government to evict the appellant's dwelling house. This is obviously contrary to the intendment of Section 14A and is interdicted by the proviso to Section 14A(1). It is true that when an officer is sought to be evicted by the government from its premises he has to be rehabilitated in his own house by an accelerated remedial procedure provided by Section 14A read with Section 25B of the Act. But this emergency provision available merely to put the government servant back into his own residential accommodation cannot be used as a weapon for evicting several tenants if he has many houses let out to various persons. The object of Section 14A is fulfilled once the landlord recovers immediate possession of his premises from one of his tenants. The right is exhausted thereby and is not available for continual applications for eviction against all other tenants holding under him." We may, however, notice that in Kanta Goel (supra) the matter was ultimately compromised which was recorded in the judgment itself, and th....
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....gument was raised before this Court that since the Amending Act 57 of 1988 which carved out a class of classified landlords did not make corresponding amendments particularly to sub- sections (4) and (5) of Section 25B, the tenant's right to contest the application for eviction on the grounds specified in Section 14(1)(e) cannot be denied even as against the classified landlords falling under Section 14B to 14D of the Act. The submission was rejected as its acceptance would practically obliterate the purpose and object of classification of landlords under Sections 14B to 14D who were carved out from the general category of landlords. It was noticed that the remedy under section 14(1)(e) is available only to the landlords in general or the landlords who are not classified landlords under Sections 14B to 14D. The classified landlords have been conferred with certain rights which are different from and independent of rights under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. It was noticed that the two provisions are different in many respects. Comparing the two provisions the Court observed as follows :- " Under Section 14B the right to evict the tenant is available to two categories of persons ....
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....ion his dependant could seek immediate eviction of the premises let out by such person. It is noticeable that the expression, "premises let out by him" is used in Section 14B and 14C, but the expression, in Section 14D is "premises let out by her, or by her husband." Section 14B contemplates two situations, firstly, where the landlord is a released or retired person from any armed forces and secondly, where he was killed in action. In case the landlord was killed in action a right has been given to his dependant within one year of the death of the landlord, to apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of the premises. Section 14C confers a right on a retired employee of the Central Government or of the Delhi Administration who requires the premises let out by him for his own residence. Section 14D confers a right on a widow of the landlord to seek immediate possession of the premises let out "by her, or by her husband". The scheme of these Sections appears to be that where the landlord is alive and the premises have been let out by him, he only can make an application for immediate possession of the premises for his own use. Only in the case of his death his d....
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.... by her husband implies that the provision would not apply to a premises let out by any other person. If the intention of the legislature was to confer an unlimited right on a widow landlord, the use of the words "the premises let out by her, or by her husband" would have been unnecessary and the Section would have simply read as follows:- "Where the landlord is a widow and the premises are required by her for her own residence, she may apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises." By expressly providing that the premises must be one let out by her or by her husband, the legislature has clearly excluded from the purview of the said provision "premises let out by any other person" even if in course of time the widow may have become its landlord. We are obliged to read the provision as it is, and cannot give it a meaning by deleting an expression expressly employed by the legislature. The expression, "let out by her, or by her husband" is not an expression which permits of any ambiguity. We must, therefore, give it its normal meaning. So understood the conclusion is inescapable that the legislature intent was only to confer a special right on a l....