1995 (7) TMI 423
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.... special leave petition was disposed of by this Court on December 2, 1994 with the following order: "In view of the Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court this special leave petition has become infructuous. The special leave petition is disposed of as such." The judgment in Chini Mill's case is by the Bench consisting of B. M. Lall and S.R.Singh,JJ. The question of law decided by the Bench in Chini Mill's case was later on reconsidered by a Full Bench of the High Court which came to the conclusion that the judgment of the Division Bench in Chini Mill's case was contrary to the law laid down by this Court in Nasiruddin Vs. STA Tribunal AIR 1976 BC 331 and as such was not correctly decided. It was in this background - Chini Mill's case having been overruled by the Full Bench of the same court - that this Court did not go into the merits of the special leave petition and disposed of the same as having become infructuous. The jurisprudence governing court-functioning in this country makes a judgment, delivered by a judge or a Bench comprising of more than one judges, the judgment of the court and not of the person holding the judicia....
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....79. In 1925 Oudh Courts Act was passed by the Utter Pradesh Legislature. The Chief Court of Oudh with one Chief Justice and four puisne judges was established replacing the Judicial Commissioner's Court. In 1937 by the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws) Order, 1937, it was provided that the Chief Court of Oudh shall consist of Chief Justice and such other judges as may be appointed under the Government of India Act, 1935. It was in this background that the Governor General made the Amalgamation Order. The said order came into force on July 19, 1948. Clause 3 of the Amalgamation Order provided that as from the appointed day, namely, July 26, 1948, the High Court in Allahabad and the Chief Court in Oudh would be amalgamated and would constitute one High Court by the name of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The judges of the existing High Courts, namely, the Allahabad High Court and the Oudh Chief Court became Judges of the new High Court. The Chief Justice of the existing High Court became the Chief Justice of the new High Court. Clause 14 of the Amalgamation order is as under:- &....
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.... of the Amalgamation Order. The Division Bench of the High Court accepted the contention. B.M. Lall,J. who primarily spoke for the Bench interpreted the relevant expression in clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order in the following words: "Thus in this context if entire provision of Clause 14 is read together, the true intent ingrained in the expression appears to be that the Judges shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise power and jurisdiction vested in the High Court in respect of cases "pertaining to" Oudh area alone and; not pertaining to the area outside the Oudh area. By no stretch of imagination, it can be assumed that the Judges while sitting at Lucknow can exercise power and jurisdiction in respect of any area outside the Oudh area." The learned Judge supported the conclusions reached by the Bench on the following reasoning: "The theory of 'cause of action' originates from the code of Civil Procedure which is of general character and is, therefore, a general law. In ....
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....arisen in the districts where the lis originated. Thus the submissions made by Sri Umesh Chandra in this regard have no legs to stand after 1.2.1977 and the aid taken by Sri Chandra from Nasiruddin's case (supra) is otiose and is of no avail to the petitioners." We are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court fell into patent error in holding that the interpretation placed by this Court on Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order had ceased to be operative after the incorporation of the Explanation to Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This Court in Nasiruddin's case did not rely on the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In fact this Court did not even notice any of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Division Bench of the High Court took shelter behind the Explanation to Section 141 of the code of Civil Procedure without any justification. It created an argument when none existed. We have no hesitation in holding that the reasoning of the High Court in not following the law laid down by this Court in Nasiruddin's case was wholly perverse. This Court in Nasiruddin's case speaking through A.N. Ray, CJ dealt with the relev....
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....iens. The litigant has the right to go to a Court where part of his cause of action arises. In such cases, it is incorrect to say that the litigant chooses any particular Court. The choice is by reason of the jurisdiction of the Court being attracted by part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court. Similarly, if the cause of action can be said to have arisen partly within specified areas in Oudh and partly outside the specified Oudh areas, the litigant will have the choice to institute proceedings either at Allahabad or Lucknow. The Court will find out in each case whether the jurisdiction of the Court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of action." While reaching the above conclusion this Court kept in view the plain language of clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order. No provision of the Code of Civil Procedure was noticed, referred to or taken into consideration directly or indirectly. The territorial jurisdiction of a Court and the "cause of action" are interlinked. To decide the question of territorial jurisdiction it is necessary to find out the place where the "cause of action" arose. We, with respect, reiterate that the law laid down by a Four-J....
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