1949 (5) TMI 13
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....nbsp; ------------------------------------------- | | | Jhuman Lal Daibari Lal Mewa Ram = Mt. Chandan Kuar | ---------------------------------- | |  ....
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....d by them, a pronote of Rs. 8000 executed by one Panna Lal in favour of Fateh Chand Hira Lal, Fateh Chand being the father of the applicants and Hira Lal being the brother of Fateh Chand, was not shown. This pronote was dated 31st October 1927. On 4th March 1937 a creditor Shiva Dayal objected to the list of properties given by the applicants and stated that they had concealed the pronote of 31st October 1927. That pronote was therefore included in the list of properties belonging to the applicants and published in the gazette under Section 10, Encumbered Estates Act. To this list nobody objected with the result that on 8th July 1940 a decree under Section 11 of the Act was passed wherein it was declared that the applicants were possessed of other properties including this pro-note. In due course decrees under Section 14 of the Act were passed and the case was sent to the Collector for liquidation of the debts along with the list of properties as provided under Section 19, Encumbered Estates Act. This list included the pro-note aforesaid. While the liquidation proceedings were pending, the applicants along with Mewa Bam, their grand uncle, filed a suit on the basis of the aforesaid....
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....nts before us and the story, that it belonged either to Mewa Ram exclusively or that it belonged to Mewa Ram, the two applicants, Jain Kuar and Chandan Kuar jointly, was rejected. There was an appeal against this order to the District Judge and he confirmed the order of the Special Judge on 19th January 1944. The matter then became final between the parties. The civil Court, therefore, finally declared that the pronote was the exclusive property of the applicants and that Mewa Ram or Jain Kuar or Chandan Kuar had no share or title thereto. It further held that the applicants were not the members of a joint Hindu family with Mewa Ram. After the Special Judge had rejected the claim of Mewa Ram, Jain Kuar and Chandan Kuar, the liquidation officer ordered the applicants to deposit in Court the amount of Rs. 13,400 which they had received from Ram Dayal Saksena. Against this order the applicants went up in appeal to the Commissioner, The Commissioner dismissed their appeal, but he allowed them time to deposit the amount up to 15th January 1945. The applicants did not deposit the amount and on 11th January 1945 they applied for further time alleging that Mewa Ram had put the money somewh....
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....d in execution of a decree under Section 60, Civil P.C. It was, therefore, necessary for the applicants to show it in their written statement. It was a property which was to be made available to the liquidation officer in order that he might liquidate the applicants' debt. 8. The next contention is that the complaint in this case could not be filed by the liquidation officer as a Court because the offence under Section 422, Penal Code, does not fall within the purview of Section 476 read with Section 195, Criminal P.C. The argument, therefore, is that since the Court, namely, the liquidation officer, had no power to make a complaint, the complaint was invalid and the Magistrate was incompetent to take cognizance thereunder and so the whole trial is accordingly vitiated. 9. It is true that an offence under Section 422, Penal Code is not included in the offences mentioned in Section 195 (1) (b) or (e), Criminal P.C., and therefore the liquidation officer, acting as a civil or revenue Court, could not under the provisions of Section 476, Criminal P.C., make a complaint for an offence which fell under Section 422, Penal Code. This circumstance, however, in our opinion, does n....
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....rictly necessary for answering the question that was referred to the Full Bench. However, that may be, as the observation is contained in a Full Bench judgment we are prepared to consider ourselves bound by it. 12. Assuming, therefore, that a Court has no jurisdiction to make a complaint otherwise than as is provided in Section 476, Criminal P.C., the question is whether the liquidation officer, who made the complaint in the present case, was acting as Court. It is at least arguable that under the Encumbered Estates Act a liquidation officer is not a Court. We, however, do not decide this question as, in our opinion, whether he is a Court or not a Court he, in his capacity as a public officer, was not prevented by any rule of law from making a complaint if he considered that a party in a proceeding pending before him had committed an offence. As a public officer it would be his duty to bring it to the notice of the Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. With exception of certain specified cases in which the law requires a complaint to be made by particular individuals, any person may lodge a complaint about an offence having been committed by a person ....
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....cial duties, to examine such a public servant on oath. If, however, the complaint in the present case is to be treated as a complaint made not by a public servant but by a Court and therefore, invalid, then, in that case, as we have already observed, it is an in. formation within the meaning of Clause (c) of Section 190 (1), Criminal P.C. In such a case under Section 191, Criminal P.C., the Magistrate, receiving : the information and taking cognizance of an offence on receipt of such information, should not try the case himself without informing the accused that he is entitled to have the case tried by another Court. In the present case, however, as we have already noted, the Magistrate, who took cognizance of the case, did not try the case himself. It was tried by another Magistrate. There is, therefore, no defect in the procedure adopted by the trial Court. 15. The view we have expressed above is supported by a number of authorities of this Court. 16. In the case of Bilas Singh v. King Emperor A.I.R. (12) 1925 ALL. 737, an election Commissioner had sent a com-plaint purporting to act as a Court under Section 476, Criminal P.C., and the validity of the complaint was question....
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...., but thereafter a formal writ-ten complaint was lodged. It was held that the case was taken cognizance of only after the formal complaint had been filed, and the mere fact that previous to the making of the complaint the Magistrate had inspected the locality, would not bring the case within the purview of Clause (e) of Section 190 (1), Criminal P.C. There is nothing in this case which in any way, conflicts with our own view. 23. In Lallu Singh v. Emperor A.I.R. (30) 1943 Oudh 226, Ghulam Hasan, J. held that Clause (c) of Section 190 (1), Criminal P.C., applied to oases where the party concerned was not prepared to lodge a formal complaint and prosecute the case, and the Magistrate chose to take cognizance of the offence upon the basis of the information received by him either directly or through persons other than the complainant or the aggrieved party. What happened in that case was that on receipt of a letter from the complainant informing the Magistrate of the offence, the Magistrate forwarded the letter to the police for investigation and, as a result of the investigation, the accused were put up for trial and convicted. It was held that in such a case the Magistrate must b....
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.... proposition that the matter might fall under the purview of Section 190 (1) (c), though not under the purview of Section 190 (1) (a). This case also does, not support the contention of learned Counsel. 26. It is next urged that the learned Magistrate acted illegally in examining certain witnesses after the arguments were over and that, therefore, the trial was vitiated. 27. What happened in this case appears to be this. After the evidence for the prosecution and the defence was over on 28th January 1947, the learned Magistrate fixed 30th January 1947 for the hearing of arguments. While the arguments were being heard and not concluded, the learned Magistrate thought that Hem Chandra Misra,. one of the prosecution witnesses, already examined, should be recalled. He, therefore, ordered that Hem Chandra Misra be recalled and fixed 81st January 1947 for his examination. On 31st January 1947 Hem Chandra Misra was further examined and arguments were again heard. 7th February 1947 was then fixed for judgment On this date the learned Magistrate again considered that two other witnesses, Gajadhar Singh and Siya Ram, should also be recalled. He, therefore, called the counsel and inform....
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....inal P.C. Now these two sections, no doubt, lend colour to the argument advanced by learned Counsel. 30. In Bahshi Ram v. Emperor A.I.R. (25) 1938 ALL. 102 :, it was held that in the present Criminal Procedure Code a trial did not include a judgment and that the trial concluded before the judgment was pronounced. As pointed out by Iqbal Ahmad (as he then was) in that case, although in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1872 the word 'trial' was defined as meaning the proceedings taken in Court after a charge has been drawn up and includes the punishment of the offender. that definition was omitted from the present Criminal Procedure Code. The word 'trial' is therefore not now defined and, as appears from the perusal of Sections 366 and 497 (4), the judgment is not part of the trial. 31. The mere fact, however, that judgment is not included in the word 'trial' does not mean that the trial finally concludes once the arguments are heard and that no evidence (sic. wit-ness?) can be examined after that point of time, even though the judgment has not been pronounced. The Code does not lay down the point of time when a trial is to be deemed to be concluded.....
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