TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2013 (3) TMI 572
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....0 days and a further period of 180 days prescribed by sub-section (2) of section 22 of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, for short, "the Act", and therefore had no jurisdiction to treat within the limitation, an application filed before it beyond such maximum time-limit? It cannot be denied that the appellant failed to register under the Act, despite obtaining a licence to quarry sand, during the financial year 200102 and failed to pay the taxes, leading to an order dated January 9, 2007-annexure A of assessment, called in question in an appeal before the Joint Commissioner, whence by order dated January 9, 2008-annexure B, was dismissed confirming the order of the assessing authority. The petitioner preferred a second appeal to the Karna....
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.... effect to the same, more so since the Act is a taxing statute. The KAT being a creator of the statute vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay within the permissible period provided under the Act, can therefore entertain an application to condone the delay within that period. Sub-section (2) of section 22 of the Act, having made the position clear that an appeal has to be preferred within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order and that if the KAT is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause in presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, can allow it to be presented within a further period of 180 days, the Legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appe....
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....e the delay, observed that there is complete exclusion of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. (c) In Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise v. Hongo India (P) Ltd. [2009] 24 VST 298 (SC); [2010] 2 GSTR 305 (SC); [2009] 315 ITR 449 (SC), regard being had to sections 35G and 35H of the Central Excise Act, 1944, providing for the filing of an appeal and a reference to the High Court within 180 days from the date of communication of the decision or order and the language used in the other provisions, i.e., sections 35, 35B and 35E, observed that the Legislature intended the appeal/revisional authority to entertain an appeal/revision by condoning the delay after expiry of the preliminary period for preferring an appeal and that the absence....