TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2000 (9) TMI 1001
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.... defendant in the suit) in respect of the property and on that strength he claimed to be in possession of the property. He alleged that the defendants 1 to 5 have been threatening to dispossess him. Appellant-plaintiff filed the suit on 25.6.1999 for a decree of permanent injunction restraining defendant Nos.1 to 5 from dispossessing him. Along with the institution of the suit he moved an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the Code) to pass an ad interim injunction restraining respondents 1 to 5 or their men or agents, or their representatives or any person claiming through them or under them from evicting the petitioner from the suit property other than by due process of law and to pass such further or other order or orders. On 29.6.1999 the Assistant Judge of the City Civil Court, Chennai passed the following ex-parte order on the said application: Heard. Documents perused. Rental receipt Document 11 to Document 47 proves that the petitioner is the statutory tenant and prima facie possession of the suit property. Though the property was leased out by R.6 on the basis of mortgage document 3, the petition is now in continuous possess....
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....aterials are relevant for consideration before granting ad interim injunction. As per the plaint and affidavit averments admit that the first respondent is occupying a vacant portion of 1670 sq. ft. and running paper business and charcoal. But there is no document to show that the first respondent is actually in possession and running such a business except the lease deed. Hence the ex-parte order is unsustainable. For all these reasons, I am of the view that the order passed by the learned Judge is liable to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside. After holding thus learned Single Judge directed the trial court to take up the interlocutory application for injunction and pass orders on merits and in accordance with law expeditiously. Sri Sivasubramaniam, learned Senior Counsel contended that the High Court should not have entertained a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution when the respondent had two remedies statutorily available to him. First is that the respondent could have approached the trial court for vacating, if not for any modification, of the interim ex-parte order passed. Second is that an appeal could have been preferred by him against the said order. ....
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....pears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party: [Provided that, where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite-party, the Court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, and require the applicant (a) to deliver to the opposite-party, or to send to him by registered post, immediately after the order granting the injunction has been made, a copy of the application for injunction together with- (i) a copy of the affidavit filed in support of the application; (ii) a copy of the plaint; and (iii) copies of documents on which the applicant relies, and (b) to file, on the day on which such injunction is granted or on the day immediately following that day, an affidavit stating that the copies aforesaid have been so delivered or sent. What would be the position if a court which passed the order granting interim ex parte injunction did not record reasons thereof or did not require the applicant to perform the duties enumer....
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....n writing. What would happen if a Court does not do either of the courses? We have to bear in mind that in such a case the Court would have by-passed the three protective humps which the legislature has provided for the safety of the person against whom the order was passed without affording him an opportunity to have a say in the matter. First is that the Court is obliged to give him notice before passing the order. It is only by way of a very exceptional contingency that the Court is empowered to by-pass the said protective measure. Second is the statutory obligation cast on the Court to pass final orders on the application within the period of thirty days. Here also it is only in very exceptional cases that the Court can by-pass such a rule in which cases the legislature mandates on the court to have adequate reasons for such bypassing and to record those reasons in writing. If that hump is also bypassed by the Court it is difficult to hold that the party affected by the order should necessarily be the sole sufferer. It is the acknowledged position of law that no party can be forced to suffer for the inaction of the court or its omissions to act according to the procedure esta....