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2010 (7) TMI 875

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....it to the parties by speed post. The postal cover containing the award was received by a peon/beldar in the office of the Executive Engineer on 10.11.2007 (a Saturday) which was a government holiday. 11th November, 2007 being a Sunday was also a holiday. It was received by the Executive Engineer on 12.11.2007. 3. A petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ('Act' for short) was filed by the appellant on 11.3.2008, challenging the arbitral award. The petition was accompanied by an application under sub-section (3) of section 34 of the Act, for condonation of delay of 28 days in filing the petition. The respondent resisted the application contending that the petition under section 34 was filed beyond the period ....

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....at if the court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter." Having regard to the proviso to section 34(3) of the Act, the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will not apply in regard to petitions under section 34 of the Act. While section 5 of the Limitation Act does not place any outer limit in regard to the period of delay that could be condoned, the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 34 of the Act places a limit on the period of condonable delay by using the words "may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days but n....

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....ceived the arbitral award. Sub-section (5) of section 31 of the Act provides that after an arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party. If one of the parties to arbitration is a government or a statutory body or a corporation, which has notified holidays or non-working days, and if the award was delivered to it on a holiday, the question is whether the date of physical delivery to the office of a party, should be considered as the date of receipt of the award by the party, or the next working day should be considered as the date of receipt. 7. In Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors [2005 (4) SCC 239], this Court considered the meaning of the word 'received' in Section 31(5) of the Act and held ....

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....ysical delivery is not the date of 'receipt' of the award by that party. The fact that the beldar or a watchman was present on a holiday or non-working day and had received the copy of the award cannot be considered as 'receipt of the award' by the party concerned, for the purposes of section 31(5) of the Act. Necessarily the date of receipt will have to be the next working day. In this case, it is not disputed that though the cover containing the award was delivered to the beldar in the office of the Executive Engineer on 10.11.2007 which was a holiday, the Executive Engineer received the award on 12.11.2007 (Monday), which was the next working day. Therefore we hold that the date of delivery of the award on a holiday (10.11.2007) could no....

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....ap year or not. 10. Sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act and the proviso thereto significantly, do not express the periods of time mentioned therein in the same units. Sub-section (3) uses the words 'three months' while prescribing the period of limitation and the proviso uses the words 'thirty days' while referring to the outside limit of condonable delay. The legislature had the choice of describing the periods of time in the same units, that is to describe the periods as 'three months' and 'one month' respectively or by describing the periods as 'ninety days' and 'thirty days' respectively. It did not do so. Therefore, the legislature did not intend that the period of three months used in sub-section (3) to be equated to 90 days, no....