TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1995 (4) TMI 249
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....nd under the occupation of the defendants. The suit had come to be filed after the plaintiffs had issued a notice to defendants 1 and 2 on 19.10.1947 under section 7 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 terminating the tenancy and claiming that the land was required for personal cultivation. The possession was demanded by the notice on the expiry of 31st March, 1949. In the mean time, the Act came into force whose section 88 (1) (c) stated that the Act would not apply to any area within the limits, inter alia, of the municipal borough of Surat and within a distance of two miles of the limit of the borough. The suit land being admittedly situate within this periphery the Act did not apply, when enacted, to the area in question. However, an amendment was made by Bombay Act 33 of 1952 which substituted a new clause (c) deleting that part of earlier clause (c) which made the Act inapplicable to an area of two miles within the limits of municipal boroughs named in the clause. Now, if the 1952 amendment were to apply retrospectively, that is, from the date coming into force of the act, the civil court in which the suit for eviction was filed would admittedly cease to have jurisdiction; and vi....
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.... a protected tenant under the provisions of 1939 Act would continue to enjoy that status even for the areas covered by clause (c), was not correct, because that Bench somehow missed important words "save as expressly provided in this Act" as finding placed in Section 89 (1) (b) of the Act, reliance on which was placed by Sakharam's Bench to uphold the status of even those protected tenants residing in the area covered by clause (c) of section 88 (1). The Constitution Bench said that section 88(1) (c) was an express provision showing the contrary. 5. Despite what was held in Kamble's case, the contention advanced on behalf of the respondents-tenants is that because of what was held by this court in Mohanlal Chunilal Kothari v. Tribhovan Haribhai Tamboli, [1963] 2 SCR 707 and Hiralal Prabhubhai v. Nagmdas Atmaram Khatri, [1964] 6 SCR 773, the provisions of the 1948 Act, as enacted, have to apply to the facts of the present case. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, what they have contended finds support from the decision in Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula v. Motibhai Nagjibhai Bhai, [1966] 1 SCR 367, in which this Court approved the Full Bench decision of the Bombay ....
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....r any non- agricultural purpose. Though the plaintiffs did state in the notice of termination that the need of the land is bonafide for personal cultivation, that has to be determined, and till this question is decided in favour of the landlord the tenancy cannot be come to an end. We find sufficient force in this contention. Another submission advanced by Shri Vakil is that by force of section 23, as inserted in the 1939 Act, the period of tenancy of the defendants got extended upto 11.1.1952 as the written lease was on 12.1.1942. As such, the tenancy was continuing when the suit was filed in 1949. As to this contention, we would observe that the Act, as enacted, having not saved any right of the protected tenants like the respondents, the benefit of statutory extension to the period of tenancy given to protected tenants by section 23 of the 1939 Act would not be available. It may be pointed out that this is also the view taken by the Letters Patent Bench as would appear from what has been stated at page 200 of the Judgment as printed in the paper book. 9. In so far as Mohanlal's case is concerned, the submission of Shri Dholakia is that that case has dealt with an altogether d....
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....t to take away the same by means of retrospective legislation; and retrospectively can be inferred even by necessary implication. In that case, the provisions of the Assam Non- agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act were made applicable to pending proceedings. 13. The change in law may apply, not only when the proceeding is pending in the court to the first instance, but during pendency of appeals as well, as pointed out in Lakshminarayana v. Niranjan, [1985] 2 SCR 202. In that case, some earlier decisions of this Court on this point were noted, one of which was in the case of Dayavati v. Inderjeet, [1966] 3 SCR 275, in which it was observed that if the new law speaks in language, which expressly or by clear intendment, takes in even pending matters, the court of appeal may give effect to such a law, even after the judgment of the court of the first instance. 14. What is more to the point for our purpose is the decision in H. Shiva Rao v. Sushila, AIR (1987) SC 248, in which a two -Judge Bench held that legal principle that rent control legislations being beneficial have to be given liberal interpretation is well settled. It was further observed that when substantive rights are....
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....ment and observed that if the landlords had obtained an effective decree and had succeeded in ejecting the tenants as a result of that decree, which might have become final between the parties, that decree might not have been reopened and the execution taken thereunder might not have refused. But the second notification had come to be issued during the pendency of the suit, because of which it was held that the court was bound to apply the law as it was found on the date of its judgment, because there was no question of taking away of any vested rights in the landlords. In the present case, the position is precisely what was found in the Mohanlal's case inasmuch as the amendment in question had come into force when the suit of the appellant was pending before the trial court, which goes to show that no vested rights to get possession had accrued to the landlord-plaintiff. 18. In view of the aforesaid, we have no difficulty in holding that insofar as the present case is concerned, the amendment has to be held as applicable to the suit which was pending. Indeed, we would go further and say that even if vested right would have accrued to the landlord by the time the amendment of 19....