TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2002 (2) TMI 1218
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....ques dated 24-12-1993 drawn on Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd., Govindappa Naicken St., Madras were issued for the value of Rs. 1,86,000 each. When the second respondent presented one of the cheques with the bankers, the same was returned as dishonoured on 19-2-1994 with an endorsement 'Payment Stopped'. The other cheque, which was presented with Indian Overseas Bank, Chindadripet Branch, Madras-2 was also dishonoured on 16-3-1994 with an endorsement 'Payment Stopped'. The second respondent thereafter issued lawyer's notices dated 2-3-1994 and 28-3-1994, calling upon the petitioner and the firm to pay the amount covered by those cheques. In spite of the said notices, the amount was not paid. Complaining the action of the petitioner as 'deficiency in service', the second respondent filed the said complaint, inter alia, praying for a direction to the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 3,72,000 towards the chit amount, to pay a sum of Rs. 52,080 towards interest, also for payment of Rs. 1 lakh towards compensation and cost. The 'State Commission' took the complaint on file in O.P. No. 142 of 1994 and issued notices to the writ petitioner and the firm. 2. Even though notices were served on the wr....
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.... enforced by the same as has been done by the impugned order. In support of the said submissions, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment in Chairman, Thiruvalluvar Transport Corpn. v. Consumer Protection Council [1995] (2) SCC 479. 5. Replying to the above submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent submitted that the petitioner, having acquiesced in the proceedings before the 'State Commission', cannot now challenge the same on the ground that the order is nullity for want of jurisdiction. Hence, the learned counsel submitted that the petitioner is estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction when the order of the 'State Commission' has become final and that too at the stage when the said order is sought to be executed. 6. In view of the above rival submissions, the points for determination are as to (1) whether the 'State Commission' could entertain a complaint arising out of Chit Transaction under the provisions of 'the Act' and (2) whether the petitioner is entitled to raise the question of jurisdiction of the 'State Commission' to entertain a complaint in respect of a matter, which is governed und....
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....enactment and the Consumer Protection Act, is a general law. 10. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the abovesaid judgment, the complaint under the Consumer Protection Act in regard to the chit transactions governed under 'the Act' cannot be entertained as 'the Act' is a complete Code providing machinery for settlement of disputes arising out of chit transactions. 11. Keeping the above position of law in mind and the facts of the present case, the point for consideration is as to whether the petitioner can be allowed to take the plea of want of jurisdiction of the 'State Commission' in entertaining a complaint from the second respondent over a chit transaction, bye-passing the remedy under 'the Act' ? 12. For effective consideration of the above points, certain facts are necessarily to be stated : It is not in dispute that the second respondent bid the chit on 25-11-1993 at the discount rate of Rs. 1,28,000 and thereby he became entitled to the payment of prize amount of Rs. 3,72,000. When the petitioner did not pay the said amount, the second respondent ought to have referred the said dispute to the Registrar under section 64 of 'the Act'. Nevertheless, he ch....
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....1922. Assessees who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the ITOs to whom the cases have been transferred had later on challenged the jurisdiction of the ITOs to pass orders. While considering the said challenge, the Supreme Court held that the assessees who acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the ITOs to whom their cases were transferred, were certainly not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, challenging the jurisdiction of the ITOs to entertain and pass orders. The Supreme Court also held that it is well-settled law that such conduct of the petitioners would disentitle them to any relief at the hands of the Supreme Court. 14. In yet another judgment in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corpn. v. Balwant Regular Motor Service AIR 1969 SC 329, the Supreme Court considered a similar question under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. That was also a case, where some private operators submitted to the jurisdiction of the regional transport authority, later on questioned the jurisdiction of the authority to hear the petitions. The Supreme Court while passing an order allowing the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation to commence its operation from 1-7-1967, has he....
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.... as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But, in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy. . . ." (p. 335) 15. In De Bussche v. ALT [1878] Chancery Division/Vol. VIII/286, while considering the issue of acquiescence, it has been held as follows:- "It still remains to be considered whether, short of such ratification or adoption, the Plaintiff can be held to have by his conduct in any way precluded himself from taking....