TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1967 (2) TMI 65
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....esiduary entry 1 of Part VI of that Schedule, and consequently was liable to be assessed at the rate of 4 per cent. of the price of charcoal. In a further appeal before the Board of Revenue, the Board, relying on the dictionary meaning of the word "coal" as given in Blackies' Concise Dictionary, held that charcoal would be included in the term "coal" and, therefore, entry 1 in Part III of Schedule II would apply and the tax chargeable would be at 2 per cent. only. At the instance of the Commissioner of Sales Tax, the Board referred the following question to the High Court: "Whether charcoal is covered under entry 1 of Part III of Schedule II to the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958, and is taxable at the rate of 2 per cent. or will be taxable at the rate of 4 per cent. under entry 1 of Part VI of Schedule II to the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958." The High Court held that while construing entries in a statute like the Sales Tax Acts, the Court should prefer the popular meaning of the terms used in such entries and not their dictionary meanings and that so construed charcoal would be included in the word "coal". Consequently, it answered the question in favour of the respondent. ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....al and charcoal are different products, one being a mineral product, and the other prepared from wood and other articles by human agency, and, therefore, the term "coal" would not cover char- coal; (2) that while construing such entries, the dictionary meaning should not be preferred to the popular meaning or the meaning in the commercial sense; and (3) that the legislative policy in reference to the term "coal " shows that it is not used by the Legislature in India so as to include charcoal. Now, there can be no dispute that while coal is technically understood as a mineral product, charcoal is manufactured by human agency from products like wood and other things. But it is now well- settled that while interpreting items in statutes like the Sales Tax Acts, resort should be had not to the scientific or the technical meaning of such terms but to their popular meaning or the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them, that is to say, to their commercial sense. In Ramavatar Budhaiprasad etc. v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola [1962] 1 S.C.R. 279; 12 S.T.C. 286., the petitioners who were dealers in betel leaves were assessed to sales tax under the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....es, but otherwise no one would consider them as such." This rule was stated as early as 1831 by Lord Tenterden in Attorney-General v. Winstanley [1831] 2 D. & Cl. 302., Similarly, in Grenfell v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1876] 1 Ex. D. 242, 248., Pollock, B., observed, "that if a statute contains language which is capable of being construed in a popular sense such statute is not to be construed according to the strict or technical meaning of the language contained in it, but is to be construed in its popular sense, meaning of course, by the words 'popular sense', that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it." But "if a word in its popular sense and read in an ordinary way is capable of two constructions, it is wise to adopt such a construction as is based on the assumption that Parliament merely intended to give so much power as was necessary for carrying out the objects of the Act and not to give any unnecessary powers. In other words, the construction of the words is to be adopted to the fitness of the matter of the statute." On the other hand, as Fry, J., said in Holt & Co. v. Collyer [1881] 16 Ch. D....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....oal including coke in all its forms is charged at 2 per cent. tax. The State Legislature, however, knew or must be presumed to know that firewood is also used by the people as fuel, but would not fall within that entry, and, therefore, provided 2 per cent. tax on it by a separate entry, namely, entry 8 in Part III. Having taxed coal and firewood at 2 per cent., it does not appear to be possible that the Legislature deliberately left out charcoal from the connotation of the word "coal" and left it to be charged at 4 per cent. under the residuary entry 1 in Part VI. The object of the Legislature clearly was to tax coal and firewood as articles used as fuel and did not make a separate entry in regard to charcoal as it must be aware that coal as understood in ordinary and commercial sense would include charcoal. Had that not been so, instead of leaving it to be dealt with under the residuary item, it would have enacted a separate entry just as it did in the case of firewood which it knew would not in its ordinary meaning fall under the term "coal". In this view, the contention of counsel for the State must be rejected. Counsel then relied upon section 5 of the Colliery Control Order, ....