TaxTMI Updates e-Newsletter
Jul 12,2021

Classification under Tariff/HSN - Branded goods versus unbranded goods (unit container and brand-name exclusion) - Exemption under Notification No.2/2017 (entry for Chapter 3101) - Interpretation of chapter and subheading notes and GI Rules - Taxability under Notification No.1/2017 (Schedule I entries for Chapter 3101 and Hawan samagri) - End-use irrelevance for tariff classification

Classification under Tariff/HSN - Interpretation of chapter and subheading notes and GI Rules - End-use irrelevance for tariff classification - "Gomaya Samidha" is classifiable as organic manure under Chapter 3101 and therefore falls within the tariff entries of Chapter 3101 rather than under HSN 4401 or as plain animal dung sub-heading 31010091. - HELD THAT: - The Authority examined the product composition (95% cowdung and 5% herbs), packaging description and lab report and concluded the product has the characteristics of an organic manure. Applying the chapter and subheading structure and the rules of interpretation, a mixture of cowdung and herbs is not merely animal dung but an organic manure within Chapter 3101, suitably described under the residual subheading for 'other' organic manures. The Authority rejected classification under Chapter 4401 since the product is not of woody origin and the technical and ordinary meanings point to organic manure; end-use as hawan is not decisive for tariff classification where the Chapter and Notes govern classification.

Classified as organic manure under Chapter 3101 (not under HSN 4401 or limited to sub-heading 31010091).

Branded goods versus unbranded goods (unit container and brand-name exclusion) - Exemption under Notification No.2/2017 (entry for Chapter 3101) - "Gomaya Samidha - Patanjali Ayurved ka Utpad" is a branded product put up in a unit container and therefore not eligible for exemption under entry S.No.108 of Notification No.2/2017 for Chapter 3101. - HELD THAT: - Entry S.No.108 exempts 'all goods and organic manure' of Chapter 3101 except those put up in unit containers bearing a registered brand name or a brand name on which an actionable claim exists. The Authority found that the product's packaging links the invented name 'Gomaya Samidha' with 'Patanjali Ayurved ka Utpad', creating a brand connection. Merely printing the manufacturer's name on a package does not always make a product branded, but on the facts the Authority concluded that the applicant has given the product a specific trade name tied to the applicant and thereby created a brand. Consequently the product falls outside the exemption under S.No.108.

Not exempt under S.No.108 of Notification No.2/2017 because the product is branded and supplied in a unit container.

Exemption under Notification No.2/2017 (entry for Chapter 3101) - Interpretation of chapter and subheading notes and GI Rules - The product is not exempt under S.No.113 (entry for Chapter 4401 - firewood or fuel wood) of Notification No.2/2017. - HELD THAT: - Entry S.No.113 covers firewood or fuel wood under Chapter 4401; the Authority held that firewood/fuelwood presupposes origination from wood. 'Gomaya Samidha' is composed of cowdung and herbs and is not material of woody nature; therefore it does not satisfy Chapter 4401 and cannot claim exemption under S.No.113.

Not exempt under S.No.113 of Notification No.2/2017 as it is not firewood or fuel wood.

Taxability under Notification No.1/2017 (Schedule I entries for Chapter 3101) - Branded goods versus unbranded goods (unit container and brand-name exclusion) - "Gomaya Samidha - Patanjali Ayurved ka Utpad" is taxable under S.No.182 of Schedule I to Notification No.1/2017 and thus liable to GST at the applicable combined rate for branded organic fertilisers put up in unit containers. - HELD THAT: - S.No.182 in Schedule I of Notification No.1/2017 applies to goods of Chapter 3101 (animal or vegetable fertilisers or organic fertilisers) put up in unit containers and bearing a brand name. Having found the product to be organic manure supplied in a unit container and bearing a brand name linked to the applicant, the Authority held the product falls squarely within S.No.182 and is therefore taxable at the rate specified in that Schedule (applicable combined GST rate).

Leviable to GST under S.No.182 of Schedule I to Notification No.1/2017 (as a branded organic fertiliser put up in unit container).

Taxability under Notification No.1/2017 (Schedule I entries for Hawan samagri) - Classification under Tariff/HSN - "Gomaya Samidha" does not qualify as 'Hawan Samagri' for the purposes of S.No.263A of Schedule I to Notification No.1/2017 and therefore cannot be taxed under that entry. - HELD THAT: - Entry S.No.263A covers rosaries, prayer beads or Hawan samagri. The Authority examined the product composition and packaging and noted the applicant did not describe the product as 'Hawan Samagri' on the package; the product is essentially an organic manure and not a recognized or complete Hawan samagri mixture. Drawing on precedents that classification must follow tariff descriptions and common or technical meaning where appropriate, the Authority concluded the product does not satisfy the criterion of being Hawan samagri and thus S.No.263A is inapplicable.

Not leviable under S.No.263A (not covered as Hawan samagri).

Final Conclusion: The Authority ruled that 'Gomaya Samidha - Patanjali Ayurved ka Utpad' is an organic manure falling under Chapter 3101 but, being a branded product supplied in a unit container, it is not exempt under S.No.108 or S.No.113 of Notification No.2/2017 and is taxable under S.No.182 of Schedule I to Notification No.1/2017; it does not qualify as 'Hawan Samagri' under S.No.263A.

Jurisdiction to entertain writ in absence of constituted GST Tribunal - release of seized goods on provisional payment and security - penalty under Section 129(1)(a) of the CGST Act - challenge to classification of penalty under Section 129(1)(b) versus Section 129(1)(a) - security in lieu of remaining liability other than cash or bank guarantee

Jurisdiction to entertain writ in absence of constituted GST Tribunal - Entitlement of the High Court to entertain the writ petition in view of non-constitution of the GST Tribunal. - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that the GST Tribunal has not yet been constituted and therefore entertained the present writ petition which challenged orders passed under the GST/IGST statutory scheme. The petition was directed to be connected with an earlier writ (Writ Tax No.279 of 2020) and the respondents were granted a timetable to file their response, indicating the Court's assumption of jurisdiction to proceed with judicial review in the absence of the specialized tribunal.

Writ petition entertained and listed for further consideration after grant of time for respondents' response.

Release of seized goods on provisional payment and security - penalty under Section 129(1)(a) of the CGST Act - security in lieu of remaining liability other than cash or bank guarantee - Whether interim release of seized goods should be permitted and on what terms. - HELD THAT: - Considering the facts and circumstances, the Court directed interim release of the seized goods to the petitioners upon payment of the specified tax together with 100% penalty under Section 129(1)(a) of the Act. For any remaining amount, the Court permitted the petitioners to furnish security other than cash or bank guarantee. The Court made clear that such provisional payments and security are subject to the final adjudication in the matter, thereby preserving the respondents' substantive rights while allowing provisional relief to the petitioners.

Seized goods to be released on payment of specified tax plus 100% penalty under Section 129(1)(a), with remaining liability secured by permissible security; payments subject to final determination.

Challenge to classification of penalty under Section 129(1)(b) versus Section 129(1)(a) - Substantive contention whether penalty liability arises under Section 129(1)(a) or was rightly imposed under Section 129(1)(b). - HELD THAT: - The petitioners contended that at best liability would arise under Section 129(1)(a) and that the Authority erred in treating the matter as falling under Section 129(1)(b). The Court recorded that this question requires consideration and accordingly afforded the respondents time to file a response and directed further hearing after completion of pleadings. The Court did not decide the substantive question on merits but preserved the contest for adjudication.

Substantive issue as to applicability of Section 129(1)(a) versus Section 129(1)(b) not finally decided and left for determination after respondents' response and further hearing.

Final Conclusion: The High Court, exercising jurisdiction due to the non-constitution of the GST Tribunal, entertained the writ, granted interim relief permitting release of seized goods upon provisional payment (specified tax plus 100% penalty under Section 129(1)(a)) and suitable security for the balance, and refrained from finally deciding the contested question whether penalty liability properly falls under Section 129(1)(a) or Section 129(1)(b), directing further pleadings and hearing.

Pre-SCN consultation requirement - trade facilitation and voluntary compliance under paragraph 5.0 of the Master Circular - sufficiency of summons and exchanged responses as consultation - judicial interference with show cause notice at pre-adjudicatory stage

Pre-SCN consultation requirement - trade facilitation and voluntary compliance under paragraph 5.0 of the Master Circular - sufficiency of summons and exchanged responses as consultation - Whether the requirement of holding a pre-SCN consultation in terms of paragraph 5.0 of the Master Circular was complied with in the present case - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the object of paragraph 5.0 - namely trade facilitation and promotion of voluntary compliance to reduce the need for issuing show cause notices - is satisfied by conduct that effectively engages the person or entity in consultation. Where the Department had issued multiple summons to the petitioner and its director and examined documents produced and posed detailed questions (as reflected in the SCN itself), that process constituted the consultation contemplated by the Master Circular. The Department could not have formulated the issues or demand for the SCN prior to receiving and examining responses to summons; the interrogation of documents and answers given amounted to the requisite pre-SCN consultation envisaged by paragraph 5.0. [Paras 7, 8]

The requirement of a pre-SCN consultation under paragraph 5.0 of the Master Circular is satisfied in the facts of this case; the petition seeking to set aside the SCN on that ground is rejected.

Judicial interference with show cause notice at pre-adjudicatory stage - Whether the Court should interfere with the impugned show cause notice at the present stage and what interim relief, if any, should be granted - HELD THAT: - Having held that the pre-SCN consultation requirement is met, the Court declined to interfere with the impugned SCN at this stage. The Court observed that the petitioner is entitled to advance any defence before the Department in accordance with law and therefore extended the time to file a reply to the SCN to a specified date to enable the petitioner to respond. [Paras 9]

No interference with the SCN; time to reply to the SCN is extended.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition is disposed of by holding that the Master Circular's pre-SCN consultation requirement is satisfied by the summons, production of documents and answers given; the Court refuses to quash the SCN at this stage and grants an extension of time to the petitioner to file its reply.

Summary order. Respondent-State granted three weeks to file response; rejoinder, if any, permitted within one week; matter listed for hearing on 11th August, 2021.

Violation of principles of natural justice - ex parte order - quashing of administrative order - remand for fresh adjudication on merits - opportunity to be heard - stay on coercive action - deposit as condition precedent to hearing of appeal - acceptance of delay due to COVID-19 restrictions

Violation of principles of natural justice - ex parte order - quashing of administrative order - Impugned demand and appellate orders were quashed on account of violation of the principles of natural justice and being ex parte without sufficient reasons. - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the summary demand order and the appellate order did not afford the petitioner adequate opportunity to represent its case and were passed ex parte without assigning decipherable reasons as to how the liability was determined. Such defect in procedure and absence of reasons rendered the orders legally unsustainable and entitled the petitioner to relief notwithstanding the availability of statutory remedies. The Court therefore set aside the impugned orders to ensure adjudication in conformity with the right to be heard.

Impugned orders dated 13.03.2020, 26.02.2021 (GST APL-04) and 25.02.2021 were quashed and set aside.

Remand for fresh adjudication on merits - opportunity to be heard - Matter remitted to the Assessing Authority for fresh decision on merits after affording adequate opportunity and considering all documents. - HELD THAT: - Having quashed the earlier orders for procedural infirmities, the Court directed that the Assessing Authority decide the liability afresh on merits. The Assessing Authority is to comply with the principles of natural justice, afford opportunity to place necessary documents and materials, and pass a reasoned order. The Court expressly left all issues on merit open for fresh consideration and urged expeditious disposal; a preferred two-month timeline from the petitioner's appearance was indicated.

Proceedings remitted to Assessing Authority for fresh adjudication on merits with directions to afford adequate hearing and to decide expeditiously.

Deposit as condition precedent to hearing of appeal - stay on coercive action - de-freezing of bank accounts - Interim directions were issued regarding deposits, de-freezing of bank accounts and prohibition of coercive steps during pendency. - HELD THAT: - The Court recorded the petitioner's statement that ten per cent of the total amount as a condition precedent for hearing of the appeal had been deposited and directed that, if not already deposited, it shall be deposited before the next date. The petitioner was further directed to deposit an additional ten per cent of the demanded amount within four weeks. These deposits were ordered to be without prejudice to parties' contentions and refundable if found excessive. The Court ordered immediate de-freezing/de-attachment of any bank accounts attached in relation to the subject proceedings and prohibited coercive action during pendency.

Petitioner to deposit amounts as directed; bank accounts to be unfrozen; no coercive steps to be taken during pendency; refunds if deposits found excessive.

Acceptance of delay due to COVID-19 restrictions - Delay in prosecuting the appeal was accepted as sufficiently explained on account of COVID-19 restrictions and the appellate rejection on limitation ground was set aside. - HELD THAT: - The Court recorded that the delay caused during the COVID-19 period was sufficiently explained and, in view of the circumstances, concluded that the appellate dismissal solely on the ground of limitation was not sustainable. Accordingly, the appellate order rejecting the petitioner's appeal as time-barred was quashed to permit adjudication on merits.

Delay on account of COVID-19 accepted; appellate dismissal on limitation ground set aside.

Final Conclusion: The High Court quashed the impugned demand and appellate orders for breach of natural justice and absence of reasons, accepted COVID-19 related delay, remitted the matter to the Assessing Authority for fresh merits adjudication after affording adequate hearing, directed specified interim deposits, ordered de-freezing of accounts and prohibited coercive action during pendency, while leaving all substantive issues open for fresh decision.

Violation of principles of natural justice - ex parte order - quashing of administrative/assessment orders - remand for fresh adjudication on merits - interim protection from coercive action - conditional deposit as pre condition for adjudicatory hearing - de freezing of bank accounts - court interference notwithstanding availability of statutory remedy where order is bad in law

Violation of principles of natural justice - ex parte order - quashing of administrative/assessment orders - court interference notwithstanding availability of statutory remedy where order is bad in law - Impugned ex parte orders were quashed on the ground that they were passed in breach of principles of natural justice and without sufficient reasons discernible from the record. - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the appellate and assessing orders were ex parte and did not afford the petitioner adequate opportunity to be heard; the orders likewise failed to assign sufficient reasons as to how the demand was determined. The delay in seeking relief was held to be sufficiently explained by COVID restrictions. On this short but determinative ground of denial of fair hearing and absence of reasoned findings, the impugned orders were set aside even though statutory remedies existed, because the Court formed the view that the orders were bad in law.

Impugned appellate and assessing orders set aside for being ex parte and in violation of principles of natural justice; matters remitted for fresh consideration.

Remand for fresh adjudication on merits - opportunity to place on record documents - decision on merits after complying with principles of natural justice - The matter was remitted to the Assessing Authority to decide afresh on merits after affording adequate opportunity of hearing and permitting the parties to place relevant material on record. - HELD THAT: - The Court directed that the Assessing Authority shall decide the case on merits after complying with the principles of natural justice and shall afford parties opportunity to produce essential documents. The Court expressly left all merits open and did not express any opinion on substantive questions; it also directed that the authority should, if possible, conduct proceedings digitally and dispose the matter expeditiously, preferably within two months from the date of the petitioner's appearance.

Matter remanded to Assessing Authority for de novo adjudication on merits with directions to afford fair hearing and conclude expeditiously.

Interim protection from coercive action - conditional deposit as pre condition for adjudicatory hearing - de freezing of bank accounts - Interim reliefs were granted: (a) no coercive steps during pendency; (b) de freezing/de attachment of bank accounts, if attached; and (c) directions concerning deposits to be made by the petitioner as condition for hearing. - HELD THAT: - The Court accepted the petitioner's statement that ten per cent of the total amount had been deposited as the condition precedent for hearing; it directed that, and further ordered the petitioner to deposit an additional ten per cent of the demand within four weeks. The deposit and any refund if found excessive were to be without prejudice to the parties' substantive rights. The Court restrained coercive action during pendency and directed immediate de freezing of bank accounts attached in respect of the subject proceedings.

Petitioner to ensure prescribed deposits; bank accounts to be de frozen; no coercive steps to be taken during pendency; deposits to be refundable if found excessive.

Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed by quashing the impugned ex parte appellate and assessing orders for breach of natural justice and lack of reasoned findings; the matter is remitted to the Assessing Authority for fresh adjudication on merits after affording fair opportunity, with interim directions on deposits, de freezing of bank accounts and prohibition of coercive action during pendency.

Payment of GST on works contracts executed prior to GST implementation and continued post implementation - neutralisation of additional tax burden arising from transition to GST - contractual allocation of tax liabilities in public works contracts - direction to decide representation by a speaking order after affording hearing

Direction to decide representation by a speaking order after affording hearing - Petitioner's representation is to be considered and decided by the Principal Secretary, Public Works Department, by a speaking order after providing opportunity of hearing within three months. - HELD THAT: - The petitioner submitted a representation seeking payment/reimbursement of GST and related reliefs following the implementation of GST w.e.f. 01.07.2017. Having noted the representation (to be filed by the petitioner) and the pendency of an identical matter (WP-1310-2021), the High Court did not adjudicate the substantive merits of the claim. Instead, the Court directed the Principal Secretary, Public Works Department to decide the representation by a speaking order after affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing within a period of three months from production of a copy of the Court's order. The direction is administrative and procedural, aimed at ensuring the executive considers the grievance on merits and records reasons, without expressing any view on the entitlement to the reliefs sought.

Respondent No.1 to decide the petitioner's representation by a speaking order, after hearing, within three months.

Payment of GST on works contracts executed prior to GST implementation and continued post implementation - neutralisation of additional tax burden arising from transition to GST - contractual allocation of tax liabilities in public works contracts - Claims concerning entitlement to GST payment/reimbursement and related policy for works contracts executed before 01.07.2017 but continued thereafter are remitted to the executive for fresh consideration. - HELD THAT: - The Court refrained from deciding the substantive controversy as to whether GST liability or reimbursement is due to contractors for works executed partly after GST implementation. Instead, by directing the Principal Secretary to decide the representation by a reasoned order after hearing, the Court effectively remitted the factual and policy issues-including whether and how contractors should be compensated or neutralised for additional GST burden-to the executive authority for fresh consideration. The order requires the authority to address the contention that earlier bid documents and SORs did not account for GST and to consider representations and analogous administrative measures taken by other authorities, but does not resolve the legal entitlement itself.

Substantive claims about GST payment/reimbursement and related policy are remitted to the executive for fresh consideration and decision on merits.

Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed by directing the Principal Secretary, Public Works Department to decide the petitioner's representation by a speaking order after hearing within three months; the Court did not adjudicate the substantive entitlement to GST reimbursement and remitted those matters for fresh consideration.

Summary order. Petition seeking to challenge Notification dated 1st May 2021 (and impugning Notification dated 3rd May 2021) disposed only to permit amendment of the writ petition (to add notifications of Haryana and Gujarat) within one week; re-verification dispensed with; respondents directed to file affidavits in reply within two weeks; matter posted to 7th June 2021.

Characterisation of carbon credit / CDM receipts as capital receipt - characterisation of carbon credit / CDM receipts as revenue / business receipt - eligibility for deduction under Section 80IA - precedential value of earlier judicial determinations declaring the legal position - capital v. revenue distinction tests (enduring benefit / fixed v. circulating capital)

Characterisation of carbon credit / CDM receipts as capital receipt - characterisation of carbon credit / CDM receipts as revenue / business receipt - precedential value of earlier judicial determinations declaring the legal position - capital v. revenue distinction tests (enduring benefit / fixed v. circulating capital) - Proceeds realised by the assessee on sale of Certified Emission Reduction / carbon credits earned under the Clean Development Mechanism are capital receipts and not taxable as business income. - HELD THAT: - The Division Bench found the question covered by earlier appellate authority and High Court decisions which treated receipts from sale of carbon credits (including Certified Emission Reduction credits / CDM receipts) as capital in nature. The court noted precedent applying established tests for distinguishing capital and revenue - including whether an asset or enduring advantage in the capital field is created and the fixed-versus-circulating-capital considerations - and accepted the view that carbon credits are an offshoot of environmental concerns, not an asset generated in the ordinary course of the business activity of power/wind generation. Reliance was placed on prior decisions which held that such receipts are not directly linked to the core business operations and therefore constitute capital receipts. In view of those authorities, no substantial question of law arose for re examination and the Tribunal's conclusion that the receipts are capital in nature was affirmed.

The Tribunal's holding that the CDM / carbon credit receipts are capital receipts and not taxable as business income is upheld; appeal dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal, holding that the sale proceeds of Certified Emission Reduction (carbon) credits in Assessment Year 2009-10 are capital receipts (not taxable as business income) and that earlier judicial decisions supporting that view govern the matter.

Assessment/reassessment under Section 153C - reopening proceedings under Section 147/148 - abatement of proceedings on receipt of seized materials - handing over of seized materials to jurisdictional Assessing Officer - reason to believe - jurisdiction to issue show cause notice - principles of natural justice - colourable exercise of power / legal malice

Assessment/reassessment under Section 153C - handing over of seized materials to jurisdictional Assessing Officer - abatement of proceedings on receipt of seized materials - Validity of notices issued under Section 153C and effect of receipt/handing over of seized materials on pending Section 147/148 proceedings. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that Section 153C may be invoked only after the seized materials from the searched person are handed over to the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over the 'other person' and after the Assessing Officer records the requisite written satisfaction. Where seized materials were officially handed over to the jurisdictional officer for the petitioners and the Assessing Officer recorded satisfaction thereafter, the special procedure under Section 153C (read with Section 153A) applied and any pending reopening proceedings under Section 147/148 stood abated by operation of the proviso to Section 153A. The Court found from departmental files that the seized materials were handed over (received on 28.11.2019), satisfaction recorded and notices issued thereafter (16.12.2019). Consequently the invocation of Section 153C and issuance of show cause notices were within the statutory scheme and not vitiated for want of procedure. [Paras 118, 119, 121, 122, 127]

Notices under Section 153C were validly issued after handing over of seized materials and recording of satisfaction; pending Section 147/148 proceedings stood abated on receipt of those materials.

Reopening proceedings under Section 147/148 - reason to believe - jurisdiction to issue show cause notice - Whether initiation of Section 147/148 proceedings earlier precluded later proceedings under Section 153C or amounted to colourable exercise of power. - HELD THAT: - The Court examined the sequence of events and distinguished the informations initially received by the Assessing Officer from the full set of seized materials handed over later. It recognized that an AO may initiate reopening under Section 147/148 on information available to him (having 'reason to believe'), but that does not permit invocation of Section 153C until the statutory handover and satisfaction requirements are met. The Court rejected the petitioners' contention that the earlier initiation of Section 147/148 and the lapse of limitation required completion of those proceedings irrespective of subsequent receipt of seized materials. On facts, the Court found no demonstrable colourable exercise or lack of jurisdiction: the AO acted on information to start Section 147/148 and later, upon receipt of seized materials, validly proceeded under Section 153C. [Paras 116, 120, 121, 123, 126]

Initiation of Section 147/148 did not preclude later valid initiation of Section 153C once seized materials were handed over; no jurisdictional defect or established colourable exercise of power was made out.

Principles of natural justice - colourable exercise of power / legal malice - jurisdiction to issue show cause notice - Whether the Section 153C show cause notices were vitiated by mala fide, vagueness or breach of natural justice at the notice stage. - HELD THAT: - The Court reiterated that high courts ordinarily do not quash show cause notices unless issuance is without jurisdiction or on malafide grounds. It considered the petitioners' allegations of contradictory or vague cases and legal malice but found no established malafide or jurisdictional infirmity in the material before it. The Court observed that detailed fact-finding and contested adjudication are for the assessing authority and appellate fora; at the show cause stage the petitioners must be allowed to answer and test the materials. Given the compliance with procedural prerequisites (handover, satisfaction, issuance of notice) and absence of demonstrable bad faith, interference at writ stage was unwarranted. [Paras 121, 123, 125, 126, 129]

Allegations of mala fide, vagueness or breach of natural justice were not established; writ relief at show cause stage was declined and petitioners directed to avail statutory remedies.

Final Conclusion: Writ petitions challenging the Section 153C show cause notices were dismissed. The High Court held that the Assessing Officer validly proceeded under Section 153C after receipt of seized materials and recording of satisfaction, that pending Section 147/148 proceedings stood abated on that basis, and that no jurisdictional malice or breach of natural justice had been shown to warrant quashing the notices at the interlocutory stage; petitioners must pursue the statutory adjudicatory process.

Validity of omnibus show-cause notice - Non-application of mind in penalty proceedings - Requirement of specificity in penalty notices - Prejudice and principles of natural justice in penalty proceedings - Penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act - Strict construction of penal provisions

Validity of omnibus show-cause notice - Non-application of mind in penalty proceedings - Requirement of specificity in penalty notices - Penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act - Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) could be sustained where the assessing officer issued an omnibus printed show-cause notice without deleting inapplicable portions and without specifying whether concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars was alleged. - HELD THAT: - Applying the Full Bench decision of the Jurisdictional High Court in Mohd. Farhan A Shaikh (reproduced and followed), the Tribunal held that omnibus printed notices which retain irrelevant portions and thereby leave ambiguity as to the nature of the charge betray non-application of mind. Penal provisions must be strictly construed and a vague or omnibus notice gives rise to prejudice and violates principles of natural justice. The Tribunal observed that Dilip N. Shroff and the Full Bench reasoning disapprove of routine use of form notices without striking off inapplicable parts, and that where the mandatory requirement of a clear notice is contravened the defect is fatal to the penalty proceedings. Relying on these authorities and the principle that ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the assessee, the Tribunal directed deletion of the penalty for both assessment years. [Paras 3]

Penalty imposed under section 271(1)(c) is deleted for A.Y.2005-06 and A.Y.2010-11 as the show-cause notice was omnibus and reflected non-application of mind.

Prejudice and principles of natural justice in penalty proceedings - Strict construction of penal provisions - Status of other grounds raised by the assessee challenging the legality and merits of the penalty after deletion on the omnibus-notice ground. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal expressly confined its decision to the preliminary ground (ground No.1(e)) concerning the omnibus notice and its consequences. Because relief was granted on that ground, the Tribunal did not adjudicate the remaining grounds on legality and merits and left those grounds open for consideration in appropriate proceedings. No decision on the merits of those other grounds was rendered. [Paras 3]

Other grounds raised by the assessee are not adjudicated and are left open for future consideration.

Final Conclusion: Both appeals are allowed: the penalty under section 271(1)(c) is deleted for A.Y.2005-06 and A.Y.2010-11 on the ground that the omnibus show-cause notice exhibited non-application of mind; other grounds remain undecided and are left open.

Assessment under section 153A read with section 153C - Requirement of incriminating material found during search to tinker a concluded assessment - Documents seized on third party premises must 'pertain to' the assessee - Concluded assessment cannot be reopened without relatable incriminating material - Burden of proof under section 68 (identity, creditworthiness and genuineness) - Invocation of Rule 27 of the ITAT Rules to challenge a jurisdictional finding

Assessment under section 153A read with section 153C - Requirement of incriminating material found during search to tinker a concluded assessment - Documents seized on third party premises must 'pertain to' the assessee - Validity of invoking section 153A/153C to reopen the concluded assessment for AY 2009-10 where seized documents were recovered from a third party and whether those documents were 'incriminating material' pertaining to the assessee. - HELD THAT: - Search on Akruti Hotels Pvt. Ltd. yielded share certificates and transfer forms which were in the names of individual shareholders and a corporate shareholder and thus were the property of those shareholders, not of the assessee company. The Tribunal held that mere recovery of share certificates from a third party's premises does not establish that those documents 'pertain to' the assessee in the sense required to trigger assessment under section 153C prior to 01.06.2015. The Tribunal examined the authorities relied upon and noted that the Delhi High Court's decision in Anil Kumar Bhatia did not address the situation where no incriminating material relating to the assessee was found on search; the Supreme Court's decision in Sinhgad Technical Education Society was taken to support the proposition that a concluded assessment may be reopened only if incriminating material relating to the assessee is found. Applying these principles, the Tribunal found no incriminating material in respect of the assessee arising from the seizure and concluded that the assessing officer lacked a valid basis to tinker the concluded assessment year 2009-10 on that basis. Consequently, the revenue's jurisdictional ground failed and the addition under section 68 based on the said seized documents could not be sustained on jurisdictional grounds. The Tribunal expressly left open the merits of the section 68 addition for the assessing officer to pursue if appropriate. [Paras 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]

Addition made under section 68 by invoking section 153A/153C for AY 2009-10 is not sustainable because no incriminating material pertaining to the assessee was found; jurisdictional challenge succeeds and the revenue appeal is dismissed on this ground, with merits left open.

Final Conclusion: The appeal filed by the Department is dismissed on the jurisdictional ground that no incriminating material pertaining to the assessee was found during the search on a third party, so the concluded assessment for AY 2009-10 could not be reopened under section 153A/153C; the question on the merits of the addition under section 68 is left open.

Substantiation of the manner of earning undisclosed income - payment of taxes with interest in due time under section 271AAA(2)(iii) - penalty under section 271AAA - adjustment of seized cash towards advance tax liability

Substantiation of the manner of earning undisclosed income - Assessee had substantiated and specified the manner in which the surrendered undisclosed income was derived. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted that the Commissioner (Appeals) had already accepted the assessee's contentions on this condition and returned a finding in favour of the assessee. Having considered the facts, submissions and judicial pronouncements relied upon, the Tribunal agreed with the appellate finding that the second condition-substantially explaining the manner in which the undisclosed income was derived-was satisfied by the assessee. [Paras 7, 8]

First question decided in favour of the assessee; the requirement to specify and substantiate the manner of earning the surrendered income is satisfied.

Payment of taxes with interest in due time under section 271AAA(2)(iii) - adjustment of seized cash towards advance tax liability - Assessee has, on the material on record and in view of a coordinate Bench's final quantum order, paid taxes along with interest in due time as required by section 271AAA(2)(iii); entitlement to credit of seized cash also established by the coordinate Bench, but verification by AO directed. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined Form 26AS, dates of deposit and the coordinate Bench's quantum order which had attained finality. That order held that the surrendered income included seized cash and that the assessee was entitled to adjustment of the seized cash towards advance tax liability. In light of that binding finding and the payments recorded, the Tribunal concluded that the assessee satisfied the requirement of payment of tax with interest in due time under section 271AAA(2)(iii). However, the Tribunal directed that the payment of due taxes along with interest be verified by the Assessing Officer, thereby entrusting the AO with confirmation of the payments and adjustments recorded. [Paras 9, 14, 16]

Second question answered in favour of the assessee subject to verification by the AO of the payments and adjustment of seized cash towards tax liability.

Final Conclusion: Penalty under section 271AAA confirmed by the lower authorities is set aside: Tribunal deletes the penalty since the assessee satisfied the substantiation requirement and, in view of the coordinate Bench's final quantum order and payments shown, met the payment-with-interest condition under section 271AAA(2)(iii), although the Assessing Officer is directed to verify the payments and adjustments.

Prospective application of statutory amendment - power under section 200A to compute fee under section 234E - invalidity of intimation issued under section 200A for periods prior to 01.06.2015 - follow the view favourable to the assessee where High Court decisions conflict

Prospective application of statutory amendment - power under section 200A to compute fee under section 234E - invalidity of intimation issued under section 200A for periods prior to 01.06.2015 - Levy of late filing fee under section 234E by issuing intimation under section 200A in respect of TDS statements relating to the period prior to 01.06.2015. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the amendment inserting clause (c) in section 200A(1) (enabling computation of fee under section 234E) came into effect w.e.f. 01.06.2015 and is prospective in operation. For TDS/TCS statements relating to periods prior to 01.06.2015, the Assessing Officer was not empowered under section 200A to compute or levy fee under section 234E by issuing intimation under section 200A. In view of conflicting High Court decisions, the Tribunal followed the ratio favourable to the assessee (as laid down by the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court) and the principle that where High Courts differ the view beneficial to the assessee should be followed. Consequently, intimations issued under section 200A charging fees under section 234E for periods prior to 01.06.2015 were held not maintainable and the demands could not survive. The Tribunal also recorded that where the fee is deleted, consequential interest charged under section 220(2) falls away. [Paras 11, 12, 16]

The demand intimated under section 200A by charging late filing fee under section 234E for defaults prior to 01.06.2015 is invalid; the fee and consequential interest are deleted.

Final Conclusion: Following coordinate-bench decisions and the view of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court, the Tribunal allowed the appeal, set aside the intimation under section 200A insofar as it charged fee under section 234E for the period prior to 01.06.2015, and directed deletion of the late fee and consequential interest.

Penalty under section 271(1)(c) for concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income - Validity of notice issued under section 274 initiating penalty proceedings - Requirement to specify which limb of section 271(1)(c) is invoked - Assessing Officer's recorded satisfaction as a condition precedent to penalty initiation - Disallowance of expenses as difference of opinion not inviting penalty - Consideration of amnesty scheme benefit in assessment and penalty proceedings

Validity of notice issued under section 274 initiating penalty proceedings - Requirement to specify which limb of section 271(1)(c) is invoked - Notice issued under section 274 read with section 271(1)(c) which did not specify whether proceedings were for concealment of particulars of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars was invalid and vitiated the penalty proceedings. - HELD THAT: - The notice issued to the assessee incorporated both limbs of section 271(1)(c) without specifying which limb was the basis for initiating penalty proceedings, rendering it vague and ambiguous. The Tribunal followed the precedents relied upon by the parties, including CIT vs. Manjunatha Cotton & Ginning Factory , CIT vs. SSA's Emerald Meadows and Pr. CIT vs. Sahara India Life Insurance Company Ltd. , which hold that absence of specification as to which limb of section 271(1)(c) is invoked makes the notice bad in law. A penal charge must be framed with sufficient particularity so that the assessee knows the case to be met; a notice that leaves the charge indeterminate fails this requirement and cannot sustain penalty proceedings. Having found the notice to be vague and ambiguous, the initiation of penalty under section 271(1)(c) is unsustainable. [Paras 9, 12]

Notice was invalid; penalty proceedings initiated thereon are not sustainable.

Assessing Officer's recorded satisfaction as a condition precedent to penalty initiation - Penalty under section 271(1)(c) for concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income - Disallowance of expenses as difference of opinion not inviting penalty - Consideration of amnesty scheme benefit in assessment and penalty proceedings - Absence of proper recorded satisfaction by the Assessing Officer and treatment of disallowances that reflect mere differences of opinion (including failure to consider amnesty benefit) render the penalty unsustainable on merits. - HELD THAT: - The assessment order excerpt relied upon by the Assessing Officer stated initiation of penalty on the basis that the assessee 'has furnished inaccurate particulars of its income' but the AO later levied penalty for concealment; this demonstrates lack of coherent application of mind and absence of the requisite recorded satisfaction. Further, one of the disallowances related to prior period electricity expenses where the assessee had availed an amnesty scheme from the Electricity Department; the AO never disputed the genuineness of the expenses but took a different view in disallowing them. Where a disallowance arises from a difference of opinion and the genuineness is not impugned, the conduct does not attract the penal provision of section 271(1)(c). In view of the defective satisfaction and the nature of the disallowances, the penalty cannot be sustained on merits. [Paras 13, 14, 15]

Penalty initiation lacked valid recorded satisfaction and, given the disallowances resulted from difference of opinion and amnesty benefit was not considered, penalty is unsustainable on merits.

Final Conclusion: The penalty under section 271(1)(c) levied for assessment year 2010-11 was deleted because the notice under section 274 was vague and ambiguous and the Assessing Officer had not recorded a valid satisfaction; further, the disallowances constituted differences of opinion (with amnesty benefit unconsidered) and did not attract the penal provision. The assessee's appeal is allowed.

Admission of additional evidence - Deduction under Section 54 - Onus of proof for exemption claims - Remand for fresh adjudication

Admission of additional evidence - Deduction under Section 54 - Onus of proof for exemption claims - Remand for fresh adjudication - Ld. CIT(A) erred in refusing to admit the additional documents filed by the assessee and the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication of the claim of deduction under Section 54 after admitting those documents. - HELD THAT: - The assessee produced additional documents in the form of an allotment letter dated 28/03/2014 and an agreement dated 30/03/2016 which directly bear on the claim for deduction under Section 54. The Tribunal found that these documents were material to determine whether the conditions of Section 54 were fulfilled and therefore ought to have been admitted by the Ld. CIT(A). Since the documents could materially affect the factual conclusion on the exemption claim, the Tribunal directed that the additional evidence be admitted, and that the Ld. CIT(A) re-adjudicate the deduction claim in the light of these documents and the existing factual matrix, with the assessee required to substantiate the claim. The Tribunal also noted the burden on the assessee to demonstrate fulfillment of the conditions for the exemption but left the factual determination to the appellate authority upon admission of the evidence. The Tribunal further directed that, given the assessee's non-resident status, the appeal be disposed of preferably within six months from receipt of the order. [Paras 6]

Additional evidence to be admitted; matter remanded to Ld. CIT(A) to re-adjudicate the claim of deduction under Section 54 after considering the newly admitted documents; direction for disposal preferably within six months.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal set aside the refusal to admit the additional evidence, directed admission of the allotment letter and agreement, and remanded the claim for deduction under Section 54 to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh consideration; the appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.

Validity of jurisdiction under section 158BD - Condition precedent of handing over seized books, documents or assets - Invocation of block assessment provisions where jurisdictional conditions not met - Quashing of proceedings under section 158BD/143(3)

Validity of jurisdiction under section 158BD - Condition precedent of handing over seized books, documents or assets - Quashing of proceedings under section 158BD/143(3) - Jurisdictional conditions for assuming jurisdiction under section 158BD were not satisfied and the proceedings under section 158BD/143(3) are vitiated. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found on the record that notice under section 158BD was issued on 4.9.1997 but the seized books/documents pertaining to the assessee were handed over to the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction only thereafter (correspondence and acknowledgements dated after 4.9.1997 are on the file). Reliance was placed on the principle affirmed by the Supreme Court in Manish Maheshwari that before invoking section 158BD against a person other than the searched person, the condition precedent of handing over seized/requisitioned books, documents or assets to the AO having jurisdiction over that other person must be satisfied. Applying that principle to the admitted chronology on the record, the Tribunal held that the AO assumed jurisdiction under section 158BD without receipt of the seized material and therefore the statutory conditions for invoking section 158BD were not met. Consequentially, the block assessment framed under section 158BD read with section 143(3) is vitiated and liable to be quashed. As the appeal succeeds on this legal ground, other grounds including merits were not adjudicated. [Paras 16, 17, 18]

Proceedings under section 158BD/143(3) quashed because seized books/documents were not handed over to the AO before assumption of jurisdiction under section 158BD.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed: the assessee's block assessment proceedings under section 158BD/143(3) are quashed on the ground that the jurisdictional requirement of handing over the seized material to the AO before invoking section 158BD was not satisfied.

Depreciation on commercial vehicles - Third proviso to clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 32 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 - use of plant and machinery for own business as distinct from running vehicles on hire - Annexure I to the Income Tax Rules, 1962 - category-based higher depreciation

Depreciation on commercial vehicles - Third proviso to clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 32 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 - use of plant and machinery for own business as distinct from running vehicles on hire - Annexure I to the Income Tax Rules, 1962 - category-based higher depreciation - Whether the assessee is entitled to higher rate of depreciation (30%/40%) under the third proviso to clause (ii) of s.32(1) in respect of JCBs and trucks when the assets are used in the assessee's own contracting business and not run on hire. - HELD THAT: - The Assessing Officer reduced the claim to 15% on the basis that the assessee did not run a business of hiring commercial vehicles; the CIT(A) confirmed that view. The Tribunal examined the third proviso to s.32(1)(ii) and Annexure I to the Income Tax Rules, 1962 and held that those provisions and categories which permit higher rates apply where vehicles are used for hire or otherwise fall within the specific Annexure I categories. The assessee undisputedly used the JCBs and trucks for its own subcontracting business and did not operate them on hire; its case therefore does not attract the higher rates specified in Annexure I for the relevant assessment year. The decision relied on by the assessee was distinguishable on facts because in that case the vehicles were used for hire and fell within the Annexure I category permitting higher depreciation. For these reasons the AO and the CIT(A) were correct to restrict depreciation to 15%. [Paras 7, 8]

Claim for higher depreciation under the third proviso to clause (ii) of s.32(1) is not allowable where commercial vehicles and JCBs are used in the assessee's own business and are not run on hire; depreciation correctly restricted to 15%.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal dismissed the appeal and upheld the restriction of depreciation on JCBs and trucks to 15%, holding that the higher rates under the third proviso/Annexure I are inapplicable where the assets are used for the assessee's own contracting business and not for hire.

Penalty under section 271(1)(c) - Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c) - Return filed in response to notice under section 153A treated as return under section 139 - Levy of penalty on income declared in section 153A return

Penalty under section 271(1)(c) - Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c) - Return filed in response to notice under section 153A treated as return under section 139 - Levy of penalty on income declared in section 153A return - Validity of levy of penalty under section 271(1)(c) on income declared in the return filed in response to a notice under section 153A for AY 2012-13 - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted that a search under section 132 resulted in the assessee declaring additional income which was included in the return filed in response to the section 153A notice on 31.03.2014 (within the due date under section 139(4)). The Assessing Officer levied penalty invoking Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c) treating the income as concealed, but the CIT(A) deleted the penalty on the view that the impugned income had been declared in the return filed under section 153A. The Tribunal examined precedent, including the Gujarat High Court decision in Kirit Dahyabhai Patel which holds that a return filed in response to a section 153A notice is to be treated as a return under section 139 for the purpose of penalty under section 271(1)(c), and that penalty cannot be levied on income shown in such a return. Applying that principle and noting that the additional income was offered and accepted without variation, the Tribunal affirmed the deletion of penalty. As the primary submission disposed the matter, other alternate contentions were not adjudicated. [Paras 9, 10, 11]

Penalty under section 271(1)(c) deleted as the impugned income was declared in the return filed in response to the section 153A notice and therefore penalty was not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal by the Revenue is dismissed; the Tribunal affirms the CIT(A)'s deletion of the penalty since the additional income was declared in the return filed pursuant to the section 153A notice and such return is to be treated as a return under section 139 for the purpose of section 271(1)(c).

Penalty under section 271(1)(c) - furnishing inaccurate particulars - concealment of particulars of income - difference of opinion between assessee and Assessing Officer - claim unsustainable in law does not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars - depreciation claimed by a charitable trust

Penalty under section 271(1)(c) - furnishing inaccurate particulars - concealment of particulars of income - difference of opinion between assessee and Assessing Officer - claim unsustainable in law does not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars - Validity of penalty levied under section 271(1)(c) for disallowance of claimed receipts (corpus donations treated as income) and related additions - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the assessee had disclosed the receipts in the balance sheet as corpus donations and the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim without alleging that the receipts were bogus or that their genuineness was questioned. The levy of penalty was rooted in a difference of opinion on the legal nature of the receipts and in disallowance of a claim which, although rejected by the AO, did not involve inaccurate or false particulars. Reliance on the principle in CIT vs Reliance Petroproducts that making an incorrect claim in law does not equate to furnishing inaccurate particulars under section 271(1)(c) led to the conclusion that the statutory penal provision could not be invoked merely because the AO did not accept the claim. Applying that reasoning to the facts, the Tribunal held that the penalty could not be sustained and therefore deleted the penalty on merits. [Paras 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]

Penalty under section 271(1)(c) deleted on merits insofar as it related to the disputed additions arising from claimed corpus donations and similar disallowances

Depreciation claimed by a charitable trust - no penalty where issue covered by Supreme Court - difference of opinion - Whether penalty could be levied in respect of disallowance of depreciation claimed by the trust - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal recorded that the issue of depreciation was covered in favour of the assessee by binding precedent of the Supreme Court (as relied upon by the assessee), and the disallowance in that respect arose from a difference of opinion. Since the depreciation issue was not a case of bogus or false claim and was otherwise covered by authoritative decision, no penalty could be sustained on that ground. [Paras 9, 12]

No penalty leviable in respect of the depreciation disallowance; issue decided in favour of the assessee

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed: the penalty imposed under section 271(1)(c) is deleted on merits (including the disallowance relating to corpus donations and the depreciation issue), and consequential grounds were rendered academic.

Remand for de novo consideration - ex parte assessment and appeal - validity of notice under section 148 - assessment completed under section 144 read with section 147

Remand for de novo consideration - ex parte assessment and appeal - Assessment remanded to the file of the Assessing Officer for de novo consideration. - HELD THAT: - Both the assessment order and the first appellate order were decided ex parte. In view of the absence of adversarial adjudication at both levels, the Tribunal considered it appropriate that the matters be reconsidered afresh by the Assessing Officer. The remand is directed to enable a proper hearing and fresh decision in accordance with law rather than to re-open the preliminary question of validity of the reopening notice which the Assessing Officer has already determined. [Paras 5]

The appeal is partly allowed and the assessment is remanded to the Assessing Officer for de novo consideration in accordance with law.

Validity of notice under section 148 - assessment completed under section 144 read with section 147 - Validity of the notice under section 148 shall not be reconsidered on remand. - HELD THAT: - Although the Tribunal has remanded the assessment for fresh consideration, it expressly declined to permit re-examination of the question of the validity of the notice under section 148, observing that that aspect has already been decided by the Assessing Officer. The remand is therefore limited and does not encompass re-opening the previously adjudicated validity of the reopening notice. [Paras 5]

The Assessing Officer shall not revisit the question of the validity of the notice under section 148 while conducting the de novo consideration.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal by remanding the assessment for de novo consideration to the Assessing Officer because both the assessment and the first appeal were decided ex parte, but directed that the previously decided validity of the notice under section 148 shall not be reopened.

Validity of assessment under section 153A read with section 143(3) - Requirement of incriminating material for assessment under section 153A - Effect of prior regular assessment (unabated assessment) on subsequent section 153A proceedings - Jurisdiction to decide a pure question of law by the Tribunal as per NTPC

Validity of assessment under section 153A read with section 143(3) - Requirement of incriminating material for assessment under section 153A - Effect of prior regular assessment (unabated assessment) on subsequent section 153A proceedings - Whether the assessment framed under section 153A read with section 143(3) is valid where a regular assessment had already been framed earlier and no incriminating material was found or seized during the search/survey - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found on the materials on record that a regular assessment under section 143(3) had been completed prior to the search, and that the additions sustained in the section 153A assessment were not based on any incriminating material found or seized during the course of the search/survey but on items already recorded in the assessee's books and earlier dealt with. Relying on precedents cited in the order - including CIT Vs. Kabul Chawla , CIT Vs. Continental Warehousing Corporation and CIT Vs. Salasar Stock Broking Ltd. - the Tribunal held that where no incriminating material is found or seized in a search/survey, framing an assessment under section 153A in relation to those matters is not valid. The Tribunal further accepted that it may entertain the pure question of law whether the impugned assessment is sustainable notwithstanding the Revenue's contention that the plea alters the case's texture, referencing the principle that the Tribunal can decide pure questions of law where relevant facts are on record. Applying these legal principles to the facts, the Tribunal concluded that the section 153A assessment was not sustainable and therefore quashed it. [Paras 6]

The assessment framed under section 153A read with section 143(3) was quashed because it was framed in the absence of any incriminating material and after a prior regular assessment had already been completed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed: the impugned assessment under section 153A read with section 143(3) for Asst. Year 2001-02 is quashed because it was framed in the absence of any incriminating material and when a regular assessment had already been completed.

Reopening of assessment on change of opinion - requirement of fresh information to form reasonable belief that income has escaped assessment - failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts - reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer must speak for themselves - reassessment initiated beyond four years without requisite satisfaction

Reopening of assessment on change of opinion - requirement of fresh information to form reasonable belief that income has escaped assessment - failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts - reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer must speak for themselves - reassessment initiated beyond four years without requisite satisfaction - Validity of reopening the assessment and consequent reassessment proceedings - HELD THAT: - The Assessing Officer reopened the assessment completed after scrutiny on the ground of short accountal of closing stock. The tribunal found that the same books, statements and trading details on which reassessment was based had been filed and considered during the original assessment; no fresh material or new information came to the AO's notice to form a reasonable belief that income had escaped assessment. The notice for reassessment was issued beyond four years without indicating any failure by the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts. Reliance was placed on the settled principle that reopening based on the identical material already considered in the original assessment amounts to a change of opinion, and that the reasons recorded must themselves disclose failure to disclose material facts and cannot leave the matter to conjecture. Applying these principles, the tribunal held that the reassessment was not sustainable in law and the lower appellate authority correctly annulled the reassessment. [Paras 2, 3]

Reopening and reassessment held to be invalid; CIT(A)'s order annulling reassessment is confirmed and the Revenue's appeal is dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal, confirming that reassessment founded on the same material already considered in the original scrutiny assessment and initiated beyond four years without requisite satisfaction was a mere change of opinion and therefore invalid; the assessee's cross-objection was rendered infructuous.

Limitation for determination of duty and interest under Section 28(9)(a) - time-bar and procedural finalisation under Section 28(9)(b) - quashing for inordinate delay and failure to decide within statutory period

Limitation for determination of duty and interest under Section 28(9)(a) - quashing for inordinate delay and failure to decide within statutory period - Validity of a show cause notice issued under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 where no determination was made within the statutory time limits and proceedings remained pending for an inordinate period. - HELD THAT: - The show cause notice issued in 2009 was under Section 28 of the Customs Act. Section 28(9)(a) prescribes that duty and interest called for by a show cause notice should, where possible, be determined within six months from the date of the notice; Section 28(9)(b) provides a one year limit in applicable circumstances. The Court noted that the six months period under Section 28(9)(a) had long expired and that the revenue did not disclose any circumstances justifying the prolonged pendency of the proceedings from 2009 to the present. The usual explanations such as transfer to a call book or change of incumbent officer were not shown to apply or to constitute sufficient justification for the delay. Having regard to the statutory time limits and the absence of any acceptable reason for the delay in finalising the proceedings, the Court concluded that the continuation of the show cause proceedings was untenable and warranted quashing. [Paras 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]

Impugned show cause notice quashed and writ petition allowed.

Final Conclusion: Proceedings initiated by the 2009 show cause notice were quashed for inordinate delay and failure to determine duty and interest within the statutory periods; writ petition allowed and connected petition closed.

Suspension of license under Regulation 16 of Customs Broker Licensing Regulation, 2018 - Confirmation of suspension after opportunity of hearing under Regulation 16(2) - Prima facie material and necessity for immediate action - Obligations of Customs Broker under Regulation 10 of CBLR, 2018 - Proceedings for revocation/penalty under Regulation 14 of CBLR, 2018

Suspension of license under Regulation 16 of Customs Broker Licensing Regulation, 2018 - Confirmation of suspension after opportunity of hearing under Regulation 16(2) - Prima facie material and necessity for immediate action - Validity of the suspension and its confirmation under Regulation 16(1) and 16(2) of CBLR, 2018. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the suspension was taken after an investigation produced prima facie material: the SIIB investigation, laboratory report confirming the goods were prohibited for export, and issuance of a Show Cause Notice dated 22.12.2020 proposing penalties against the appellant. The Commissioner suspended the Customs Broker's licence on 07.01.2021 and confirmed the suspension after affording hearing; the impugned order records that "immediate action was felt necessary" (referring to para 37 of the impugned order). The Tribunal held that Regulation 16(1) permits suspension where immediate action is necessary and Regulation 16(2) provides for confirmation after hearing; the Commissioner legitimately triggered suspension upon issuance of the Show Cause Notice and acted within a reasonable timeframe (suspension within seven days of the SCN and confirmation within eight days thereafter). The contention of inordinate delay was rejected because the departmental enquiry and laboratory confirmation of the prohibited nature of the goods furnished the requisite basis for action. [Paras 14, 15, 16]

The suspension of the appellant's Customs Broker licence and its confirmation under Regulation 16 are upheld as fair, reasonable and not vitiated by delay or failure to record necessity for immediate action.

Obligations of Customs Broker under Regulation 10 of CBLR, 2018 - Proceedings for revocation/penalty under Regulation 14 of CBLR, 2018 - Status of substantive proceedings under Regulation 14 and determination of alleged violations of Regulation 10. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal expressly declined to adjudicate the merits of alleged violations of Regulation 10 (duties such as verification of IEC, due diligence, cooperation with authorities) because proceedings under Regulation 14 for revocation of licence and imposition of penalty are pending before the Commissioner. The decision to suspend was treated as an interim protective measure and the appellant was afforded the opportunity to defend itself in the ongoing Regulation 14 process. The Tribunal made no finding on the substantive culpability of the appellant and clarified that no inference on merits should be drawn from its order upholding suspension. [Paras 10, 16]

Substantive merits under Regulation 14 are left open for determination by the Commissioner; the Tribunal did not decide alleged breaches of Regulation 10 and permitted the ongoing proceedings to continue.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed; the order suspending the Customs Broker's licence (confirmed under Regulation 16(2) of CBLR, 2018) is upheld. The Tribunal refrained from adjudicating the merits of alleged breaches under Regulation 10, leaving the pending proceedings under Regulation 14 to be decided by the Commissioner.

Dispensation of meetings of equity shareholders and secured creditors - Convening meetings of unsecured creditors - Compliance with Sections 230-232 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Companies (CAA) Rules, 2016 - Conduct of meetings through video conferencing and other audiovisual means in accordance with MCA circulars - Notice to statutory authorities under subsection (5) of Section 230 and Rule 8 - Voting by ballot/polling paper and prohibition of proxy voting in virtual meetings - Appointment of Chairman and Scrutinizer for creditor meetings

Dispensation of meetings of equity shareholders and secured creditors - Compliance with Sections 230-232 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Companies (CAA) Rules, 2016 - Whether meetings of equity shareholders and secured creditors of the applicant companies could be dispensed with - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that all equity shareholders and all secured creditors of the respective applicant companies had filed consent affidavits in support of the proposed scheme of amalgamation. The application was considered to have complied with the requirements of Sections 230-232 of the Companies Act, 2013 and the Companies (CAA) Rules, 2016. In view of unanimous consent recorded by shareholders and secured creditors and compliance with statutory filing and certification requirements, the Tribunal exercised its power to dispense with convening meetings of equity shareholders and secured creditors.

Meetings of the equity shareholders and secured creditors of both applicant companies are dispensed with.

Convening meetings of unsecured creditors - Conduct of meetings through video conferencing and other audiovisual means in accordance with MCA circulars - Voting by ballot/polling paper and prohibition of proxy voting in virtual meetings - Appointment of Chairman and Scrutinizer for creditor meetings - Whether and on what terms meetings of unsecured creditors of the applicant companies should be convened - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal recorded that both applicant companies have several unsecured creditors and therefore it is expedient to convene meetings of unsecured creditors. The Tribunal directed that separate meetings of unsecured creditors for the Transferor and Transferee companies be convened on the specified dates and times, to be conducted physically and also through video conferencing or other audiovisual means as permitted by recent Ministry of Corporate Affairs circulars. Voting at the meetings shall be by ballot/polling paper at the venue; proxy voting is not permitted for virtual meetings in terms of the cited MCA circulars, though Authorized Representatives are permitted. The Tribunal appointed named independent professionals as Chairman (with an alternate) and as Scrutinizer (with an alternate), conferred on the Chairman powers to decide procedural questions and determine disputed entries in company records for valuation purposes, fixed quorum rules, and required the Chairman to publish advertisements and issue notices and to file an affidavit and the meeting result in FORM No. CAA-4 within the time prescribed by the Companies (CAA) Rules, 2016.

Meetings of unsecured creditors of each applicant company shall be convened on the directed dates and conducted in accordance with the Tribunal's directions, including use of VC/AV means, voting by ballot/polling paper, appointment of Chairman and Scrutinizer, publication and service of notices, quorum and reporting requirements.

Notice to statutory authorities under subsection (5) of Section 230 and Rule 8 - Compliance with Sections 230-232 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Companies (CAA) Rules, 2016 - What statutory communications and filings are required prior to and after the creditor meetings - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal directed that, in compliance with subsection (5) of Section 230 and Rule 8 of the Companies (CAA) Rules, 2016, the applicant companies must forthwith send notices in Form No. CAA.3 (with the required disclosures) to the Central Government through the Regional Director, the Registrar of Companies, Gujarat, the concerned Income Tax authorities and the Official Liquidator, informing them that representations, if any, must be made within 30 days of receipt of such notice. The Tribunal required the applicants to file an affidavit confirming compliance with issuance of notices under subsection (5) of Section 230 and further required the Chairman to file an affidavit before the meeting and to report results in FORM No. CAA-4 within the time prescribed by Rule 14.

Applicants must serve statutory notices to the prescribed authorities and file affidavits reporting compliance and the results of the meetings in the specified forms and timeframes.

Final Conclusion: The Company Application is allowed to the extent indicated: meetings of equity shareholders and secured creditors are dispensed with on account of consent affidavits; meetings of unsecured creditors of each applicant company are ordered to be convened and conducted in accordance with the Tribunal's directions (including use of VC/AV means, voting method, appointment of Chairman and Scrutinizer, publication and personal service of notices, quorum and valuation rules); statutory notices to authorities and filing of affidavits and FORM No. CAA-4 are mandated. The application is disposed of subject to these directions.

Resolution plan versus liquidation value - remand for fresh consideration of CIRP and resolution plan - liquidation as a last resort - impleading a statutory/local authority to ascertain project-specific disputes - compliance with CIRP Regulations (4th Amendment, 2020) in commercial evaluation - role and expertise of Committee of Creditors comprising homebuyers

Remand for fresh consideration of CIRP and resolution plan - resolution plan versus liquidation value - compliance with CIRP Regulations (4th Amendment, 2020) in commercial evaluation - Whether the Adjudicating Authority's rejection of the resolution plan and direction for liquidation should be sustained or the matter should be remanded for fresh consideration of the resolution plan and related compliance. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal reviewed the Adjudicating Authority's reasons for rejecting the resolution plan, including the comparison of the plan consideration (Rs. 95 crore) with the declared liquidation value, the treatment of certain claims and adjustments asserted by the resolution applicant, and the application of the CIRP Regulations (4th Amendment, 2020). The Tribunal observed that realisable value in real-estate CIRPs and the commercial assessments by a CoC composed predominantly of homebuyers may differ from standard financial creditor assessments, and that a careful full review of the programme, valuation reconciliations and regulatory compliance is required. In light of these considerations the Tribunal concluded that liquidation is not to be treated as the automatic outcome and that the Adjudicating Authority should reassess the resolution plan and compliance with applicable regulations before finally ordering liquidation. [Paras 11, 12, 13, 15, 16]

The matter is remanded to the Adjudicating Authority with directions to review the programme and resolution plan in full, along with applicable provisions of the Code and Regulations, and to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law.

Impleading a statutory/local authority to ascertain project-specific disputes - resolution plan versus liquidation value - Whether the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA) should be impleaded to ascertain the status of disputes with farmers and their impact on the project and resolution process. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal identified a need to determine the status and effect of disputes involving land/farmers on the viability of the resolution plan. To enable a complete and informed reassessment by the Adjudicating Authority, the Tribunal directed impleading of YEIDA so that the impact of those external disputes on project realisation and the resolution process can be examined and factored into the Adjudicating Authority's fresh consideration. [Paras 14, 16]

YEIDA is to be impleaded to ascertain the status of disputes with farmers and their consequential impact, and the Adjudicating Authority shall consider that information on remand.

Liquidation as a last resort - Disposition of interim applications and effect of vacating the Adjudicating Authority's liquidation order pending fresh consideration. - HELD THAT: - Having set aside the liquidation direction and remanded the matter, the Tribunal disposed of any pending interlocutory applications and vacated any interim orders previously in force. The Tribunal recorded that liquidation is the last resort and therefore stayed the consequences of the Adjudicating Authority's order so that a full review may be undertaken. [Paras 15, 16]

The Adjudicating Authority's liquidation order is set aside and remanded; pending IAs are disposed of and interim orders passed by this Tribunal are vacated.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeed to the extent the Tribunal has set aside the Adjudicating Authority's liquidation direction and remitted the matter for comprehensive reassessment of the resolution plan, regulatory compliance and project-specific disputes (including impleading YEIDA); pending applications are disposed of and interim orders vacated.

Treatment of claims of subvention buyers - voting rendered infructuous once Committee of Creditors has voted - prematurity of relief prior to filing of approved resolution plan - classification of homebuyers as a separate sub-class of financial creditors - revocation of unit cancellation and pari passu ranking of affected buyers - role of Resolution Professional as facilitator in the resolution process

Voting rendered infructuous once Committee of Creditors has voted - Prayer to postpone voting on the proposed resolution plan - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the Members of the Committee of Creditors had already voted on the resolution plan by the time of hearing; consequently the applicants' request to postpone voting had become infructuous and could not be granted. [Paras 6]

Prayer (a) is infructuous and is not granted.

Prematurity of relief prior to filing of approved resolution plan - role of Resolution Professional as facilitator in the resolution process - Prayer to amend admitted claims to include pre-EMI interest as part of principal and to compel RP to amend Information Memorandum now - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted that applicants had opportunities to meet Prospective Resolution Applicants and place their demands, and that how PRAs address such commercial demands is a matter for the PRAs. As the resolution plan approved by the CoC had not yet been filed with the Authority at the time of application, seeking amendment of admitted claims and IM at this stage was premature; the commercial treatment of claims would be addressed in the resolution process. [Paras 6]

Prayer (b) is premature and not granted at this stage.

Classification of homebuyers as a separate sub-class of financial creditors - treatment of claims of subvention buyers - Prayer to create a separate class of subvention buyers and to appoint an authorised representative for that sub-class - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code does not envisage or recognise a separate sub-class of homebuyers (such as 'subvention buyers') within the class of Homebuyers as Financial Creditors for the purposes sought by the applicants. Consequently, the requests to create such a subclass and to appoint an authorised representative specifically for that subclass cannot be acceded to under the statutory scheme. [Paras 6]

Prayers (c) and (d) are rejected.

Revocation of unit cancellation and pari passu ranking of affected buyers - treatment of claims of subvention buyers - Prayer to consider claims of buyers who had submitted affidavits for cancellation but were neither refunded nor had tripartite agreements cancelled - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal directed the Resolution Professional to consider the claims of buyers who had submitted affidavits for cancellation but to whom no refund was made and whose tripartite agreements were not cancelled. For such buyers, the Tribunal ordered that unit cancellations shall be revoked and that they shall rank pari passu with other homebuyers of the same class with respect to their claims, rights and obligations. [Paras 6]

Prayer (e) is allowed in part: cancellations to be revoked and affected buyers to rank pari passu with other homebuyers; RP to consider their claims.

Final Conclusion: The application is disposed of: the request to postpone voting is infructuous, amendment of admitted claims and IM is premature, creation of a separate sub-class of subvention buyers and appointment of a separate authorised representative is rejected, and buyers who sought cancellation but were neither refunded nor had agreements cancelled are directed to have their cancellations revoked and to rank pari passu with other homebuyers while the RP considers their claims.

Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) - operational creditor - debt and default - settlement between creditor and corporate debtor - IBC is not a recovery forum - initiation of CIRP against a solvent company - bonafides of petition

Debt and default - Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) - initiation of CIRP against a solvent company - IBC is not a recovery forum - Admission of the Company Petition under the Code despite acknowledged principal debt and default - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that although there was debt and default on the part of the corporate debtor in respect of unpaid salaries (the principal amount having been acknowledged and a cheque tendered), the corporate debtor had repeatedly expressed willingness to pay the principal and there was no material on record to show the company is insolvent. The Bench emphasised that the objective of the Code is to resolve insolvency of entities that are unable to pay their debts, and that initiating CIRP against a going concern which appears solvent would prejudice the company and its stakeholders. The Tribunal relied on precedents and reasoning that the Code is not intended to serve as a mechanism for routine recovery of disputed dues and that where the corporate debtor is willing and able to pay the principal, admission into CIRP is inappropriate. Applying these principles to the facts, the Tribunal held that despite debt and default, initiation of CIRP was not justified in the present case. [Paras 12, 14, 15, 16, 17]

The petition was not admitted and the Tribunal dismissed the Company Petition on the ground that initiating CIRP against a company which is solvent and willing to pay the principal amount would be inappropriate.

Operational creditor - settlement between creditor and corporate debtor - bonafides of petition - Relevance of the petitioner's conduct and refusal to settle to the maintainability of the insolvency petition - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal recorded that the respondent had offered settlement (including tender of a cheque for the principal) which the petitioner refused, and that subsequent settlement negotiations failed because the petitioner did not accept the proposed terms. The Bench held that the petitioner's refusal to enter into settlement and apparent use of the insolvency process as a recovery mechanism or to pursue a vendetta raised questions about the bonafides of the petition. This conduct was a material factor in concluding that the present forum was not the appropriate avenue for recovery when the corporate debtor was willing to discharge the principal claim. [Paras 8, 9, 13, 17]

The petitioner's conduct and refusal to settle were held against him and contributed to the dismissal of the petition.

Final Conclusion: The Company Petition under the Code was dismissed because, although debt and default were established in relation to unpaid salaries, the corporate debtor had acknowledged the principal liability and demonstrated willingness to pay it; the Tribunal held that initiating CIRP against a solvent going concern for recovery of such dues (and where settlement was practicable) would be contrary to the objective of the Code, and the petitioner's refusal to settle cast doubt on his bonafides.

Operational Creditor's Section 9 application under IBC 2016 - Affidavit requirements under Section 9(3)(b) and verification affidavit under Rule 10 / NCLT Rules - Demand notice issued by advocate under Section 8 of IBC 2016 - Pre-existing dispute and acknowledgment of debt - Limitation and admissibility of claim - Admission of application and declaration of moratorium under Section 14 - Appointment of Interim Resolution Professional

Affidavit requirements under Section 9(3)(b) and verification affidavit under Rule 10 / NCLT Rules - The absence of an affidavit under Section 9(3)(b) or a specified format of verification affidavit is not a fatal infirmity and is curable where it does not cause prejudice to the corporate debtor. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that non-filing of the affidavit envisaged by Section 9(3)(b) at the time of filing (28.02.2019) was a technical defect which could be cured and was not mandatory in a manner that would vitiate the application unless it affected the corporate debtor or caused prejudice. The contents of the affidavits placed on record were held to be adequate for verification; no specific format has been prescribed by the cited rules such that the affidavit would negate the merits of the application. Consequently, objections on this ground were treated as immaterial to the determination on merits. [Paras 9, 10]

Objections based on non-production or format of affidavits are curable and do not invalidate the Section 9 application where no prejudice is shown.

Demand notice issued by advocate under Section 8 of IBC 2016 - A demand notice issued by an advocate on behalf of the operational creditor is valid even if not expressly authorised, and lack of separate authorization does not vitiate the notice. - HELD THAT: - Relying on established precedent, the Tribunal observed that an advocate may issue the demand notice under Section 8 on instructions and that absence of express authorization does not render the notice invalid. The Registrar/Registry objections in respect of authorization were therefore rejected as not affecting the maintainability of the petition. [Paras 11]

The demand notice issued by the advocate is valid despite the contention of lack of authorization.

Pre-existing dispute and acknowledgment of debt - Limitation and admissibility of claim - The corporate debtor failed to establish any pre-existing dispute; emails and correspondence demonstrated acknowledgment of the debt and supported the view that the claim was within limitation and met the statutory threshold. - HELD THAT: - On review of correspondence (including emails dated 07.03.2018 and 03.12.2018 and communication dated 16.02.2018), the Tribunal found no cogent evidence of a pre-existing dispute regarding services. The corporate debtor's own email showed an admission of outstanding liability (a slightly different amount acknowledged), which the Tribunal treated as an acknowledgment of debt. Given the timing of invoices and communications, the application was considered to have been filed within limitation and the claimed amount met the threshold under the Code. The plea of pre-existing dispute was therefore rejected for want of supporting documents. [Paras 11]

Pre-existing dispute not established; acknowledgment supports maintainability, and the claim is within limitation and meets the statutory threshold.

Operational Creditor's Section 9 application under IBC 2016 - Admission of application and declaration of moratorium under Section 14 - Appointment of Interim Resolution Professional - The Section 9 application was admitted; moratorium declared; an Interim Resolution Professional was appointed; directions were issued for public announcement, claims submission and continuation of supply during moratorium. - HELD THAT: - Having found the application to be free of non-curable defects and the contentions of the corporate debtor to be unsustainable, the Tribunal admitted the petition and invoked the statutory consequences. The order declared the moratorium in terms of Section 14 prohibiting suits, asset transfers, enforcement of security and recovery by owners/lessors; appointed an IRP in the absence of a recommendation by the operational creditor; directed the IRP to perform duties under the Code, to make public announcement and call for claims, and protected continuation of goods/services during moratorium. Administrative directions including advance payment to the IRP and communication of the order were also given. [Paras 12]

Section 9 petition admitted; moratorium imposed; IRP appointed and requisite procedural directions issued.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal found the Section 9 petition by the operational creditor to be maintainable notwithstanding curable procedural defects, rejected the corporate debtor's contentions of pre-existing dispute and invalid demand notice, admitted the application, declared the moratorium and appointed an Interim Resolution Professional with consequential directions for conducting the CIRP.

Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019 - acceptance of payment under amnesty scheme despite lapse - extension of payment period due to COVID-19 - interest payable from 01.07.2020 at 15% - remand for administrative decision by the Board

Acceptance of payment under amnesty scheme despite lapse - interest payable from 01.07.2020 at 15% - Permission to remit the quantified amount under the Scheme after the prescribed period, subject to payment of interest - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the petitioner had completed the Scheme process up to issuance of Form 3 which quantified the demand and that the delay in remittance arose on account of the COVID-19 lockdown and the portal not facilitating payments after the extended date. The short delay was treated as evidence of bona fides. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, the Court permitted the petitioner to remit the quantified amount before the appropriate authority within the time directed and ordered payment of interest at 15% from 01.07.2020 until date of remittance, invoking the rate and provisions relied upon in the order as applicable to service tax under the Finance Act, 1994 and Notification No.13 of 2016.

Petitioner permitted to remit the quantified amount under the Scheme within one week, with interest at 15% from 01.07.2020 to date of remittance.

Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019 - remand for administrative decision by the Board - extension of payment period due to COVID-19 - Obligation of the Board to consider petitioner's representation for acceptance of payment and to pass orders thereon - HELD THAT: - Though the Court's permission to remit was not an acceptance of the substantive prayer, the Court recognised a broader administrative gap affecting multiple declarants who could not remit due to pandemic-related constraints. The petitioner was allowed to make a representation to the Board enclosing the order; the Board was directed to consider that representation and pass appropriate orders within a stipulated period. This constitutes a remand to the administrative authority to decide acceptance and any incidental conditions (including possible levy of interest) in accordance with its instruction and policy.

Petitioner permitted to make representation to the Board within one week; Board directed to consider and pass appropriate orders within four weeks of receipt.

Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed on the basis that the petitioner may remit the quantified amount under the Scheme with interest at 15% from 01.07.2020 within one week and may make a representation to the Board, which is directed to consider and decide the representation within four weeks; disposal without costs.

Refund of service tax on specified services for export of goods - eligibility for refund under Notification No.41/2012-ST - chartered accountant's certificate requirement - appellate verification of record and cross-objection - substantive benefit not to be denied where conditions are fulfilled - purpose of rebate schemes to avoid export of taxes and protect exporters' competitiveness

Refund of service tax on specified services for export of goods - eligibility for refund under Notification No.41/2012-ST - chartered accountant's certificate requirement - appellate verification of record and cross-objection - substantive benefit not to be denied where conditions are fulfilled - Whether the Commissioner(Appeals) was justified in setting aside the Adjudicating Authority's grant of refund on the ground that a Cross Objection was not filed and the Chartered Accountant's certificate was not on record, notwithstanding the Adjudicating Authority's detailed verification and sanction of the refund under Notification No.41/2012-ST. - HELD THAT: - The Adjudicating Authority conducted a document-wise verification specifying shipping bill numbers, service providers, invoice particulars and examined eligibility under the Notification, and sanctioned the refund. The Commissioner(Appeals) reversed that order primarily because no Cross Objection was on file before him and the Chartered Accountant's certificate was not available in the records before the lower appellate authority. The Tribunal found that the Commissioner(Appeals) ought to have called for and verified the appellant's record (including the Cross Objection and the original Chartered Accountant's certificate) instead of denying substantive relief on that basis. Where goods are exported, the services are specified for refund, and Service Tax was paid on specified services pertaining to export, the scheme of Notification No.41/2012-ST mandates refund when conditions are satisfied. Denial of the refund on the procedural ground of absence of documents from the appellate file, without giving the appellant an opportunity or procuring the documents, defeats the purpose of the rebate scheme and improperly withholds substantive benefit. Thus the Commissioner(Appeals)'s order cannot be sustained and the Adjudicating Authority's sanction must be upheld.

The Commissioner(Appeals)'s modification of the refund order is set aside; the Adjudicating Authority's order granting refund under Notification No.41/2012-ST is upheld and the appeal is allowed with consequential relief.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed the appeal, set aside the Commissioner(Appeals) order that had negated the refund on procedural grounds, and restored the Adjudicating Authority's detailed sanction of the refund under Notification No.41/2012-ST, directing consequential relief if any.

Taxability of trenching and laying of cables - erection, commissioning and installation service - unjust enrichment - conditions for refund under Section 11B - retrospective application of beneficial circulars

Taxability of trenching and laying of cables - erection, commissioning and installation service - The activity of trenching and laying cables alongside/under roads undertaken by the appellant was not a taxable service under the category of erection, commissioning and installation service. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal accepted that there was no dispute as to taxability and relied on earlier determinations, including the Tribunal, Chennai decision in Indian Hume Pipe Company Limited and Order-in-Appeal No.95/2009 where similar demands were set aside. The adjudicatory history and the material on record show that the impugned activity did not fall within the taxable ambit of erection, commissioning and installation service. The High Court had already remanded the matter for decision on merits after holding the refund claim was not barred by limitation, permitting the Tribunal to decide taxability on records and precedents. Having considered those precedents and the facts, the Tribunal concluded the activity was not taxable and the demands could not be sustained. [Paras 7]

Demand set aside on the ground that the activity was not taxable.

Unjust enrichment - conditions for refund under Section 11B - The appellant was not guilty of unjust enrichment as the burden of the service tax paid had not been passed on to the service recipients, entitling the appellant to a refund. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the documentary evidence placed by the appellant - letters from the service recipients (BSNL and TATA Teleservices) and the work orders - which clearly indicated that no service tax was charged or collected for the relevant period. On that basis the Tribunal found that the appellant had satisfied the conditions necessary for refund, including that the tax burden was not passed on, and rejected the contention that the impugned circular could not be applied. The Tribunal observed that prior authoritative findings and the High Court's direction on limitation left open only the merits, and, on merits, the absence of passing on tax precluded a finding of unjust enrichment. [Paras 7, 8]

Refund claim allowed as there was no unjust enrichment; refund to be granted with consequential relief.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders rejecting the refund claim are set aside; the appeal is allowed and the refund granted, with consequential relief.

Unjust enrichment - refund of service tax collected from customers - relevant date under Section 11B for refund/limitation - date of reversal/adjustment as the relevant date for claiming refund - duty of assessee to refund amounts collected from customers before claiming refund from Department

Unjust enrichment - refund of service tax collected from customers - Whether the refund claim could be rejected on the ground of unjust enrichment where the assessee collected service tax from the buyer, deposited it with the Department, and later refunded the sale consideration to the buyer on cancellation but had not yet refunded the tax to the buyer. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the buyer had paid the service tax amount to the assessee and that the assessee had deposited that amount with the Department. The sale was cancelled and the assessee returned the sale consideration to the buyer and acknowledged the obligation to refund the tax amount as well. On these facts the assessee cannot retain the benefit; the Department is liable to refund the amount already paid to it so that the buyer is not unjustly deprived. The Tribunal relied on the decision cited by the appellant where buyers were held entitled to refund and remand for verification was ordered in that case; however, because there is a single purchaser here, remand was unnecessary and the assessee may be directed to produce receipt of refund to the purchaser. The Commissioner (Appeals) erred in rejecting the claim on the ground of unjust enrichment. [Paras 7, 12]

Refund cannot be refused on the ground of unjust enrichment; the Department is liable to refund the tax collected from the buyer and the Commissioner (Appeals) erred in rejecting the claim on that ground.

Relevant date under Section 11B for refund/limitation - date of reversal/adjustment as the relevant date for claiming refund - Whether the refund claim was barred by limitation where the service tax was deposited earlier but the sale consideration (and hence the cause for returning tax) was refunded to the buyer at a later date. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the statutory concept of the "relevant date" for refund under the provision and held that where the necessity to refund tax arises only upon reversal/return of the transaction value to the buyer, the date of such reversal/adjustment is the relevant date from which the one-year period for filing the refund claim is to be reckoned. Applying that principle, the Tribunal held that the one-year period began from 15.10.2017 when the sale consideration was returned to the buyer and not from the earlier dates of deposit in October 2016. Consequently the refund claim filed on 7.5.2018 was within one year of the relevant date. The Tribunal relied on earlier decisions holding that the date of reversal should be treated as the date giving rise to the cause of action for refund. [Paras 8, 10, 11]

The refund claim is not time-barred; the one-year limitation period is to be reckoned from the date of reversal/return of the sale consideration (15.10.2017), and the claim filed on 7.5.2018 is within time.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed; the order under challenge is set aside. The Department is liable to refund the service tax paid which was collected from the buyer, and the appellant is directed to return the tax amount to the buyer within 15 days of receiving the refund from the Department, failing which the Department may take appropriate action.

Condonation of delay - negligence of authorities in prosecuting appeal - requirement to fix responsibility of officers - precedential standard in Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd. - leave to appeal

Condonation of delay - precedential standard in Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd. - Whether the delay in moving the proposal and in filing the special leave petition is liable to be condoned. - HELD THAT: - The Court recorded that the impugned order was dated 20-05-2019 while the proposal was sent to the Ministry only on 06-01-2020, i.e., after six months, and that there was an earlier delay of about a year plus the 90-day period to file the special leave petition. The Court emphasised that the pendency of similar matters before other benches or in connected appeals is not a ground to grant leave where the authorities have been negligent in prosecuting the appeal. Unless the case is brought within the parameters laid down in Chief Post Master General & Ors. v. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr., the Court would not be inclined to condone such delay; special leave petitions brought merely as a formality to save officers are viewed unfavourably and have been dismissed in earlier instances.

Delay is not condoned at this stage; the Court declined to grant leave on the basis of negligence and inordinate delay by the authorities.

Negligence of authorities in prosecuting appeal - requirement to fix responsibility of officers - leave to appeal - What steps must be taken against officers responsible for the delay and what interim course the Court will adopt. - HELD THAT: - The Court directed that the appellant state what steps have been taken against the officers responsible for the delay. If no action has been taken, an inquiry must be held, responsibility fixed, and the action taken placed before the Court. Recognising the request of the Additional Solicitor General, the Court allowed three months' time to complete the process of initiating or finalising action against the officers, while noting the inordinate cumulative delay already involved and expressing concern over the stated anxiety to protect revenue without corresponding prompt action against culpable officers.

The matter was adjourned for three months for the appellant to complete inquiry/disciplinary action against officers and to place the steps taken before the Court; listed thereafter for further consideration.

Final Conclusion: The Court declined to condone the inordinate delay in prosecuting the appeal unless justified under the established parameters, directed that responsibility for the delay be inquired into and action against officers be taken and placed on record, and granted three months for completion of that process before listing the matter for further hearing.

Refund of duty and interest - natural justice - right to rebut and right to documents used against a party - role of Jurisdictional Range Officer's report in adjudication - burden of proof and presumption of preponderance of probabilities - Accounting treatment not conclusive for tax liability or passing on of duty - doctrine of unjust enrichment - re-adjudication/remand for fresh consideration

Natural justice - right to rebut and right to documents used against a party - role of Jurisdictional Range Officer's report in adjudication - re-adjudication/remand for fresh consideration - Whether the impugned orders could be sustained where the Adjudicating Authority relied solely on a JRO report not furnished to the appellant and did not permit effective rebuttal. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the Adjudicating Authority relied primarily on the JRO's report dated 26.08.2019 without furnishing that report or the invoices relied upon to the appellant for rebuttal. The Chartered Accountant's certificate and the appellant's undertaking/letter of 14.08.2019 were noted but were not addressed or disbelieved by the authorities. Sole reliance on a report not put to the appellant for rebuttal amounted to a procedural and natural justice defect. Given these deficiencies, the First Appellate Authority's adverse conclusions based on the uncommunicated JRO report cannot stand. The matter must therefore be set aside and remitted for fresh adjudication after furnishing the JRO report and the invoices relied upon, so the appellant may effectively rebut and the authority may consider all contentions and documents afresh. [Paras 7, 8, 11]

Impugned orders set aside; matter remanded to the Adjudicating Authority with direction to furnish the JRO report and invoices and to re-adjudicate after allowing the appellant to rebut.

Burden of proof and presumption of preponderance of probabilities - Accounting treatment not conclusive for tax liability or passing on of duty - Whether the appellant satisfied the initial burden to claim refund and whether the Revenue discharged the onus to show that the duty incidence was passed on to customers. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the appellant discharged the initial/minimum burden by producing supporting documents and an undertaking. In the absence of any findings discrediting those documents, the onus shifted to the Revenue to prove that the duty incidence was passed on. The Revenue failed to discharge that onus. The Tribunal also observed that mere accounting treatment (showing duty as expenditure and not as receivable) is not determinative of taxation questions regarding passing on of duty and cannot substitute for affirmative evidence that the duty was passed to customers. [Paras 10]

Appellant discharged initial burden; onus shifted to Revenue which failed to discharge it; accounting entries alone are not decisive.

Doctrine of unjust enrichment - Whether the doctrine of unjust enrichment could be invoked to deny the refund in the facts of this case. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted the Adjudicating Authority's reliance on the cited Supreme Court decision on unjust enrichment but observed that unjust enrichment operates to deny a benefit where a person is not otherwise entitled. Here the Adjudicating Authority had in fact sanctioned refund in part, indicating the Revenue did not dispute that the appellant was otherwise entitled to refund. Thus, the doctrine of unjust enrichment was not applicable in the present remittal context and could not justify denial without proper adjudication. [Paras 9]

Doctrine of unjust enrichment not applicable to justify the adverse findings in the absence of proper adjudication.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are allowed in part by way of remand: the impugned appellate findings are set aside and the matter is remitted to the Adjudicating Authority with directions to furnish the JRO report and the invoices relied upon, permit effective rebuttal by the appellant, consider the Chartered Accountant certificate, the appellant's submissions and authorities, and pass a fresh order in accordance with law.

Purchase tax - transaction in the course of inter-state trade - movement of goods occasioned by sale - inseparable connection between sale and movement of goods - Section 6 of the K.S.T. Act - levy of purchase tax where dispatch is not a direct result of inter-state sale - taxable turnover (exclusion of inter-state sales)

Transaction in the course of inter-state trade - movement of goods occasioned by sale - purchase tax - Section 6 of the K.S.T. Act - levy of purchase tax where dispatch is not a direct result of inter-state sale - Whether the transactions between M/s BPL Ltd. and the petitioner were inter-state sales or purchases within Karnataka so as to determine the applicability of purchase tax under Section 6 of the K.S.T. Act. - HELD THAT: - The court held that the nature of the transactions was a question of fact and law that the authorities under the Act and the tribunal were required to determine before invoking Section 6. Reliance was placed on the tests laid down in Oil India Ltd. v. Superintendent of Taxes regarding when a sale occasions movement of goods inter state: the movement must be occasioned by or inseparably connected with the sale, and it is not necessary that the covenant for movement be recited in the contract or that the sale precede movement. Section 6 cannot be invoked where the goods are sold or purchased in the course of inter state trade. The tribunal's order contained only a general observation characterising the transactions as branch transfers and did not record specific findings applying the above tests to the material on record. Because the determinative factual and legal issue as to whether the dispatches were a direct result of inter state sale was not examined or decided, the matter required fresh consideration by the tribunal applying the established parameters. [Paras 6, 7, 8]

Tribunal's order set aside and matter remitted to the tribunal for fresh decision on whether the transactions were inter state sales or purchases within the State, to determine the applicability of purchase tax under Section 6.

Final Conclusion: The tribunal's order is quashed and the matter is remitted for fresh adjudication on the nature of the transactions (inter state sale or intra State purchase) and consequent applicability of purchase tax; the tribunal is directed to decide the proceedings within four months and the substantial question of law is left unanswered.

Re-assessment - limitation for assessment and re-assessment - reading of re-assessment power under Section 39(2) in conjunction with limitation under Section 40 - extended period of limitation for unregistered dealers and fraudulent evasion - inapplicability of extended limitation to registered dealers

Re-assessment - limitation for assessment and re-assessment - reading of re-assessment power under Section 39(2) in conjunction with limitation under Section 40 - extended period of limitation for unregistered dealers and fraudulent evasion - inapplicability of extended limitation to registered dealers - Proceedings for re-assessment initiated by the Assessing Authority were within limitation or barred by limitation. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal's finding that the re-assessment was time-barred was upheld. While Section 39(2) empowers further re-assessment where additional evidence appears or turnover has escaped assessment, the power must be exercised subject to the period of limitation prescribed by Section 40. Section 40(1) prescribes the general limitation periods (five years, with specified provisos), and Section 40(2) extends limitation only where a dealer is unregistered and has failed to pay tax or has fraudulently evaded tax, thereby attracting penal consequences. In the present case the respondent was a registered dealer; the communication that the purchaser's 'C' Forms were invalid arrived long after the assessment period, and the proposition notice and re-assessment were initiated after more than eight years. The pre-conditions for invoking the extended limitation under Section 40(2) (unregistered dealer and fraudulent evasion) are not satisfied. Hence Sections 39 and 40 must be read together and, applying those provisions to the facts of Assessment Year 2005-06, the initiation of re-assessment was barred by limitation. [Paras 7, 8, 9, 10]

Re-assessment proceedings were barred by limitation and therefore unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The substantial question of law is answered against the petitioner; the re-assessment was time-barred and the petition is dismissed.

Input Tax Credit (ITC) - due diligence of purchaser to ascertain seller's registration and genuineness of transactions - liability to remit tax collected rests on selling dealer and enforcement lies with revenue - revisional jurisdiction to interfere with concurrent appellate finding

Input Tax Credit (ITC) - due diligence of purchaser to ascertain seller's registration and genuineness of transactions - liability to remit tax collected rests on selling dealer and enforcement lies with revenue - revisional jurisdiction to interfere with concurrent appellate finding - Entitlement to ITC claimed by the purchaser for purchases made from selling dealers who charged higher VAT but allegedly remitted lesser tax, and whether the Revisional Authority could overturn the First Appellate Authority's acceptance of the purchaser's claim. - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the selling dealers were registered, proper tax invoices were raised showing VAT at 14.5%, and the appellant discharged its obligation by paying the invoice amount including tax by online transfer. The Court held that the purchaser's due diligence is limited to verifying the seller's registration and that the transactions were effected in accordance with the Act; the purchaser is not required to ensure that the selling dealer has actually remitted the collected tax to the Government. Where a selling dealer purportedly fails to disclose corresponding sales or to remit tax collected, the statutory and enforcement remedies are for the revenue to pursue against the selling dealer, including recovery and prosecution, rather than penalising the purchaser by denial of ITC. In these circumstances the Revisional Authority erred in reversing the First Appellate Authority's finding and in characterising the transactions as bogus, because the record did not show that the dealers were unregistered or that invoices/payment were not genuine. The Court also noted precedent in similar facts favouring the purchaser's limited scope of due diligence. Accordingly, the Revisional Authority's exercise of suo motu revision to upset the concurrent appellate finding was unjustified. [Paras 11, 12, 13, 14]

The appeals are allowed; the Revisional Authority's order is set aside and the appellant is entitled to ITC for the purchases from the named dealers in Financial Year 2014-15.

Final Conclusion: The High Court allowed the appeals, set aside the Revisional Authority's order dated 25.01.2021, and directed that the ITC claimed by the appellant for purchases from the specified selling dealers in Financial Year 2014-15 be credited to the appellant's account within one month of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment.

Judicial interference with expert committee recommendations - malafide, favouritism and nepotism in administrative appointments - judicial restraint versus judicial activism - discretionary refusal to undo administrative action for want of specific proof and efflux of time - transparency and integrity in constitution of expert committees

Judicial interference with expert committee recommendations - discretionary refusal to undo administrative action for want of specific proof and efflux of time - Whether the High Court should set aside the recommendations of the committee and the consequent Government Orders granting or denying entertainment tax exemptions. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the recommendations of an expert committee are opinions of its members and, ordinarily, courts will not interfere with such opinions except in extraordinary circumstances such as established malafide or illegality. Given the lapse of years since the committee exercises and the nature of the material produced, the Court declined to reopen and upset the committee findings or the consequential Government Orders. The Court observed that mere disagreement with expert opinion or broad allegations are insufficient; specific and demonstrable malafide or illegality is necessary to warrant interference. On the material before it, the Court was not satisfied that such threshold was met and therefore refused to set aside the committee recommendations or the Government Orders. [Paras 13, 14, 23]

The writ petitions seeking to quash the committee recommendations and the related Government Orders were not allowed to the extent of undoing the committee exercise; the Court declined to interfere.

Malafide, favouritism and nepotism in administrative appointments - transparency and integrity in constitution of expert committees - Whether the allegations of discrimination, favouritism and nepotism in the constitution and functioning of the committee were established so as to attract judicial relief. - HELD THAT: - The Court acknowledged that the petitioners raised serious allegations of favouritism, nepotism and biased appointment of committee members, and found that there was some substance in the concerns expressed. However, the allegations were broad and not supported by specific, concrete proof of malafide against individual members. While inferences could be drawn from certain actions, the absence of specific evidence and the passage of time precluded the Court from granting the relief sought. The Court emphasised that mere statements or generalised assertions are insufficient to overturn administrative appointments or committee decisions. [Paras 14, 15, 23]

Allegations of discrimination and nepotism were recognised as concerning but not proved with the required specificity; no relief granted on that basis.

Judicial restraint versus judicial activism - transparency and integrity in constitution of expert committees - Whether the High Court should direct administrative or policy changes in the process of constituting committees and granting exemptions. - HELD THAT: - Although the Court refrained from undoing past exercises, it exercised its constitutional supervisory role to articulate principles and expectations for future administrative action. The Court set out that appointments to expert committees must prioritise integrity and merit, be transparent, and avoid political affinities; it emphasised the need for selection processes to be beyond partisan considerations. These observations were given as guidance to the Government to revisit and reform the process to prevent favouritism and ensure social justice, while recognising the limits of judicial intrusion into policy-making. [Paras 16, 21, 24]

The Court disposed of the petitions without granting the substantive relief sought but directed the Government to revisit the process and ensure transparent, integrity-based appointments and procedures for future grant of exemptions.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were disposed of: the Court declined to set aside committee recommendations or the Government Orders for want of specific proof of malafide and because of the passage of time, but recorded serious concerns about favouritism and nepotism and urged the Government to revisit and make the constitution and functioning of expert committees and the exemption process transparent and integrity based; no costs.

Condonation of delay - sufficient cause - liberal and justice oriented approach to limitation - delay attributable to counsel's mistake - restoration of proceedings - no adjudication on merits

Condonation of delay - sufficient cause - liberal and justice oriented approach to limitation - delay attributable to counsel's mistake - Delay of 226 days in filing the revision petition was condoned. - HELD THAT: - The Court applied established principles that "sufficient cause" must be given a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and that courts should avoid a pedantic approach requiring explanation of every day's delay. The petitioner showed bonafide prosecution of the case, including filing a revision before the High Court on counsel's advice and non communication thereafter. The Court held that mistake or lapse on part of the petitioner's counsel, coupled with the fact that the complaint had been dismissed without a decision on merits, constituted a sufficient and bonafide ground to condone the delay. The learned Additional Sessions Judge's insistence on explaining each day of delay and rejecting the explanation was held to be a misconstruction of the applicable law, warranting interference. [Paras 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]

Delay in filing the revision petition is condoned and the impugned order dismissing the revision as barred by limitation is quashed.

Restoration of proceedings - no adjudication on merits - The criminal revision is restored for decision on merits by the Sessions Court; the Court did not express any opinion on merits. - HELD THAT: - In consequence of condoning the delay and quashing the revisional court's order, the Court directed restoration of the criminal revision (previously unregistered) and remitted the matter to the District and Sessions Judge, with directions for the parties to appear on a specified date and for the case to be decided in accordance with law. The Court expressly clarified that it has not expressed any view on the merits of the underlying complaint and limited its determination to the question of sufficient cause for condonation of delay. [Paras 14, 15, 16]

The revision petition is restored and the matter is remitted to the District and Sessions Judge for adjudication on merits; no opinion expressed on the merits by this Court.

Final Conclusion: Petition allowed: impugned order dated 24.06.2014 is quashed, delay in filing the revision is condoned, and the criminal revision is restored for decision by the District and Sessions Judge; the Court refrained from expressing any view on the merits.

Power to direct interim compensation under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act - Interpretation of 'may' as directory/mandatory - Requirement of reasoned order when directing interim compensation - Prospective operation of amended penal provisions

Interpretation of 'may' as directory/mandatory - Power to direct interim compensation under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act - Whether the word 'may' in Section 143A(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act confers mere discretion or must be construed as imposing a mandatory/directory obligation to order interim compensation up to twenty per cent. - HELD THAT: - Having regard to the object and scheme of the Act, the parliamentary purpose behind the 2018 amendment and binding precedents construing auxiliary verbs in statutory provisions, the court held that the use of the word 'may' in Section 143A must be read in the context of the amendment's remedial purpose to protect complainants and curb delay tactics. The court relied on principles that where construing 'may' as directory is necessary to effectuate the statute's object, it may be given mandatory effect. Applying this principle to Section 143A, the court concluded that the provision was enacted to secure interim relief to complainants and to strengthen speedy disposal of cheque dishonour cases; accordingly 'may' in Section 143A operates as a directory/mandatory provision in that context and supports ordering interim compensation up to twenty per cent of the cheque amount. [Paras 11, 12, 16]

The amended Section 143A is to be construed as having directory/mandatory effect insofar as securing interim compensation in appropriate cases.

Requirement of reasoned order when directing interim compensation - Power to direct interim compensation under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act - Whether the impugned orders directing the drawer to pay 20% interim compensation were illegal or required interference by this Court for want of reasons or otherwise. - HELD THAT: - The court noted authorities emphasising that an exercise of discretionary power under Section 143A, when invoked, should be accompanied by reasons; such reasons enable appellate scrutiny. However, having construed Section 143A as mandatory in effect to achieve its object, the court examined the orders under challenge and found no illegality or irregularity in directing interim compensation. While the Madras High Court decision was relied upon to underline that reasons should ordinarily be recorded, that ratio did not lead to the conclusion that grant of compensation under Section 143A is discretionary. On the facts as projected in the impugned proceedings and in view of the purposive construction adopted, the trial court's direction for interim compensation and the Sessions Judge's refusal to interfere were held to be justified. [Paras 17, 18, 19]

The orders of the trial court and the revisional court directing/confirming payment of 20% interim compensation do not suffer from illegality or infirmity warranting interference.

Final Conclusion: The petition is dismissed; the interim compensation order under Section 143A and the revisional court's order upholding it are held not to be illegal or irregular.