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Where a debt had been adjudicated by the DRT and a recovery certificate issued, the liability was treated as a financial debt, and section 7 CIRP could be initiated within three years from the recovery certificate, or at the latest from the DRT order. The applications against the corporate guarantors were therefore not barred by limitation, and they could not reopen limitation by relying only on the original NPA date where joint and several liability had already been fastened. The Tribunal also found that the applications contained material particulars by referring to the DRT orders, the recovery certificate and the quantified default, so rejection for want of a separately stated default date was erroneous. The impugned orders were quashed and the matters remitted for decision on merits.
Where a debt had been adjudicated by the DRT and a recovery certificate issued, the liability was treated as a financial debt, and section 7 CIRP could be initiated within three years from the recovery certificate, or at the latest from the DRT order. The applications against the corporate guarantors were therefore not barred by limitation, and they could not reopen limitation by relying only on the original NPA date where joint and several liability had already been fastened. The Tribunal also found that the applications contained material particulars by referring to the DRT orders, the recovery certificate and the quantified default, so rejection for want of a separately stated default date was erroneous. The impugned orders were quashed and the matters remitted for decision on merits.
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