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The SC held that the appellant and Vindas-Respondent No. 3 constitute a single integrated unit under the EPF Act from September 1995, based on factors including unity of ownership, management, finance, and functional integrality. Consequently, the appellant is not entitled to infancy protection under the erstwhile Section 16(1)(d). The Court rejected the appellant's contention that dues could only be demanded from April 2004, affirming that contributions are payable from September 1995. The argument that notice of clubbing should have been issued to Vindas-Respondent No. 3 was also dismissed, as contributions were assessed only for employees of the respective units, with Vindas-Respondent No. 3 already covered. The appeal was found to be devoid of merit and was accordingly dismissed.
The SC held that the appellant and Vindas-Respondent No. 3 constitute a single integrated unit under the EPF Act from September 1995, based on factors including unity of ownership, management, finance, and functional integrality. Consequently, the appellant is not entitled to infancy protection under the erstwhile Section 16(1)(d). The Court rejected the appellant's contention that dues could only be demanded from April 2004, affirming that contributions are payable from September 1995. The argument that notice of clubbing should have been issued to Vindas-Respondent No. 3 was also dismissed, as contributions were assessed only for employees of the respective units, with Vindas-Respondent No. 3 already covered. The appeal was found to be devoid of merit and was accordingly dismissed.
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