Winding-up leave under company law does not bar rent control eviction proceedings before a special statutory forum.

Section 446(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 applies only to proceedings that the winding-up court can appropriately entertain or dispose of; rent control proceedings for fixation of fair rent or eviction, being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the special forum, do not require prior leave. On that reasoning, the absence of leave does not by itself render the resulting order void. The commentary also notes that the phrase "the court to which appeals ordinarily lie" in the rent control statute refers to the normal appellate forum, and a refusal of execution based on a mistaken view of law can amount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction, justifying revision and restoration of the execution petition.

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Issues: (i) Whether eviction proceedings under the rent control law against a company in liquidation required prior leave of the winding-up court under section 446(1) of the Companies Act, 1956, and whether an order passed without such leave was void or only voidable; (ii) Whether the subordinate judge had jurisdiction to entertain the revision against the execution order, and if not, whether interference was still warranted in revision.

Issue (i): Whether eviction proceedings under the rent control law against a company in liquidation required prior leave of the winding-up court under section 446(1) of the Companies Act, 1956, and whether an order passed without such leave was void or only voidable.

Analysis: The expression "other legal proceeding" in section 446(1) is confined to proceedings that can appropriately be dealt with by the winding-up court. Proceedings before the rent control court for fixation of fair rent or eviction are within the exclusive statutory jurisdiction of that special forum and are not matters that the company court can itself entertain or dispose of. Since such proceedings are not covered by the jurisdictional field contemplated by section 446, no leave of the winding-up court was necessary. The further distinction drawn from section 537 shows that only specified acts done without leave are declared void by statute, and the absence of leave under section 446 does not, by itself, make every order non est.

Conclusion: The eviction proceedings did not require prior leave under section 446(1), and the objection that the eviction order was void for want of such leave failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the subordinate judge had jurisdiction to entertain the revision against the execution order, and if not, whether interference was still warranted in revision.

Analysis: The words "the court to which appeals ordinarily lie" in the rent control statute were construed by reference to the normal appellate forum, not merely to a forum chosen by notification in a special category. On that construction, the subordinate judge's jurisdiction was doubtful. Even so, the munsiff had wrongly refused execution on the basis of a misconception of law, and that order amounted to a failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in him. In those circumstances, the High Court could correct the illegality in revision and set aside the munsiff's order, while leaving the execution petition to be dealt with according to law.

Conclusion: The execution order of the munsiff was set aside, and the execution petition was directed to be restored and disposed of according to law.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to execution failed, the company-liquidation objection was rejected, and the landlord's right to proceed with execution was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 446(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 applies only to proceedings that the winding-up court itself can appropriately entertain or dispose of; proceedings before a special statutory tribunal exercising exclusive jurisdiction fall outside that provision, and absence of leave under section 446 does not automatically render the resulting order void.

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