Time-barred claims under winding-up jurisdiction remain unenforceable; summary procedure does not revive limitation-barred rights.

Section 446(2)(b) of the Companies Act, 1956 provides a special summary procedure for claims by or against a company in winding up, but it does not revive a claim that is already barred by limitation. The word "claim" in that provision refers only to a claim that is legally enforceable at law, and the company court cannot use the winding-up jurisdiction to defeat the limitation defence available in an ordinary suit. A time-barred claim therefore remains unenforceable even when presented under this provision, and such a claim cannot be entertained by the company court.

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Issues: Whether a claim by a company in liquidation under section 446(2)(b) of the Companies Act, 1956, for recovery of price of goods sold before winding up is barred by limitation and, if so, whether such barred claim can be entertained by the company court.

Analysis: The application under section 446(2)(b) is not a suit, but a special summary procedure intended to enable the company court to entertain claims by or against the company. That procedural character does not enlarge the substantive right so as to revive claims that have become unenforceable by lapse of time. The word "claim" in clause (b) denotes a claim that is legally enforceable at law, and the court cannot use that provision to defeat the defence of limitation available in an ordinary suit. A time-barred claim remains unenforceable even when presented in winding-up jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The claim was held to be barred by limitation and could not be entertained under section 446(2)(b); the application was rejected against the respondent concerned.

Final Conclusion: The decision settles that section 446(2)(b) confers a special procedural jurisdiction only for enforceable claims and does not revive claims extinguished by limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: A claim presented under section 446(2)(b) of the Companies Act, 1956 must be legally enforceable at law, and the company court cannot entertain a time-barred claim merely because it is brought by summary application in winding-up proceedings.

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