Winding-up court jurisdiction and limitation in arbitration applications: overriding company-law powers can sustain maintainability and time validity.

A winding-up court may entertain an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 because section 446(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 confers overriding jurisdiction over suits and proceedings by or against the company, enabling it to deal with disputes referable to arbitration. Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not treated as a universal residuary provision for every special-law application; on the stated facts, the right to apply had not accrued earlier because the dispute had not crystallised into a final refusal to arbitrate until 9 June 1962, and the application was also within time under section 458A of the Companies Act. The agreement was directed to be filed and the dispute referred to arbitration.

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Issues: (i) Whether the court winding up the company had jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. (ii) Whether the application was barred by limitation under article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Issue (i): Whether the court winding up the company had jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.

Analysis: The definition of "court" in the Arbitration Act requires a civil court competent to decide the subject-matter as if it were a suit. Section 446(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, confers on the winding-up court jurisdiction to entertain or dispose of any suit or proceeding by or against the company, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law. That overriding provision enabled the winding-up court to entertain the application and to deal with the dispute referable to arbitration.

Conclusion: The objection to jurisdiction was rejected and the application was maintainable before the winding-up court.

Issue (ii): Whether the application was barred by limitation under article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis: The court declined to treat article 137 as a residuary provision governing all applications under special laws and held that it did not apply to the application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. On the facts, the correspondence between the parties showed that the dispute had not crystallised into a final refusal to arbitrate until 9 June 1962, so the right to apply had not accrued earlier. In any event, the application was within time in view of section 458A of the Companies Act, 1956.

Conclusion: The limitation objection failed and the application was not time-barred.

Final Conclusion: The objections to maintainability and limitation were negatived, the original agreement was directed to be filed, and the dispute was referred to arbitration between the company in liquidation and the Bihar State Electricity Board.

Ratio Decidendi: A winding-up court may entertain an arbitration application by virtue of section 446(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, and article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not, by itself, govern every application under a special law absent a clear legislative indication.

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