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Issues: Whether the conviction of company directors for defaults under the Companies Act could stand in the absence of evidence that they were knowingly and wilfully parties to the defaults.
Analysis: Liability of officers of a company under the penal provisions for defaults in holding general meetings and laying before the company the balance-sheet and profit and loss account is not automatic merely because a default by the company is proved. The statutory language requires proof that the particular officer was knowingly and wilfully a party to the default. The only prosecution witness had no direct knowledge of the conduct of the company's affairs and was unable to speak to any fact or circumstance from which such conscious participation could be inferred. In the absence of evidence establishing this essential ingredient, the conviction could not be sustained. Once the conviction failed, enhancement of sentence did not arise.
Conclusion: The conviction was unsustainable and had to be quashed; the accused were entitled to acquittal.
Ratio Decidendi: Penal liability of company directors for statutory defaults arises only on proof that they knowingly and wilfully participated in the default, and a conviction cannot be sustained on proof of the company's default alone.