Arbitration clauses require clear coverage of existence disputes; tribunal jurisdiction cannot arise from consent or expanded bye-laws.
Arbitration clauses limited to disputes arising out of or in the course of dealings or transactions do not, without clear language, extend to a dispute denying that any underlying contract or transaction existed. Tribunal jurisdiction must arise from a valid written arbitration agreement covering the specific dispute; bye-laws, consent, or participation cannot enlarge a limited clause or cure lack of jurisdiction. Articles of association may operate as a binding written arbitration framework between members for commercial transactions within the chamber's field of business. However, that framework does not confer authority to determine a preliminary dispute outside the clause's scope.
Issues: (i) Whether a dispute as to the very existence of the alleged contract or transaction fell within the arbitration clause contained in the chamber articles and bye-laws, so as to confer jurisdiction on the Lavad Committee; (ii) Whether the articles of association constituted a written arbitration agreement between members inter se for private commercial transactions.
Issue (i): Whether a dispute as to the very existence of the alleged contract or transaction fell within the arbitration clause contained in the chamber articles and bye-laws, so as to confer jurisdiction on the Lavad Committee.
Analysis: The arbitration obligation in the relevant article was confined to disputes arising out of or in course of dealings and transactions between members. A dispute denying the very existence of the transaction is antecedent to, and distinct from, disputes arising under an admitted transaction. Bye-laws could not enlarge a clear and limited article of association, and jurisdiction of the tribunal had to rest on a prior arbitration agreement. Consent or appearance before the committee could not cure the absence of jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The dispute as to the existence of the contract was not covered by the arbitration agreement, and the award was therefore without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside in favour of the appellant.
Issue (ii): Whether the articles of association constituted a written arbitration agreement between members inter se for private commercial transactions.
Analysis: Section 21 of the Companies Act was treated as making the articles binding between members inter se, but the scope of that contractual fiction was debated. The Court preferred the broader view that, where members knowingly entered transactions in a commodity within the chamber's field of business, the articles could operate as a general contractual framework governing their dealings, including the arbitration clause. The object of avoiding recourse to ordinary courts and the practical working of commercial chambers supported that construction.
Conclusion: The articles of association could operate as a binding written arbitration arrangement between members inter se in respect of transactions falling within the chamber's business.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded because the impugned award could not stand after the tribunal was found incompetent to determine the preliminary dispute about the existence of the transaction.
Ratio Decidendi: An arbitration clause framed in terms of disputes arising out of or in course of a transaction does not, without clear words, extend to a dispute denying the very existence of the transaction, and a tribunal derives jurisdiction only from a valid written arbitration agreement covering the specific dispute.