Exclusion of the first day in shipment-period computation applied to a public notice under General Clauses Act principles.

The shipment period prescribed by the public notice was to be computed by excluding the first day, so the consignment covered by the bill of lading dated 5-11-1993 was within time on the facts considered. For the second consignment dated 6-11-1993, the period ran from the day after the date of issuance of the public notice. The principle in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act was applied to this computation, even though that provision speaks to Central Acts and Regulations. The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed.

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Issues: Whether the shipment period prescribed by the public notice had to be computed by excluding the date of issuance, and whether the principles of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act applied to such computation.

Analysis: The period under the public notice was to be reckoned by excluding the first day, so that the consignment covered by the bill of lading dated 5-11-1993 was within time on the facts considered. For the second consignment dated 6-11-1993, the time limit had to run from the day following the date of issuance of the public notice. Although Section 9 of the General Clauses Act speaks to the construction of Central Acts and Regulations, its principle was held applicable to the public notice as well for calculating the period.

Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed.

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