Summary trial under company law is enabling, not restrictive, and a Magistrate's discretionary choice may stand absent legal error.

Section 278(2) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 was construed as enabling, not restrictive, so it extended a Presidency Magistrate's ordinary summary-trial power to company offences punishable with fine only, subject to the statutory scheme and sentence limits. The Magistrate's decision to proceed summarily without recording evidence in full was treated as an exercise of judicial discretion, and no interference was justified because reasons had been given and no legal error was shown. The text also notes that the later amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code informed the practical operation of the summary procedure.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 278(2) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 restricted summary trial by a Presidency Magistrate to offences punishable with fine only, or was merely enabling in nature. (ii) Whether the High Court should interfere with the Presidency Magistrate's decision to try the offence summarily without recording the evidence in full.

Issue (i): Whether Section 278(2) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 restricted summary trial by a Presidency Magistrate to offences punishable with fine only, or was merely enabling in nature.

Analysis: The provision was construed in the light of the scheme of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and the then-existing powers under the Criminal Procedure Code. The section was read as extending the ordinary summary-trial power of a Presidency Magistrate to company offences punishable with fine only, rather than as curtailing his general jurisdiction. The wording of sub-section (3), which expressly used non obstante language in relation to cognizability, supported the conclusion that sub-section (2) was enabling and not restrictive. The 1923 amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code was also taken into account in understanding the practical operation of the summary procedure.

Conclusion: Section 278(2) was held to be enabling, and a Presidency Magistrate could try an offence under the Companies Act summarily, subject to the limits indicated by the scheme of the Act and the sentence imposed.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court should interfere with the Presidency Magistrate's decision to try the offence summarily without recording the evidence in full.

Analysis: The choice of whether to proceed summarily was treated as a matter of judicial discretion for the Magistrate. Since the Magistrate had considered the matter and given reasons for adopting that procedure, the High Court held that there was no basis for interference. The existence of other decisions supporting non-interference in such discretionary matters reinforced that conclusion.

Conclusion: No interference was warranted with the Magistrate's exercise of discretion in adopting the summary procedure.

Final Conclusion: The revision failed because the challenged summary procedure was legally permissible and the Magistrate's discretionary choice did not call for interference.

Ratio Decidendi: A provision authorising summary trial in respect of specified offences is to be construed as enabling, not restrictive, where the statutory context shows an intention to expand procedural powers; an appellate or revisional court will not interfere with a Magistrate's properly exercised discretion to proceed summarily absent legal error.

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