Rectification under excise law cannot rest on later Supreme Court precedent alone; no apparent mistake was shown in the earlier order.

A request to recall or amend an earlier CEGAT order under section 35C(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was held not maintainable where the only basis was a later Supreme Court decision reversing the High Court view followed in the original order. The earlier order was passed on the law then prevailing, and a subsequent higher-court ruling did not, by itself, create a mistake apparent on the record. The approach was consistent with the Larger Bench view that supervening precedent is not enough for rectification. The rectification application was rejected and the original appellate order remained undisturbed.

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Issues: Whether the Tribunal could recall or amend its earlier order under section 35C(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 on the basis of a subsequent Supreme Court decision.

Analysis: The application sought rectification of an earlier order that had followed the then-prevailing High Court judgment. When that order was made, the Supreme Court decision reversing the High Court view had not yet been rendered. A later decision of a higher forum does not, by itself, convert the earlier order into one suffering from a mistake apparent on the record. The principle was also consistent with the Larger Bench view that such supervening precedent does not establish an apparent error in the original order.

Conclusion: The request for recall under section 35C(2) was not maintainable, and the application stood rejected.

Final Conclusion: The earlier appellate order remained undisturbed, and the Revenue obtained no rectification relief on the strength of the later Supreme Court ruling.

Ratio Decidendi: A subsequent decision of a higher court does not, without more, constitute a mistake apparent on the record in an earlier order for the purpose of rectification.

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