De novo adjudication must be fresh and independent; a set-aside order cannot be confirmed again without considering submissions anew.

A de novo adjudication cannot lawfully purport to confirm an earlier order that had already been set aside by the Tribunal, because that order no longer existed in law. The adjudicating authority was required to make a fresh determination on the material before it, not to repeat the earlier conclusion. The appellants were also entitled to have their submissions considered afresh and to receive proper opportunity before any new finding was recorded. The impugned order was therefore set aside and the matter remanded for fresh adjudication.

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Issues: Whether the de novo adjudication order, which purported to confirm an earlier order already set aside by the Tribunal, was legally sustainable and whether the matter required remand for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The earlier order had already been set aside and was no longer in existence. The adjudicating authority could not legally state that there was no reason to interfere with that earlier order, since the proceeding was a de novo adjudication and not an appellate exercise. The appellants were also entitled to have their pleas considered afresh and to be given proper opportunity before a fresh finding was recorded.

Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the matter was remanded to the adjudicating authority for fresh decision after considering the appellants' submissions and recording a new finding.

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