Oral hearing in revision proceedings is required where statute contemplates hearing; written submissions alone do not satisfy natural justice.

In revisionary income-tax proceedings, written submissions were held insufficient to replace an oral hearing where the statute contemplates a hearing consistent with natural justice. The High Court applied the Supreme Court's earlier interpretation of the corresponding revision provision under the old Act and held that the Commissioner should have fixed a hearing date and allowed counsel to be heard. Disposal of the revision without that opportunity offended natural justice, so the impugned order was quashed.

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Issues: Whether the Commissioner of Income-tax was bound to afford an oral hearing before disposing of the revision application, and whether disposal only on written submissions satisfied the requirements of natural justice.

Analysis: Written submissions were held not to be a substitute for an oral hearing, because oral argument enables clarification and interchange of thought between the decision-maker and counsel. The relevant revisionary provision was treated as conferring a hearing consistent with the principles of natural justice, and the earlier Supreme Court ruling under the corresponding provision of the old Act was applied to the statutory scheme under the Income-tax Act, 1961. On that basis, the Commissioner ought to have fixed a date of hearing and given the party an opportunity to be heard through counsel.

Conclusion: The disposal of the revision without affording an oral hearing was unsustainable and the impugned order was quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: In revisionary proceedings where the statute contemplates hearing, written representations do not displace the requirement of an opportunity of oral argument, and denial of such hearing offends natural justice.

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