Reference under customs law requires a genuine question of law, not settled precedent or pure factual dispute.

A reference under Section 130(1) of the Customs Act lies only on a genuine question of law arising from the Tribunal's order. Questions not raised in the appeal, issues already governed by settled Supreme Court authority, and disputes that are purely factual do not justify reference. The alleged misreading of a co-noticee's statement failed because it was neither pleaded below nor shown to arise from the order. Questions on corroboration, confession, and accomplice evidence were covered by binding precedent and already considered. Reliance on D. Bhoormull also failed because it distinguishes confiscation from personal penalty and burden of proof. The reference application was not maintainable on merits.

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Issues: Whether any of the eight questions proposed in the reference application constituted a referable question of law arising from the Tribunal's order under Section 130(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, including the questions on alleged misreading of a co-noticee's statement, independent corroboration, corroboration of confessional statements, use of accomplice evidence, applicability of the principles in D. Bhoormull to penalty under Section 112, and the existence of an act or omission attracting penalty.

Analysis: The alleged discrepancy in the co-noticee's statement was not raised in the memorandum of appeal and was not shown to be a point arising from the Tribunal's order, so no reference could lie on that basis. The questions on independent corroboration, corroboration of confessions, and use of accomplice evidence were already covered by settled Supreme Court authority and had been considered in the Tribunal's order, so they did not justify a reference. The questions based on D. Bhoormull also failed because that decision itself distinguishes between confiscation proceedings and personal penalty while explaining the burden of proof. The final question was either factual or outside the scope of the appellant's grievance, and therefore was not a referable question of law.

Conclusion: None of the proposed questions warranted reference to the High Court; the reference application was not maintainable on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: A reference under Section 130(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 lies only on a genuine question of law arising from the order under challenge, not on issues not raised below, questions already settled by binding precedent, or purely factual disputes.

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