Limitation computation from a specified date excludes that date, so a refund claim can fall within time.

In computing the six-month limitation for a refund claim under Section 11B, the day of payment of duty is excluded because time expressed as running "from" a specified date begins on the following day. The rule is consistent with Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and reflects the same general method of computation referred to in Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963. On that basis, the refund claim was held to be within limitation and not time-barred.

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Issues: Whether, for computing the six-month limitation period for a refund claim under Section 11B, the date of payment of duty is to be excluded and the period is to run from the following day.

Analysis: The period of limitation is computed by excluding the day from which the time is to be reckoned. The expression "from" in Section 11B indicates that the relevant date is not to be counted, and the period begins on the next day. The principle is supported by Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which embodies the rule that, where time is reckoned from a particular date, that date is excluded. Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was referred to as reflecting the same general rule of computation, though the refund claim itself is governed by Section 11B.

Conclusion: The refund claim was not time-barred, and the order holding it to be within limitation was correct.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed, and the finding that the refund application was within time stood affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: In computing a limitation period expressed as running "from" a specified date, the specified date is excluded and the period commences on the following day, unless the statute shows a contrary intention.

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