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Issues: Whether the Superintendent of Police's report, relied upon for filing a complaint, could be summoned and perused by the accused under Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Analysis: The report was treated as an internal departmental communication containing the result of investigation, comments of law officers, conflicting opinions, discussion of evidence, and recommendations on lapses and remedial measures. It was distinguished from the final report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and from the limited inspection rights connected with a case diary under Section 172(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The report was held not to be a public document and its contents were regarded as confidential and not admissible as opinion evidence under the Evidence Act. The fact that the complaint was based on such a report did not confer a right on the accused to summon or inspect it.
Conclusion: The accused had no right to summon or peruse the Superintendent of Police's report, and the refusal to direct its production was justified.
Final Conclusion: The revision challenging the refusal to produce the report failed, and the order protecting the report from disclosure was sustained.
Ratio Decidendi: An internal, confidential departmental report used for prosecution decision-making is not a document that an accused can demand under Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 merely because the complaint is founded on it.