Issues: (i) Whether reliance on statements recorded during Customs investigation and electronic records recovered from the importer's laptop, without cross-examination or a certificate for electronic evidence, violated principles of natural justice and could establish under-invoicing and misdeclaration; (ii) Whether the declared transaction value was validly rejected and the assessable value sequentially re-determined under the Customs valuation rules.

Issue (i): Whether reliance on statements recorded during Customs investigation and electronic records recovered from the importer's laptop, without cross-examination or a certificate for electronic evidence, violated principles of natural justice and could establish under-invoicing and misdeclaration.

Analysis: The relevant statements were made by the importer, its proprietor, and its agents. Their non-production for cross-examination did not cause a breach of natural justice, as they could not be compelled to depose against themselves. Voluntary statements under the Customs law were admissible as substantive evidence. The recovered laptop data, retrieved and forensically examined in the importer's presence, constituted original electronic records; consequently, certification required for secondary electronic copies was not applicable.

Conclusion: The statements and original electronic records were validly relied upon to establish under-invoicing and misdeclaration; this issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the declared transaction value was validly rejected and the assessable value sequentially re-determined under the Customs valuation rules.

Analysis: The admissions of undervaluation and misdeclaration, together with supplier invoices and other electronic material recovered during the search, provided a basis to reject the declared value under the valuation rules. The record supported the finding that the re-determination was undertaken by applying the prescribed rules in sequence.

Conclusion: Rejection of the declared transaction value and sequential re-determination of the assessable value were valid; this issue is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessed customs value and the consequential duty liability, confiscation, appropriation, and penalty consequences remain sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Voluntary Customs statements and original electronic records recovered from an importer may substantiate undervaluation and misdeclaration, furnishing a valid basis for rejection of transaction value and sequential valuation under the prescribed rules.

Issues: Whether the Registrar of Companies was required to implement the restoration direction despite the stated intention to file a review petition.

Analysis: The earlier restoration judgment remained subsisting and operative. The intended filing of a review petition did not constitute a ground to withhold compliance with that judgment.

Conclusion: The Registrar of Companies was directed to forthwith restore the company's name and reflect its status as active on the Ministry of Corporate Affairs website, with the action remaining subject to any order passed in a review application.

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for a service-tax demand founded solely on third-party information received from the Income Tax Department.

Analysis: Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 permits invocation of the extended limitation period only where the requisite elements such as fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax are established. The demand was based entirely on third-party data, without evidence establishing any such ingredient. In these circumstances, the extended period was unavailable and the notice issued after expiry of the normal limitation period could not sustain the demand.

Conclusion: The service-tax demand was barred by limitation; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether annual differential refund could be taken as suo motu credit in the account current under Notification No. 39/2001-C.E. dated 31.07.2001; (ii) Whether the recovery notice issued more than five years after availment of the credit was within limitation.

Issue (i): Whether annual differential refund could be taken as suo motu credit in the account current under Notification No. 39/2001-C.E. dated 31.07.2001.

Analysis: The notification permitted an eligible manufacturer to opt for credit in the account current, subject to submission and verification of prescribed statements. The annual differential-refund statement had been filed within the prescribed period, but the jurisdictional authority failed to determine or communicate the claim despite being required to do so. The subsequent credit was taken after prolonged inaction by the departmental authority; the decisions concerning adjustment of excess duty, duplicate payment, or credit during pending adjudication were factually distinguishable.

Conclusion: The suo motu credit of the annual differential amount could not be faulted in the circumstances and the demand was unsustainable on merits, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the recovery notice issued more than five years after availment of the credit was within limitation.

Analysis: Irregular or excess credit under the notification was recoverable as erroneous refund, attracting the limitation framework under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Even where the extended period applied, recovery proceedings had to be initiated within five years from the date of refund. The notice was issued after expiry of five years from the April 2010 credit.

Conclusion: The recovery notice was time-barred, and proceedings founded on it were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The proposed recovery of credit, together with consequential interest and penalty, lacked both temporal and substantive validity.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a notification treats recovery of irregular refund credit as recovery of erroneously refunded excise duty, the five-year outer limit under the extended limitation provision applies from the date of credit, and departmental failure to decide a timely annual differential-refund claim cannot render the resulting credit unsustainable.

Issues: Whether a complaint under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can proceed against a director where it lacks specific averments that the director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business at the relevant time.

Analysis: Section 141 creates an exception to the ordinary rule against vicarious criminal liability and must be strictly construed. Its two requirements-that the accused was in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business-are cumulative. Mere designation as a director, general allegations of involvement in day-to-day affairs, or an unspecified allegation that the cheque was issued by the accused persons do not meet this threshold. The complaint did not identify the cheque signatory or attribute any individual role, participation, control, or responsibility in the relevant transaction to the petitioner.

Conclusion: In the absence of foundational and specific averments satisfying Section 141, no vicarious liability could be fastened on the petitioner; continuation of the proceeding against the petitioner constituted an abuse of process of law.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of, permitting recourse to the statutory remedies for revocation of cancellation of registration and appeal.

Issues: Whether a penalty under Section 122(1A) could be imposed where that penalty had not been proposed against the noticee in the show-cause notice.

Analysis: The show-cause notice proposed specified penalties against the noticee under Section 122(1), while the separate penalty under Section 122(1A) was proposed against its handler/operator. The adjudication order nevertheless imposed the Section 122(1A) penalty upon the noticee, thereby conflating penalties proposed against distinct persons. This factual discrepancy was not specifically controverted.

Conclusion: A penalty under Section 122(1A) could not be sustained against the noticee when it was not proposed against it in the show-cause notice.

Issues: (i) Whether the availability and filing of a statutory appeal barred exercise of writ jurisdiction where the assessment was challenged for breach of natural justice; (ii) Whether the faceless assessment order was vitiated by non-consideration of authenticated replies, inadequate time to respond to the show-cause notice, and denial of an effective personal hearing.

Issue (i): Whether the availability and filing of a statutory appeal barred exercise of writ jurisdiction where the assessment was challenged for breach of natural justice.

Analysis: The appellate remedy had been invoked only to preserve limitation. Availability of an alternate remedy is a rule of self-restraint and does not preclude writ jurisdiction where the impugned action is affected by violation of principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable notwithstanding the pending statutory appeal, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the faceless assessment order was vitiated by non-consideration of authenticated replies, inadequate time to respond to the show-cause notice, and denial of an effective personal hearing.

Analysis: The acknowledgements containing hash values authenticated the responses under Section 144B(6)(xii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The replies filed in response to the notice under Section 142(1) and the show-cause notice were disregarded despite their authenticated submission. The show-cause notice afforded effectively only two working days, contrary to the prescribed minimum period of seven days. Although the technical failure affecting the video-conference hearing was notified, no fresh hearing was offered before the assessment was completed.

Conclusion: The assessment was rendered invalid for gross breach of principles of natural justice, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment must be undertaken afresh from the show-cause stage after considering the assessee's replies and providing any required further opportunity and an effective personal hearing before an adverse determination.

Ratio Decidendi: An assessment completed without considering authenticated responses and without affording a meaningful opportunity to respond and be heard violates principles of natural justice and is amenable to writ jurisdiction despite an alternate remedy.

Issues: (i) Whether the undertaking was eligible for deduction under section 80-IE despite its acquisition from an associated concern and the allegation that old or used plant and machinery exceeded the permissible limit; (ii) Whether section 80-IE(6) read with section 80-IA(10) justified notional allocation of selling and distribution, research and development, royalty, management and other expenses, or further disallowance of remuneration to the working partner, while computing eligible profits; (iii) Whether the central excise duty incentive was includible in eligible profits for deduction under section 80-IE.

Issue (i): Whether the undertaking was eligible for deduction under section 80-IE despite its acquisition from an associated concern and the allegation that old or used plant and machinery exceeded the permissible limit.

Analysis: Section 80-IE(3) requires that the eligible undertaking must not be formed by splitting up or reconstruction of an existing business and must not be formed by transfer of previously used plant or machinery beyond the permitted threshold. The concurrent factual findings established that the undertaking was transferred while under construction, commercial production commenced thereafter, and the change was confined to ownership of the undertaking. The material did not establish splitting up or reconstruction. The Revenue also failed to make supplier-level enquiry to support its presumption that machinery treated as old was previously used; duplicate bills, photocopies, or unavailable lorry receipts did not by themselves establish use of the machinery. The reconciled evidence did not show that old or used machinery exceeded 20 per cent of the total plant and machinery.

Conclusion: The undertaking satisfied the conditions for deduction under section 80-IE, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether section 80-IE(6) read with section 80-IA(10) justified notional allocation of selling and distribution, research and development, royalty, management and other expenses, or further disallowance of remuneration to the working partner, while computing eligible profits.

Analysis: Section 80-IA(10), as applied through section 80-IE(6), permits re-computation only where the course of business between closely connected persons is so arranged as to yield more than ordinary profits to the eligible undertaking. Although a close connection existed, no reliable evidence established such an arrangement or that the associated concern had actually borne the assessee's expenses. General statements recorded during survey without oath had only corroborative value and were subsequently retracted. A turnover-based comparison of expenses, without verification of the actual distribution network, business operations, or expenses incurred for the assessee, could not support notional allocation. The royalty and management-fee adjustments were also unwarranted where remuneration had been provided to the working partner for the facilities extended, and no further adjustment was supported. No double disallowance of remuneration was permissible after the assessee had itself added back the amount in its revised return.

Conclusion: No notional expense allocation, further reduction of eligible profits, or additional disallowance of working-partner remuneration was warranted under section 80-IA(10), in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the central excise duty incentive was includible in eligible profits for deduction under section 80-IE.

Analysis: The applicable incentive scheme was directed at industrial development and employment generation in the concerned area. The incentive accordingly bore the character of a capital receipt rather than a production or trade receipt. Its exclusion from taxable income necessarily required its exclusion from computation of eligible profits under section 80-IE; the resulting treatment was tax-neutral because the deduction otherwise available was at 100 per cent.

Conclusion: The central excise duty incentive is a capital receipt and must be excluded from both total income and eligible profits for section 80-IE purposes, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee's entitlement to the section 80-IE deduction and the computation of its eligible profits were sustained, with the excise incentive excluded as a capital receipt.

Ratio Decidendi: Re-computation of profits under section 80-IA(10) requires cogent evidence of an arrangement producing more than ordinary profits; a close connection and turnover-based presumptions alone are insufficient.

Issues: Whether the assessee's international transaction of purchase of services for resale could be characterised as provision of information technology enabled services for transfer-pricing purposes.

Analysis: The characterisation as an information technology enabled service provider was affirmed without cogent reasons and without examining the assessee's functions, assets and risks or explaining the departure from the earlier characterisation despite no material change in facts. Although the Advance Pricing Agreement did not cover the relevant assessment year, its examination of the functional profile, acceptance of the Transactional Net Margin Method and reseller characterisation were relevant material for fresh consideration. The Assessing Officer was directed to examine the assessee's characterisation, consider the Advance Pricing Agreement terms if reasonably applicable, or otherwise determine the arm's length price on the basis of the transfer-pricing study and applicable law.

Conclusion: The characterisation of the assessee as an information technology enabled service provider was set aside, and the transfer-pricing issue was restored for fresh adjudication.

Issues: (i) Whether the claimed loss was a genuine business loss arising from business carried on during the relevant year; (ii) Whether interest on borrowings used for acquiring shares in another company was allowable on grounds of commercial expediency; (iii) Whether disallowance under Section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could exceed the exempt income earned, and whether the Explanation inserted by the Finance Act, 2022 applied retrospectively; (iv) Whether the deletion of the addition for share capital under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustainable where the funds were allegedly routed through group entities.

Issue (i): Whether the claimed loss was a genuine business loss arising from business carried on during the relevant year.

Analysis: Allowability of a business loss requires genuine business activity. The advisory-fee receipt and corresponding expenditure arose under back-to-back, mirror-image agreements between group entities, executed on the same date for identical services. The assessee did not establish independent provision of services, infrastructure, or commercial activity; the entries were recorded through year-end journal entries without actual fund movement. The arrangement lacked commercial substance and constituted a colourable device to create the appearance of business activity.

Conclusion: In favour of Revenue. The claimed loss was not allowable as a business loss.

Issue (ii): Whether interest on borrowings used for acquiring shares in another company was allowable on grounds of commercial expediency.

Analysis: Section 36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits interest deduction only for capital borrowed for the purposes of business or profession. Commercial expediency required a demonstrated business nexus between the borrowed funds, the acquisition of shares, and the assessee's business. The record did not establish that the investee was a subsidiary at the relevant time, that the assessee had a deep commercial interest in it, or that acquiring its shares served the assessee's business. The acquisition was therefore not shown to be commercially expedient.

Conclusion: In favour of Revenue. The interest disallowance was sustained.

Issue (iii): Whether disallowance under Section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could exceed the exempt income earned, and whether the Explanation inserted by the Finance Act, 2022 applied retrospectively.

Analysis: The Explanation to Section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 inserted by the Finance Act, 2022 was applied prospectively. For the relevant assessment year, disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 could not exceed the exempt income earned. The amount of exempt income nevertheless required verification.

Conclusion: In favour of assessee. The disallowance is limited to the exempt income actually earned, subject to verification.

Issue (iv): Whether the deletion of the addition for share capital under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustainable where the funds were allegedly routed through group entities.

Analysis: Under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the assessee must establish the identity and creditworthiness of the subscriber and the genuineness of the transaction. Although the subscriber's identity was established, same-day transfers showed that substantially identical sums moved from the subscriber to the assessee, onward to another group entity, and back to the subscriber. The assessee did not explain the application of the share-capital funds or the purpose and manner of these circular transactions. Genuineness, a necessary limb of the statutory test, remained unverified.

Conclusion: The deletion of the share-capital addition was set aside, and the issue was restored for fresh examination after affording opportunity to the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The business-loss claim and interest deduction were denied; the disallowance relating to exempt income was confined to the verified exempt income; and the share-capital credit requires a fresh determination on genuineness.

Issues: Whether consideration received by a statutory development authority for leasing or renting land, including lease premium and ground rent, and for sports-complex membership and subscription services, is exempt from service tax as a sovereign or statutory function.

Analysis: Section 65(105)(zzzz) of the Finance Act, 1994 covers leasing and other arrangements permitting use of immovable property for business or commerce. For the post-negative-list period, the activity falls within the definition of service under Section 65B(44) and is not covered by the negative list under Section 66D. Statutory status does not itself exclude an authority from service-tax liability where it undertakes commercial activity for consideration. The protection available to mandatory statutory functions applies only where the collection is a compulsory statutory levy deposited into the Government treasury; rent, lease premium, ground rent, membership charges and subscription charges received for the relevant activities are consideration and not such statutory levies. Lease premium or salami received for leasing immovable property is taxable, and sports-complex membership and subscription activity is commercial rather than sovereign.

Conclusion: The leasing or renting receipts and sports-complex membership and subscription charges are taxable services and are not exempt as sovereign or statutory functions; the finding is against the assessee.

Issues: Whether leasing of dialysis equipment constituted a deemed sale involving transfer of the right to use goods, or a taxable declared service.

Analysis: Article 366(29A)(d) of the Constitution of India excludes from service tax a transaction that transfers the right to use goods. Under Sections 65B(44)(a)(ii) and 66E(f) of the Finance Act, 1994, hiring or leasing without such transfer remains a service. The applicable test requires that the transferee obtain a legal and exclusive right to use the identified goods, to the exclusion of the owner. The lease terms retained material control with the owner: equipment use was subject to prescribed specifications and approval, the owner bore maintenance and insurance costs, retained inspection rights, and the equipment could not be removed without its consent. Payment of VAT did not alter the character of the transaction.

Conclusion: The lease did not transfer the right to use the equipment and was a taxable declared service.

Issues: Whether the petitioner's cancelled GST registration could be considered for revocation upon filing the pending returns and fulfilling statutory requirements.

Outcome: The petitioner was directed to apply for revocation within one week, and the respondents were directed to promptly communicate any required compliance and consider revocation after such compliance.

Issues: (i) Whether drawback of Rs. 1,810/- with interest was recoverable from the appellants; (ii) Whether penalties under Section 114(iii) of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable; (iii) Whether penalties under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether drawback of Rs. 1,810/- with interest was recoverable from the appellants.

Analysis: Drawback processing through the Indian Customs EDI System credits the sanctioned amount to the bank account of the IEC holder reflected in the shipping bill. Since no shipping bill was filed using the appellants' IEC, no drawback could have been credited to them. Recovery of wrongly paid drawback is an execution process and may be undertaken, with applicable interest, only if evidence establishes that drawback was actually paid to them.

Conclusion: Drawback and interest were not recoverable from the appellants in the absence of evidence that any drawback had been paid to them.

Issue (ii): Whether penalties under Section 114(iii) of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.

Analysis: A penalty under Section 114 requires an act or omission rendering goods liable to confiscation under Section 113. Goods that have already been taken out of India cease to be "export goods" within Section 2(19) and become exported goods. Section 113 permits confiscation only of export goods; therefore, the finding that the already exported garments were liable to confiscation could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The penalties under Section 114(iii) were unsustainable and were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalties under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.

Analysis: Section 114AA requires knowing or intentional making, signing, using, or causing the use of a materially false or incorrect declaration, statement, or document. The false shipping bills were filed by the freight forwarder using another entity's IEC. The record did not establish that the appellants made any customs declaration or document, or possessed knowledge or intent concerning the false documents.

Conclusion: The penalties under Section 114AA were unsustainable and were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The drawback recovery and the impugned penalties lacked the necessary factual and statutory foundation.

Issues: Whether the interest on the balance financial debt, fixed at 9% per annum in the final insolvency appellate judgment, should be substituted by the contractual default rate of 3% per month.

Analysis: Rule 11 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 preserves inherent powers but does not warrant reopening a final adjudication merely to reach a different conclusion on facts already considered. The prior direction fixing interest at 9% per annum was a conscious exercise of judicial discretion after accounting for repayment of the entire principal and a substantial part of interest. Although contractual terms ordinarily bind the parties, the relief in proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 must accord with the insolvency-resolution objective and cannot convert closed insolvency proceedings into a mechanism for recovery of disputed enhanced contractual interest. A default rate of 3% per month, producing a substantially enlarged claim after discharge of principal, was disproportionate in the circumstances. Liberty to seek modification did not itself establish entitlement to modification.

Conclusion: The contractual default interest of 3% per month was not substituted for the judicially fixed interest of 9% per annum on the balance amount.

Issues: (i) Whether post-CIRP transfers from the corporate debtor's bank account to recipients for pre-CIRP work violated the moratorium and warranted remittance; (ii) Whether the alleged availability of the former remedy under Section 74 barred recourse to the Tribunal's jurisdiction for enforcing the moratorium.

Issue (i): Whether post-CIRP transfers from the corporate debtor's bank account to recipients for pre-CIRP work violated the moratorium and warranted remittance.

Analysis: The transfers were admittedly made after commencement of CIRP and during the moratorium, without the Resolution Professional's knowledge. The bank records established that funds credited to the corporate debtor were subsequently transferred to the appellant. Publication of the CIRP commencement and the statutory public announcement gave rise to deemed knowledge of the moratorium. The assertion that the funds were held in trust was unsupported, as no trust relationship or identifiable trust fund was established. The fact that underlying work related to a pre-CIRP period did not validate a post-moratorium disposition of the corporate debtor's assets.

Conclusion: The transfers violated the moratorium under Section 14(1)(b), and the direction to remit the amount with interest was valid, against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the alleged availability of the former remedy under Section 74 barred recourse to the Tribunal's jurisdiction for enforcing the moratorium.

Analysis: The contention based on Section 74 had neither been urged before the adjudicating authority nor raised as a ground in appeal. Further, Section 74 had been omitted with effect from 06.04.2026. In any event, the contention did not displace the established fact of transactions undertaken during the moratorium or invalidate recourse to enforce the statutory prohibition.

Conclusion: The former Section 74 remedy did not bar recourse under Sections 60(5) and 14(1)(b), against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The recovery directions enforcing the moratorium over the corporate debtor's assets remain legally sustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A post-CIRP transfer of the corporate debtor's funds during a subsisting moratorium is prohibited unless a legally established exception applies; pre-CIRP origin of the underlying transaction and an unproved claim of trust do not remove the transfer from the moratorium.