Issues: (i) Whether drawback of Rs. 1,810/- with interest was recoverable from the appellants; (ii) Whether penalties under Section 114(iii) of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable; (iii) Whether penalties under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether drawback of Rs. 1,810/- with interest was recoverable from the appellants.

Analysis: Drawback processing through the Indian Customs EDI System credits the sanctioned amount to the bank account of the IEC holder reflected in the shipping bill. Since no shipping bill was filed using the appellants' IEC, no drawback could have been credited to them. Recovery of wrongly paid drawback is an execution process and may be undertaken, with applicable interest, only if evidence establishes that drawback was actually paid to them.

Conclusion: Drawback and interest were not recoverable from the appellants in the absence of evidence that any drawback had been paid to them.

Issue (ii): Whether penalties under Section 114(iii) of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.

Analysis: A penalty under Section 114 requires an act or omission rendering goods liable to confiscation under Section 113. Goods that have already been taken out of India cease to be "export goods" within Section 2(19) and become exported goods. Section 113 permits confiscation only of export goods; therefore, the finding that the already exported garments were liable to confiscation could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The penalties under Section 114(iii) were unsustainable and were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalties under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.

Analysis: Section 114AA requires knowing or intentional making, signing, using, or causing the use of a materially false or incorrect declaration, statement, or document. The false shipping bills were filed by the freight forwarder using another entity's IEC. The record did not establish that the appellants made any customs declaration or document, or possessed knowledge or intent concerning the false documents.

Conclusion: The penalties under Section 114AA were unsustainable and were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The drawback recovery and the impugned penalties lacked the necessary factual and statutory foundation.

Issues: Whether the interest on the balance financial debt, fixed at 9% per annum in the final insolvency appellate judgment, should be substituted by the contractual default rate of 3% per month.

Analysis: Rule 11 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 preserves inherent powers but does not warrant reopening a final adjudication merely to reach a different conclusion on facts already considered. The prior direction fixing interest at 9% per annum was a conscious exercise of judicial discretion after accounting for repayment of the entire principal and a substantial part of interest. Although contractual terms ordinarily bind the parties, the relief in proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 must accord with the insolvency-resolution objective and cannot convert closed insolvency proceedings into a mechanism for recovery of disputed enhanced contractual interest. A default rate of 3% per month, producing a substantially enlarged claim after discharge of principal, was disproportionate in the circumstances. Liberty to seek modification did not itself establish entitlement to modification.

Conclusion: The contractual default interest of 3% per month was not substituted for the judicially fixed interest of 9% per annum on the balance amount.

Issues: (i) Whether post-CIRP transfers from the corporate debtor's bank account to recipients for pre-CIRP work violated the moratorium and warranted remittance; (ii) Whether the alleged availability of the former remedy under Section 74 barred recourse to the Tribunal's jurisdiction for enforcing the moratorium.

Issue (i): Whether post-CIRP transfers from the corporate debtor's bank account to recipients for pre-CIRP work violated the moratorium and warranted remittance.

Analysis: The transfers were admittedly made after commencement of CIRP and during the moratorium, without the Resolution Professional's knowledge. The bank records established that funds credited to the corporate debtor were subsequently transferred to the appellant. Publication of the CIRP commencement and the statutory public announcement gave rise to deemed knowledge of the moratorium. The assertion that the funds were held in trust was unsupported, as no trust relationship or identifiable trust fund was established. The fact that underlying work related to a pre-CIRP period did not validate a post-moratorium disposition of the corporate debtor's assets.

Conclusion: The transfers violated the moratorium under Section 14(1)(b), and the direction to remit the amount with interest was valid, against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the alleged availability of the former remedy under Section 74 barred recourse to the Tribunal's jurisdiction for enforcing the moratorium.

Analysis: The contention based on Section 74 had neither been urged before the adjudicating authority nor raised as a ground in appeal. Further, Section 74 had been omitted with effect from 06.04.2026. In any event, the contention did not displace the established fact of transactions undertaken during the moratorium or invalidate recourse to enforce the statutory prohibition.

Conclusion: The former Section 74 remedy did not bar recourse under Sections 60(5) and 14(1)(b), against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The recovery directions enforcing the moratorium over the corporate debtor's assets remain legally sustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A post-CIRP transfer of the corporate debtor's funds during a subsisting moratorium is prohibited unless a legally established exception applies; pre-CIRP origin of the underlying transaction and an unproved claim of trust do not remove the transfer from the moratorium.

Issues: Whether a CIRP admitted under Section 9 can be closed by the Appellate Tribunal on the basis of a settlement reached after admission, before constitution of the Committee of Creditors.

Analysis: The settlement was executed after commencement of CIRP and expressly recognised that closure was subject to compliance with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The amended Section 12A imposes a non obstante statutory framework for withdrawal of an admitted application and bars withdrawal before constitution of the Committee of Creditors. The authorities relied upon concerned settlements completed before admission of CIRP and predated or did not attract the amended statutory position.

Conclusion: The post-admission settlement could not justify closure of CIRP in the appeal; the IRP may seek withdrawal before the Adjudicating Authority under Section 12A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issues: Whether interest on refund of a pre-deposit under Section 35FF is payable for the entire period from the date of deposit until the actual refund, including the period attributable to the appellant's delay in seeking refund.

Analysis: Section 35FF of the Central Excise Act, 1944 mandates interest on a pre-deposit required to be refunded consequent to an appellate order, running from the date of payment until the date of refund. The provision does not qualify this entitlement by reference to the cause of delay in refund. Although the appellant delayed for over five years in furnishing the High Court judgment and seeking refund, the statutory language governs regardless of hardship, fairness, neglect, or the party responsible for the intervening delay.

Conclusion: Interest under Section 35FF is payable to the appellant for the entire period from the date of pre-deposit until the date of actual refund, including the period of delay attributable to the appellant.

Issues: (i) Whether a statutory welfare board facilitating deployment of ex-servicemen as guards to banks, without profit or commercial activity, provides taxable security agency service; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of service tax.

Issue (i): Whether a statutory welfare board facilitating deployment of ex-servicemen as guards to banks, without profit or commercial activity, provides taxable security agency service.

Analysis: The appellant was constituted under statute to undertake welfare activities for ex-servicemen. It merely facilitated deployment of guards and collected remuneration for onward payment to them, without earning profit or carrying on commercial business. Fees collected by a public authority in discharge of statutory functions were not liable to service tax. The activity did not satisfy either the definition of security agency or the taxable category of security agency service.

Conclusion: The appellant did not render taxable security agency service; the demand was unsustainable on merits, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of service tax.

Analysis: The finding that the appellant acted under a bona fide belief arising from legal interpretation, which justified waiver of penalty, negated the ingredients required for the extended period. Revenue did not establish fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade tax.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax demands fail both because the activity was outside the taxable security-agency category and because the extended limitation period was unavailable.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory welfare body which merely facilitates deployment of personnel and passes remuneration to them without commercial profit-making activity is not a security agency; a bona fide interpretative belief and absence of suppression preclude invocation of the extended limitation period.

Issues: (i) Whether a municipal corporation was liable to service tax on advertisement tax or licence fee collected for permitting display of advertisements before 1 July 2012; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the demand.

Issue (i): Whether a municipal corporation was liable to service tax on advertisement tax or licence fee collected for permitting display of advertisements before 1 July 2012.

Analysis: During the relevant period, the taxable entry for selling of space for advertisement required a service to be provided by a person. A sovereign local body was not covered by the term "person" before that expression was defined under the service-tax law. Further, the amount collected under the municipal law for display of advertisements was advertisement tax, a statutory levy authorised by Article 243X of the Constitution of India, and not consideration for a taxable service.

Conclusion: The municipal corporation was not liable to service tax on the advertisement tax or licence fee collected during the relevant period, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the demand.

Analysis: The dispute concerned interpretation of the charging provisions, and no suppression with intent to evade tax could be attributed to a government local body. The adopted ruling held that the extended limitation period was therefore unavailable.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax demand was unsustainable; consequently, no interest or penalties could survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Before the relevant statutory definition of "person" took effect, a sovereign municipal corporation collecting advertisement tax as a statutory levy was not providing a taxable service, and extended limitation cannot rest on alleged suppression in such an interpretative dispute.

Issues: Whether collection of adda-fee by a management contractor operating and maintaining State-regulated bus terminals under a concession agreement constitutes taxable Support Services of Business or Commerce.

Analysis: Service tax is a contract-based levy, requiring examination of the contractual nexus between the service provider and the recipient. The concession arrangement was between the appellant and the State Government/PUNBUS; no contract existed between the appellant and individual bus operators. The bus terminals were public-utility infrastructure developed and operated under State regulation, and the appellant's collection of adda-fee was authorised under the concession arrangement in consideration of its investment, rather than consideration for support provided to bus operators. The applicable precedent had determined that such collection, absent a direct contractual relationship with bus operators, is not Business Support Service.

Conclusion: Collection of adda-fee under the State concession arrangement did not constitute Support Services of Business or Commerce; service tax was not payable by the appellant.

Issues: Whether the notional cost of buyer-supplied drawings and designs, and royalty paid by the buyer to its foreign collaborator, is includible in the assessable value of automobile components under Rule 6 of the Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000.

Analysis: Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 permits adoption of transaction value where the buyer and manufacturer are unrelated and price is the sole consideration. Rule 6 permits addition only of the money value of additional consideration flowing directly or indirectly from the buyer to the manufacturer. Buyer-supplied drawings or designs are includible only where they are used in, or necessary for, production and relieve the manufacturer of an expense otherwise required to be incurred by it.

Analysis: The drawings supplied at the vendor-selection stage were only specifications enabling prospective vendors to understand requirements and quote prices. They were not detailed manufacturing drawings used for production; the manufacturer remained responsible for preparing the detailed designs required for manufacture. No consideration in addition to the agreed price flowed from the buyer after selection of the manufacturer. The buyer's royalty payment to its foreign collaborator was not consideration flowing to the manufacturer and had no nexus with the manufacture or clearance of the components.

Conclusion: The notional value of the drawings and designs and the buyer's royalty payment are not includible in the assessable value; the demand, interest and penalty based on such inclusion cannot be sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether the land sold was agricultural land excluded from the definition of capital asset; (ii) Whether deduction under Section 54B was available for investment in the land purchased; (iii) Whether the validity of the revision order could be challenged in proceedings arising from the consequential assessment.

Issue (i): Whether the land sold was agricultural land excluded from the definition of capital asset.

Analysis: The registered sale deed described the land as industrial-purpose land, the revenue record showed it as uncultivated, and the purchaser acquired it for non-agricultural use. The assessee had also returned the gain from its sale as capital gain. Applying the test concerning the actual and intended use of land, these circumstances established that its character at the time of sale was non-agricultural.

Conclusion: The land was a capital asset and not agricultural land; this issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether deduction under Section 54B was available for investment in the land purchased.

Analysis: The purchased land was classified in the registered purchase deed as industrial-purpose land. Further, the sold land had not been used for agricultural purposes during the prescribed preceding period, as reflected by the revenue record and its established industrial character. The statutory conditions for the deduction were therefore not met.

Conclusion: Deduction under Section 54B was not allowable; this issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the validity of the revision order could be challenged in proceedings arising from the consequential assessment.

Analysis: The revision order had not been independently challenged. The appeal arose from the appellate order concerning the consequential assessment, and did not permit a challenge to the unappealed revision order.

Conclusion: The challenge to the revision order was barred in these proceedings; this issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment treating the transferred land as a taxable capital asset and denying the claimed agricultural-land reinvestment relief remains sustained, and the unchallenged revision order cannot be assailed collaterally.

Ratio Decidendi: Land is not excluded as agricultural land where the cumulative evidence of its recorded status, contractual description, use and intended non-agricultural exploitation establishes its non-agricultural character; deduction for reinvestment in agricultural land requires satisfaction of the prescribed agricultural-use conditions.

Issues: Whether refund arising after an assessment under Section 201 or an appellate order can be made conditional upon filing Form 26B or withheld against outstanding demands without an order under Section 245.

Analysis: Section 201 concerns assessment of tax deducted at source, whereas Section 200A, Rule 31A and Form 26B govern processing and adjustment of TDS statements at the CPC stage before assessment. A refund quantified upon an assessment under Section 201 or pursuant to an appellate order is a vested and crystallised entitlement, with applicable interest. The Form 26B procedure does not govern such refund. Withholding or adjustment of the quantified refund is permissible only through a legally passed order under Section 245; outstanding demands, including demands relating to associated TANs, cannot by themselves justify non-payment.

Conclusion: Form 26B cannot be compelled for refund arising from an assessment under Section 201 or an appellate order, and the refund cannot be withheld absent a lawful order under Section 245. The assessee is entitled to payment of the quantified refund with applicable statutory interest.

Issues: Whether a writ petition against a tax-determination order should be entertained despite a statutory appeal having been filed, where the order was passed without a hearing and without considering the assessee's reply.

Analysis: The availability of an appellate remedy does not require relegation to that remedy where the challenged order suffers from breach of the principles of natural justice. The order merely recorded the assessee's reply, stand and documents, without considering the contentions therein, and was made without affording an opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The determination order was vitiated by breach of the principles of natural justice; the statutory appeal did not bar writ relief. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether blocking of input tax credit under Rule 86A could continue after expiry of one year from the date on which the restriction was imposed.

Analysis: Rule 86A(3) of the Tamil Nadu Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 provides that a restriction imposed under Rule 86A(1) ceases to have effect after one year. The restriction, imposed on 27.01.2023, had continued beyond that period. The statutory language requires the restriction to cease automatically; continued denial of debit from the credit ledger cannot be sustained indefinitely, particularly when it produces serious civil consequences. An internal departmental communication, without satisfaction of the requirements for invoking Rule 86A, cannot justify continued blocking. Recovery, where warranted after assessment, must proceed through the regular statutory mechanism.

Conclusion: The restriction on the petitioner's input tax credit ceased upon expiry of one year and the credit ledger must be unblocked. The conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the appellate order dismissing the appeal as time-barred could be set aside and the appeal restored for decision on merits where delay resulted from explained medical circumstances beyond the petitioner's control.

Analysis: Section 107 of the Rajasthan Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 binds the Appellate Authority to the prescribed limitation. Extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot ordinarily be used to circumvent that scheme, but may be exercised in exceptional circumstances. The medical reasons for the delayed appeal were beyond the petitioner's control, and refusal of adjudication on merits would cause grave prejudice.

Conclusion: The appellate order was set aside and the appeal was directed to be considered on merits, subject to payment of admissible late fees, penalty and statutory deposits.

Issues: Whether penalty for purchase of an excavator against Form C could be sustained under Section 10A of the Central Sales Tax Act without proof of mens rea or false representation.

Analysis: The revisionist was engaged in civil works, mining and excavation, and the excavator was purchased for use in executing such contracts. Its registration was subsequently amended to include civil contractor activity. The authorities recorded no finding of mens rea, mala fides, or a false representation that the revisionist was entitled to purchase the machinery at the concessional rate. Bona fide use of Form C for machinery required in the registered business did not establish the essential ingredients for penalty.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 10A could not be levied in the absence of proof of mens rea and false representation; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised to challenge the adjudication order despite an efficacious statutory appellate remedy where consideration of the taxpayers' replies and their alleged role requires factual examination.

Analysis: The challenge required examination of disputed factual matters, including whether the replies to the show-cause notice were considered and the precise role of each petitioner in the alleged transactions. Such matters were suitable for adjudication by the Appellate Authority. The reliance on principles requiring consideration of a taxpayer's response to a show-cause notice was distinguishable because the impugned adjudication was a consolidated order concerning numerous firms and individuals.

Conclusion: Writ jurisdiction ought not to be exercised to bypass the efficacious statutory appellate remedy where disputed factual issues require appellate examination.

Issues: Whether the assessee's appeal before the appellate authority was barred by limitation where a physical appeal was filed within time because of technical difficulties in mandatory electronic filing.

Analysis: During the transition to mandatory electronic filing of Form 35, the assessee attempted electronic filing but faced system-related difficulties. It filed a physical appeal within the prescribed period and explained the circumstances to the appellate authority. Circular No. 20/2016 dated 26.05.2016 acknowledged the technical difficulties and extended the time for electronic filing. The delay was therefore not attributable to the assessee.

Conclusion: The appeal before the appellate authority was not time-barred; the dismissal on limitation was unjustified and is set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether an addition for unexplained investment could be sustained solely on WhatsApp chats retrieved from a third party's mobile phone without independent corroboration and compliance with requirements governing electronic evidence.

Analysis: The presumption under Section 132(4A) was confined to the person from whom the material was found and could not bind a third party. The WhatsApp chats constituted the sole material against the assessee, with no independent evidence establishing the alleged investment. Their authenticity was not established through the certificate required for electronic records, and compliance with the requirement concerning extraction of electronic evidence was also not demonstrated.

Conclusion: The WhatsApp data of the third party was insufficient to sustain the addition for unexplained investment; the addition was liable to be deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether licence fees for grant of live broadcasting rights, and the contractual 95:5 allocation between live and non-live broadcasting rights, were taxable as royalty under Article 13(3) of the India-UK Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement and Section 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether release fees received from IPL franchises for permitting English players to participate in the tournament were taxable under Article 18(2) of the India-UK Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.

Issue (i): Whether licence fees for grant of live broadcasting rights, and the contractual 95:5 allocation between live and non-live broadcasting rights, were taxable as royalty under Article 13(3) of the India-UK Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement and Section 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Article 13(3) covers consideration for use of, or right to use, copyright or a scientific work. Live transmission of a match is a one-time event that does not confer an enduring benefit. A live feed is neither a scientific work nor a work in which copyright subsists; broadcast rights and copyright are distinct. The consideration attributable to non-live rights had already been offered to tax. The 95:5 allocation of consideration between live and non-live rights was contractually agreed and could not be disturbed without material establishing that it was unjustified; differing allocations adopted on peculiar facts of other cases did not warrant a reallocation.

Conclusion: Licence fees for live broadcasting rights were not royalty, and the 95:5 contractual allocation between live and non-live rights was sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether release fees received from IPL franchises for permitting English players to participate in the tournament were taxable under Article 18(2) of the India-UK Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.

Analysis: Article 18 concerns income derived by athletes from their personal activities and income from such activities accruing to another person. The release fee was payable to the assessee for granting consent for a player's participation and was over and above the league fee paid to the player. It was not income accruing from the player's personal activities within the scope of Article 18(2).

Conclusion: Release fees received by the assessee were not taxable under Article 18(2), in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Live broadcasting licence fees were excluded from royalty taxation, the agreed allocation of broadcasting consideration remained undisturbed, and release fees fell outside the taxation scope of Article 18(2).