Issues: Whether the adjudication order under Section 73 was non-speaking and violative of the principles of natural justice for non-consideration of the reconciliation and reply.

Analysis: Reasons required of a quasi-judicial authority depend upon the facts, the noticee's response, and the nature of the controversy. The adjudication order reflected application of mind to the discrepancies between GSTR-2A, GSTR-3B and GSTR-9, the reply, and the opportunity of hearing. The assessee bore the burden to substantiate the claimed input tax credit and explain the discrepancies through documentary evidence, rather than merely a reconciliation chart. Recording that reconciliation had not been made constituted a sufficient basis to reject the explanation where no further factual explanation or evidence had been furnished. The assessee also did not seek additional time before the adjudicating authority for filing further material.

Conclusion: The adjudication order was not completely non-speaking and did not warrant interference on the asserted ground of breach of natural justice; the factual objections may be urged with further evidence in appellate proceedings.

Issues: (i) Whether the taxpayer had established reversal of the excess input tax credit forming the disputed demand; (ii) Whether interest and penalty attributable to the disputed input tax credit required fresh computation and consideration of statutory waiver.

Issue (i): Whether the taxpayer had established reversal of the excess input tax credit forming the disputed demand.

Analysis: The reconciliation statements, DRC-03 debit entries and revenue acknowledgement in DRC-04 established reversals through the electronic cash and credit ledgers that covered the disputed excess input tax credit. The absence of a reason in column 8 of DRC-03 did not invalidate the reversals, since that field is optional. The benefit under Section 16(5) also displaced the objection based on the time limit in Section 16(4) for the specified financial years.

Conclusion: The reversal of the disputed excess input tax credit stood established, in favour of the taxpayer.

Issue (ii): Whether interest and penalty attributable to the disputed input tax credit required fresh computation and consideration of statutory waiver.

Analysis: The first appellate order did not determine the interest and penalty consequences of the residual demand. Demands under Section 73 for the relevant period fall within Section 128A, which permits waiver of interest or penalty subject to compliance with the prescribed procedure. Computation is required in accordance with the applicable departmental instructions after affording a hearing.

Conclusion: The question of interest and penalty is remitted for fresh computation, with the taxpayer entitled to seek waiver under Section 128A if liability is determined.

Final Conclusion: The finding that the principal excess input tax credit had been reversed remains undisturbed, while the consequential interest and penalty liability is to be determined afresh by the first appellate authority.

Ratio Decidendi: Documented DRC-03 reversals corroborated by ledger debits, reconciliation material and revenue acknowledgement cannot be rejected merely because the optional reasons field in DRC-03 is blank; consequential interest and penalty must be separately determined under the applicable statutory framework.

Issues: Whether exemption under section 54 could be denied solely because the capital gain was not deposited in the Capital Gains Account Scheme before the due date under section 139(1), despite investment in a new residential house within the stipulated period.

Analysis: Section 54 is a beneficial provision intended to encourage investment in residential housing and must receive a liberal construction. The statutory substance is investment of the capital gain in a new residential house within the prescribed period. The assessee acquired a fifty per cent share in a new residential property before the extended return-filing date, and the amount invested exceeded the capital gain. Non-deposit in the Capital Gains Account Scheme was only a procedural lapse and could not override substantive compliance where the genuineness and timely investment in the new asset stood established.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to deduction under section 54; the addition made by disallowing the claim was deleted.

Issues: Whether the High Court could entertain writ applications challenging an order of the National Company Law Tribunal when a statutory appellate remedy before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal was available.

Analysis: An aggrieved party against an order of the National Company Law Tribunal must pursue the appellate remedy before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal. No sufficient reason existed to invoke writ jurisdiction against the National Company Law Tribunal's order.

Conclusion: The High Court ought not to have entertained the writ applications; the aggrieved respondents may pursue an appropriate remedy before the competent forum in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether conversion and packaging of biscuits under output-based agreements constituted supply of manpower or a process amounting to manufacture exempt from service tax; (ii) Whether service-tax demands under reverse charge for security services, GTA services and legal services were sustainable; (iii) Whether the extended period of limitation and consequential penalties were invocable.

Issue (i): Whether conversion and packaging of biscuits under output-based agreements constituted supply of manpower or a process amounting to manufacture exempt from service tax.

Analysis: The conversion charges were fixed by reference to the quantity of goods packed rather than personnel deployed. As biscuits were Third Schedule goods, packing, repacking, or treatment rendering them marketable constituted manufacture under Section 2(f)(iii) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Note 5 to Chapter 19 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. Such activity fell within Section 66D(f) of the Finance Act, 1994 and Entry 30 of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012. The identical contractual arrangement had already been treated as manufacture, and departure from that binding precedent without reasons was untenable.

Conclusion: The activity amounted to manufacture and not supply of manpower; the related service-tax demand and interest were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether service-tax demands under reverse charge for security services, GTA services and legal services were sustainable.

Analysis: The security-services demand was based on expenditure from an incorrect financial year despite nil expenditure in the relevant year; moreover, the provider was a body corporate that had charged service tax, making reverse charge under Notification No. 30/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 inapplicable. The GTA balance demand related to non-GTA expenses recorded in the secondary-freight ledger, while the amount identified during audit had already been paid and adjusted. For legal services, the invoices showed payments to consultants rather than advocates, so reverse-charge liability did not arise.

Conclusion: The demands for security services, GTA services and legal services were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the extended period of limitation and consequential penalties were invocable.

Analysis: The dispute concerned an interpretational question and was founded entirely on statutory records produced during audit. No fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, or suppression with intent to evade was established. The departmental treatment of the issue as dependent on related litigation further negated the basis for alleging suppression.

Conclusion: The extended period was not invocable and the penalties were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: No service-tax liability, interest, or penalty survived in respect of the impugned demands.

Ratio Decidendi: Packaging of Third Schedule goods for consideration determined by output quantity is a process amounting to manufacture, and an interpretational dispute revealed solely through audited records cannot sustain extended limitation absent proof of suppression with intent to evade.

Issues: (i) Whether sanitation, housekeeping and cleaning activities undertaken under the work orders were classifiable as manpower recruitment or supply agency service; (ii) Whether service-tax demand could be sustained solely on a mismatch between income-tax returns and ST-3 returns without corroboration of taxable services.

Issue (i): Whether sanitation, housekeeping and cleaning activities undertaken under the work orders were classifiable as manpower recruitment or supply agency service.

Analysis: Rule 2(g) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and Circular No. 190/9/2015-Service Tax distinguish manpower supply from performance of a contracted job. Manpower supply requires personnel to be placed at the recipient's disposal and under its effective control and supervision, with consideration ordinarily correlated to the number of personnel deployed. The work orders required sanitation, housekeeping and cleaning for hospitals and educational institutions; the personnel remained under the service provider's control, and the agreed consideration was for cleaning activity rather than for deployment of persons.

Conclusion: The activities were cleaning services and not manpower recruitment or supply agency service; the principal service-tax demand, consequential interest and penalties were unsustainable. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether service-tax demand could be sustained solely on a mismatch between income-tax returns and ST-3 returns without corroboration of taxable services.

Analysis: A disparity between income-tax disclosures and service-tax returns may arise from differing revenue-recognition norms, valuation principles, abatements and exemptions. Such mismatch, without corroborative evidence establishing the taxability and value of services, does not establish service-tax liability or justify the demand.

Conclusion: The demand founded only on information from income-tax returns and ST-3 returns, without further corroboration, was legally unsustainable. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned fiscal liability was substantially eliminated, while the admitted tax and interest relating to receipt of legal services remained payable without penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: A contract for execution of cleaning work does not constitute manpower supply where the service provider retains control over the personnel and consideration is for the completed service; tax liability cannot rest solely on uncorroborated discrepancies between income-tax and service-tax returns.

Issues: (i) Whether services of facilitating Indian students' admission to foreign educational institutions for commission constituted intermediary services and were consequently ineligible for treatment as export of services; (ii) Whether commission received from domestic educational institutions was liable to service tax despite the small-service-provider exemption threshold.

Issue (i): Whether services of facilitating Indian students' admission to foreign educational institutions for commission constituted intermediary services and were consequently ineligible for treatment as export of services.

Analysis: The respondent rendered services to foreign universities and received consideration from them, while students paid fees directly to the institutions and were not invoiced by the respondent. The arrangement did not establish the essential elements of intermediary service: three parties, two distinct supplies, and facilitation of a main service supplied by another person. Labelling the respondent as an agent and payment of commission did not by themselves establish intermediary status. The respondent supplied the relevant service on its own account. The settled decisions on materially identical arrangements also applied; Revenue's attempt to contest reliance on an earlier accepted decision was contrary to judicial discipline.

Conclusion: The services were not intermediary services and qualified for export-of-service treatment, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether commission received from domestic educational institutions was liable to service tax despite the small-service-provider exemption threshold.

Analysis: The commission earned from domestic institutions during the relevant financial years was below the aggregate-value threshold under the exemption notification. The value of exported services could not be included for computing that threshold.

Conclusion: No service tax was payable on the domestic-institution commission, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The proposed service-tax liability on both the foreign-university and domestic-institution commissions was unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A service provider acting on its own account is not an intermediary unless the arrangement involves facilitation between distinct parties of a separate main supply, with the requisite principal-agent relationship.

Issues: Whether penalty could be imposed upon the appellant under Rule 26(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 for alleged abetment of wrongful availment of CENVAT credit by the purchaser.

Analysis: Rule 26(2) applies where a person issues an excise-duty invoice without delivery of goods, abets issuance of such invoice, or abets preparation of a document on the basis of which ineligible benefit is likely to be or has been taken. The record did not establish that the appellant had issued or abetted issuance of any excise invoice or other document enabling the purchaser to avail ineligible credit. Mere receipt of goods from a broker could not establish abetment of the purchaser's alleged wrongful credit availment.

Conclusion: The penalty under Rule 26(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the ingredients of cheating under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, were established against the appellants; (ii) Whether the charge of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, was proved against the appellants.

Issue (i): Whether the ingredients of cheating under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, were established against the appellants.

Analysis: Cheating requires proof of a fraudulent or dishonest false representation, deception of the complainant, and consequent delivery of property or legally cognisable loss or harm. The record did not show that the Income Tax Department acted on any false representation or that the appellants dishonestly induced issuance of the certificate under Section 230A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. There was also no evidence that the alleged collateral title deeds were furnished as security, that a mortgage was created in favour of the Department, or that the appellants derived a monetary benefit from the transaction.

Conclusion: The essential ingredients of cheating were not proved; the finding is in favour of the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the charge of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, was proved against the appellants.

Analysis: Criminal conspiracy requires cogent proof of an agreement or prior meeting of minds between two or more persons to commit an illegal act or to achieve a lawful act by illegal means. Suspicion, association, or circumstances without proof of such agreement are insufficient. No direct or substantive evidence established a prior agreement between the accused, and the evidence did not explain how the original title deeds reached the Income Tax Department. The acquittal of the public servant alleged to be the principal beneficiary, coupled with the absence of independent evidence against the remaining accused, left the conspiracy charge unproved.

Conclusion: The prosecution failed to prove criminal conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt; the finding is in favour of the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The prosecution evidence did not establish the requisite dishonest inducement or agreement to commit an unlawful act, and the convictions and sentences lacked a sustainable evidentiary foundation.

Ratio Decidendi: A conviction for cheating or criminal conspiracy requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of, respectively, dishonest deception causing the requisite consequence and a definite agreement or meeting of minds to commit an unlawful act; suspicion or association alone cannot substitute such proof.

Issues: Whether the pending reply to the show-cause notice proposing cancellation of GST registration required expeditious consideration by the tax authorities.

Analysis: The petition was confined to seeking an early decision on the reply already filed against the show-cause notice. No adjudication was made on the allegations underlying the proposed cancellation of registration.

Outcome: The respondent authorities were directed to consider and decide the matter expeditiously, preferably within three weeks.

Issues: Whether the statutory appellate remedy against cancellation of GST registration could be reopened despite delay beyond the limitation prescribed for appeal.

Analysis: The adopted ruling recognises that cancellation of GST registration has serious consequences for the conduct of business. Though the Appellate Authority is bound by the statutory outer limit for condoning delay, constitutional writ jurisdiction may be exercised in an appropriate case where the delay is plausibly explained and refusal to entertain the appeal would cause disproportionate hardship. The merits of the cancellation proceedings, including service of notice and compliance with natural justice, remain for the Appellate Authority.

Conclusion: The appellate remedy must be reopened and the appeal must receive merits consideration without rejection on limitation.

Issues: (i) Whether cancellation of GST registration from a date falling within the period of return-default was invalid for want of a separate notice or adequate opportunity; (ii) Whether writ jurisdiction could be exercised to condone delay beyond the statutory maximum for filing an appeal and require merits adjudication.

Issue (i): Whether cancellation of GST registration from a date falling within the period of return-default was invalid for want of a separate notice or adequate opportunity.

Analysis: Section 29(2)(c) of the Rajasthan Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits cancellation where returns have not been furnished continuously for six months, subject to an opportunity of hearing. The cancellation notice disclosed the return-default, but no reply was furnished. The effective date fell within, and not before, the period of default; it was therefore not retrospective cancellation in the strict sense requiring specific reasons for operation before the default. Section 29 requires notice of the proposed cancellation and does not require a further notice concerning the precise consequential date from which cancellation may operate.

Conclusion: The cancellation proceedings and cancellation order were valid; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether writ jurisdiction could be exercised to condone delay beyond the statutory maximum for filing an appeal and require merits adjudication.

Analysis: Section 107 of the Rajasthan Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 prescribes a defined appeal period and a limited additional period for condonation. The appellate authority lacks jurisdiction to condone delay beyond that maximum period. Extraordinary writ jurisdiction cannot ordinarily be used to defeat this statutory limitation; interference after expiry may arise only in exceptional circumstances, such as patent lack of jurisdiction or a complete denial of natural justice. No such circumstance was established. Earlier contrary coordinate-bench decisions, having not accounted for binding precedent and an earlier binding coordinate-bench decision, were treated as per incuriam.

Conclusion: No writ relief to condone the delay or remit the appeal for merits consideration was warranted; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The registration cancellation and the appellate order refusing to entertain the belated appeal remain legally effective.

Ratio Decidendi: Extraordinary writ jurisdiction cannot ordinarily be invoked to circumvent a statutory appellate limitation that expressly restricts condonation, absent exceptional jurisdictional or natural-justice infirmity.

Issues: Whether the transfer and centralisation of the assessee's case to Nashik under Section 127 was justified after completion of the searched person's assessment.

Analysis: The transfer was founded on administrative convenience and co-ordinated investigation concerning the searched person. That person's assessment had already been completed before the transfer orders were issued. Consequently, the stated purpose for centralising the assessee's case at Nashik no longer subsisted, and no reason remained for transferring the case from Mumbai.

Conclusion: The transfer orders were quashed, and the assessee's assessment is to be conducted in Mumbai under the appropriate charge.

Issues: Whether a transferee importer using DFIA licences obtained through fraudulent exports is liable for customs duty and penalty despite claiming to be a bona fide purchaser.

Analysis: The DFIA licences used for duty-free imports had been procured on the basis of fabricated exports. The importer did not independently verify the genuineness of the licences, underlying exports, issuing exporter, or related customs documentation. Mere purchase through intermediaries and payment through banking channels did not establish the requisite due diligence. The materially identical fraud investigation and the governing coordinate-bench decisions required transferee importers to verify the authenticity of the licences and release documents; reliance solely on brokers was insufficient.

Conclusion: The transferee importer was liable for the customs duty and penalty because the fraudulently obtained DFIA licences were void ab initio and no due diligence was established. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether demands under Section 28 could be sustained before finalisation of provisional assessments under Section 18; (ii) Whether redemption fine and penalties could be imposed after provisionally assessed goods had been exported and were unavailable for confiscation.

Issue (i): Whether demands under Section 28 could be sustained before finalisation of provisional assessments under Section 18.

Analysis: The export bonds expressly recorded an undertaking to pay duty finally assessed and were executed under Section 18, establishing that the exports were provisionally assessed rather than finally reassessed under Section 17. Regulation 5 of the Customs (Finalization of Provisional Assessment) Regulations, 2018 required finalisation within two months of receipt of the test reports. No final assessment had been made. Recovery proceedings for non-levy or short-levy under Section 28 could not be initiated while the assessment remained provisional.

Conclusion: The show cause notices and consequential duty demands issued before finalisation of the provisional assessments were premature and legally unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether redemption fine and penalties could be imposed after provisionally assessed goods had been exported and were unavailable for confiscation.

Analysis: The goods were exported on execution of Section 18 bonds and were neither seized under Section 110 nor provisionally released. Since the exported goods were unavailable for confiscation, imposition of redemption fine under Section 125 was not sustainable.

Conclusion: Redemption fine and penalties were not imposable and were set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Recovery action must follow finalisation of the provisional assessments, and exported goods unavailable for confiscation cannot attract redemption fine.

Ratio Decidendi: Recovery proceedings for short-levy cannot be maintained under Section 28 while an assessment made under Section 18 remains unfinalised; redemption fine cannot be imposed where exported goods are unavailable for confiscation.

Issues: Whether conversion of shipping bills from the Advance Authorisation Scheme to the Duty Drawback Scheme could be denied on the basis of the three-month limitation in Circular No. 36/2010-Cus. or the subsequently issued notification prescribing a time limit.

Analysis: Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962 does not prescribe a limitation period for amendment of shipping bills after export, subject to the statutory requirement of contemporaneous documentary evidence. The three-month limitation in Circular No. 36/2010-Cus. was ultra vires Section 149 and could not defeat entitlement to a consequential export benefit. Notification No. 11/2022-Customs (N.T.) dated 22.02.2022, prescribing time limits for post-export conversion in specified cases, could not be applied retrospectively to exports made before its issuance.

Conclusion: Conversion of the shipping bills from Advance Authorisation to Duty Drawback could not be denied on limitation grounds, and the export benefit was required to be extended in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a public authority is obliged under the Right to Information Act, 2005 to obtain information from a private body in order to furnish it to an information applicant.

Analysis: The right to information extends to material held by or under the control of a public authority. Information relating to a private body is disclosable only where the public authority can access it under another law, subject to the preconditions and restrictions imposed by that law. The Act does not require a public authority to collect, collate, create, or obtain information that is not available in its records merely to answer an information request. The impugned directions requiring the regulator to procure information from a private exchange were inconsistent with this position.

Conclusion: A public authority is not obliged to obtain information from a private body solely for furnishing it under the Right to Information Act, 2005; the impugned directions were unsustainable.

Issues: Whether a company petition dismissed for want of prosecution could be restored despite the restoration application being filed beyond the thirty-day period under Rule 48 of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016.

Analysis: Rule 48(2) prescribes thirty days for seeking restoration upon sufficient cause for non-appearance, but does not impose an absolute prohibition against restoration after that period. The provision must be read harmoniously with Rule 11, which preserves inherent powers necessary to meet the ends of justice. The explanation that counsel missed the hearing because the sitting was preponed remained unrebutted. The restoration application had also been accompanied by a delay-condonation application which was not registered or placed before the Tribunal; the applicant could not be prejudiced by that omission.

Conclusion: The thirty-day period under Rule 48(2) was capable of condonation in the circumstances, and the restoration application was maintainable. The dismissal order was set aside and the company petition was restored for decision on merits.

Issues: Whether the interim moratorium under Section 96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 stays prosecution under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against directors or persons responsible for a company, where the company issued the dishonoured cheque towards its own debt.

Analysis: Section 96 applies to legal action or proceedings in respect of the debt of the person against whom personal insolvency resolution is initiated. A company has an independent juristic existence, and a debt incurred by it remains its debt; it does not become the personal debt of its directors. Directors are prosecuted under Section 141 because of statutory vicarious liability, which does not alter the character of the underlying corporate debt. The binding position is that proceedings under Section 138 are penal in character and are not merely debt-recovery proceedings; personal insolvency moratorium cannot be invoked to avoid criminal prosecution. The pending reference concerning the compensatory component of such proceedings does not dilute the binding effect of the existing decisions or warrant suspension of trials. Any moratorium affecting recovery of compensation, if ordered, does not justify staying the criminal trial.

Conclusion: The interim moratorium under Section 96 does not stay the prosecutions under Sections 138 and 141 against the directors or responsible persons; the issue is decided against the Applicants/Petitioners.

Ratio Decidendi: A personal insolvency moratorium does not bar criminal prosecution of directors under Sections 138 and 141 for dishonour of a cheque issued by the company towards its corporate debt, since vicarious criminal liability does not convert that corporate debt into the directors' personal debt.