Issues: (i) Whether deductions claimed for provisions for non-performing assets were allowable under Section 36(1)(viia); (ii) Whether accrued interest on non-performing assets was taxable on accrual basis in the hands of a co-operative bank; (iii) Whether deduction under Section 80P(2)(c)(ii) was allowable to the co-operative bank.

Issue (i): Whether deductions claimed for provisions for non-performing assets were allowable under Section 36(1)(viia).

Analysis: The deductions actually claimed for provisions were below the amounts computed as eligible deductions. The first appellate authority's factual findings, based on the remand report and the record, remained uncontroverted.

Conclusion: The deductions under Section 36(1)(viia) were allowable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether accrued interest on non-performing assets was taxable on accrual basis in the hands of a co-operative bank.

Analysis: The bank was bound by RBI directions requiring interest on non-performing assets to be recognised on receipt basis, and had consistently followed that method. The amendment extending Section 43D treatment to co-operative banks was regarded as curative and retrospective, removing the distinction between scheduled and non-scheduled co-operative banks for this purpose.

Conclusion: Interest on non-performing assets was taxable on receipt basis and not on accrual basis. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether deduction under Section 80P(2)(c)(ii) was allowable to the co-operative bank.

Analysis: The deduction had been allowed in earlier years, and the position that it was available to a co-operative society including a co-operative bank was not controverted.

Conclusion: The deduction under Section 80P(2)(c)(ii) was allowable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The deletions and deductions sustained by the first appellate authority remain effective for all the assessment years concerned.

Issues: Whether the derivative-trading loss claimed by the assessee was genuine and allowable.

Analysis: The derivative options were acquired shortly before expiry and allowed to lapse, resulting in losses in nearly every transaction. The broker involved had admitted to participating in organised, premeditated trades intended to create artificial derivative losses. Contract notes, execution through a registered broker and banking-channel payments did not, by themselves, establish genuineness once the Revenue's investigation shifted the burden to the assessee. The assessee did not produce cogent rebuttal material, including evidence from the broker, to displace the investigation findings. The right of cross-examination was not absolute on these facts.

Conclusion: The derivative-trading loss was not genuine and its disallowance was upheld against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the refund claim for export duty illegally collected from an SEZ developer was barred by limitation; (ii) Whether refund was barred by unjust enrichment.

Issue (i): Whether the refund claim for export duty illegally collected from an SEZ developer was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The duty levy had been declared unconstitutional and that determination attained finality. The assessee had pursued refund before the SEZ authority and thereafter before the customs authorities as directed by them. On the record, the claim could not be treated as delayed. Further, an amount forcibly collected under an illegal levy is refundable notwithstanding the ordinary statutory refund limitation.

Conclusion: The refund claim was not barred by limitation, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether refund was barred by unjust enrichment.

Analysis: The assessee established through contractor documentation, payment evidence and Chartered Accountant certificates that it bore the export-duty incidence. The steel was used for development of the SEZ and was neither resold nor used in manufacture of goods for sale. As the assessee was the ultimate buyer and had not passed the incidence to another person, the statutory presumption of passing on duty incidence did not apply.

Conclusion: Unjust enrichment was not established and could not bar refund, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to refund of the illegally collected duty in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A claimant that proves it bore an illegally collected duty as the ultimate buyer and did not pass its incidence to another person is entitled to refund; the statutory presumption of passing on duty is rebutted by cogent evidence.

Issues: Whether the contractor was entitled to refund of the amount deducted following a reduction in excise duty despite the agreed firm contract price.

Analysis: The work orders incorporated the tender documents and the contract agreement, under which quoted rates included taxes and duties and statutory variations in taxes and duties were reimbursable on actuals. The firm-price condition was construed with the incorporated tax-variation clauses as a whole. Section 64-A of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 applies unless the contract manifests a different intention. The contractual arrangement showed that the tax component was to be borne by the purchaser: an increase would be reimbursed to the supplier, while a reduction correspondingly benefited the purchaser. Retention of the savings from reduced excise duty by the supplier, without any change in its costs or agreed profit, would result in unjust enrichment.

Conclusion: The contractor was not entitled to refund of the deduction arising from the reduction in excise duty; the benefit of the reduced tax was payable to the respondent.

Issues: Whether the appellate acquittal for the alleged offence of dishonour of cheques was sustainable where one cheque was presented after expiry of its validity, another was presented before its date, and the demand notice claimed the aggregate amount of all seven cheques without valid service.

Analysis: A cheque presented after its validity period cannot found proceedings for dishonour, and a post-dated cheque presented before its date cannot support such proceedings. The demand notice included amounts under both the expired and prematurely presented cheques along with the remaining cheques. Further, the notice was returned with the endorsement "not known", which was not valid service; no further steps were taken to effect service. A demand notice in a penal proceeding must accurately and validly demand the dishonoured cheque amount.

Conclusion: The acquittal was sustainable; the requirements for prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act were not fulfilled.

Issues: Whether QFT Tubes, imported separately and used as a component of an ELISA kit, qualify for the 5% concessional basic customs duty available to ELISA kits under Serial No. 166(A) of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs.

Analysis: The notification extends the concession to specified diagnostic kits or equipment, including ELISA kits, but does not extend it to their individual components. QFT Tubes are blood-collection glass tubes containing antigens and are only one of several components required for an ELISA kit; they do not themselves constitute an ELISA kit in commercial or common parlance. Functional interdependence and intended use with an ELISA plate cannot enlarge the scope of an exemption entry. Exemption notifications require strict construction, and end use is not relevant to classification unless the tariff entry expressly makes use or adaptation a criterion. The relevant condition is that of the goods at importation.

Conclusion: QFT Tubes imported separately are not eligible for the concessional duty exemption prescribed for ELISA kits; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether preferential customs-duty benefit based on certificates of origin could be denied without following the prescribed procedure for verification of those certificates.

Analysis: A claim for preferential concession supported by a certificate of origin issued by the designated authority of the exporting country is governed by the Interim Rules of Origin. Where there is doubt regarding the authenticity of the certificate or accuracy of origin particulars, Rule 15 of Annexure B requires the importing party to seek retroactive verification from the issuing authority. The investigation relied on statements and third-party material without obtaining verification from the Thai issuing authority. The prescribed mechanism for questioning and rejecting the certificates was therefore not followed.

Conclusion: The preferential-notification benefit could not be denied; the duty demand and penalties were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the Chairperson of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India could act as the Disciplinary Committee and cancel an insolvency professional's registration; (ii) Whether a show-cause notice and disciplinary action could be founded on adverse observations of the appellate tribunal without an inspection or investigation under the statutory scheme.

Issue (i): Whether the Chairperson of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India could act as the Disciplinary Committee and cancel an insolvency professional's registration.

Analysis: Section 220 requires the Board to constitute a Disciplinary Committee consisting only of whole-time members. The statutory composition of the Board and the service rules distinguish the Chairperson from a whole-time member. The delegation order authorised the Chairperson to constitute committees, but specifically reserved disposal of show-cause notices and cancellation of registration to the Disciplinary Committee. A statutory power required to be exercised in a prescribed manner cannot be exercised otherwise.

Conclusion: The Chairperson lacked jurisdiction to act as the Disciplinary Committee; the cancellation order was a nullity. The finding is in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether a show-cause notice and disciplinary action could be founded on adverse observations of the appellate tribunal without an inspection or investigation under the statutory scheme.

Analysis: Sections 218 to 220 establish a sequence in which the Board, upon reasonable grounds, directs inspection or investigation, receives the resulting report, and may then issue a show-cause notice for disciplinary consideration. The prior inspection covering the petitioner's assignments, including the concerned corporate debtor, found no illegality. That report could not be disregarded while initiating proceedings directly from appellate observations, particularly when independent consideration had been required. The issuing officer also did not correspond with the authority designated under the applicable delegation order. The factual circumstances, including unavailable records and the company's non-going-concern status, required an appropriate statutory inquiry before disciplinary action.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice and consequential disciplinary proceedings were vitiated by non-compliance with the mandatory inspection and investigation framework. The finding is in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The statutory defects do not preclude the Board from initiating and pursuing fresh action on the same matters in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute confines disciplinary authority to a committee composed only of specified members and requires inspection or investigation before disciplinary action, an order made by an unauthorised functionary without following that statutory process is void.

Issues: (i) Whether non-disposal of the intervention application before recording completion of the sale and liquidation process caused prejudice to the appellant; (ii) Whether the liquidator could sell the corporate debtor's leasehold and project rights, and the corporate debtor's legal entity, in liquidation despite the appellant's ownership and contractual rights under the BOT, lease and shareholders' arrangements.

Issue (i): Whether non-disposal of the intervention application before recording completion of the sale and liquidation process caused prejudice to the appellant.

Analysis: The intervention application sought participation, a copy of the sale application and a condition that transfer of leased land be subject to a board resolution; it did not seek cancellation of the completed sales, sale certificates or sale agreement. The sale-completion order was subject to pending litigation, and the intervention application was later withdrawn. In the absence of a contemporaneous challenge to the sale process or an effective substantive relief, recording completion of sale and liquidation was ministerial and caused no prejudice, though both applications ought preferably to have been disposed of together.

Conclusion: Non-disposal of the intervention application simultaneously with the sale-completion application did not prejudice the appellant; the finding is against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the liquidator could sell the corporate debtor's leasehold and project rights, and the corporate debtor's legal entity, in liquidation despite the appellant's ownership and contractual rights under the BOT, lease and shareholders' arrangements.

Analysis: The concession, lease and shareholders' arrangements created a bundle of leasehold, operational and project rights in favour of the corporate debtor for the concession term. Although ownership of the land remained with the appellant, the corporate debtor's leasehold rights and rights to operate the project were assets capable of inclusion in the liquidation estate and sale by auction. The appellant had not terminated the contractual arrangements, and its creditor claims had already been rejected conclusively. Its equity contribution ranked last in the statutory distribution waterfall; the equity could not pass to the purchaser. The liquidation sale extinguished pre-existing liabilities consistently with the clean slate principle, while the purchaser acquired no superior rights and remained bound by the surviving BOT obligations, including remittance of the facility at the end of the stipulated term. No material irregularity, fraud or substantial undervaluation in the sale was established to warrant interference with the liquidator's commercial decision.

Conclusion: The sale of the corporate debtor's leasehold and project rights and its legal entity was valid, subject to preservation of the appellant's BOT rights; the finding is against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The auction purchaser may exercise only the rights formerly vested in the corporate debtor, and remains bound to transfer the facility in accordance with the corporate debtor's BOT obligations at the end of the concession term.

Ratio Decidendi: Leasehold and contractual development or operational rights vested in a corporate debtor constitute liquidation assets capable of sale by the liquidator; a sale purchaser takes no better rights than the corporate debtor and remains bound by subsisting contractual obligations.

Issues: (i) Whether the order directing de-sealing of the project property was sustainable when sealing and confiscation preceded commencement of CIRP; (ii) Whether the Resolution Professional was authorised to challenge the order remanding the resolution plan; (iii) Whether contractual possession and development rights under the hire-purchase agreement constituted assets of the corporate debtor and whether the resolution plan could deal with the statutory authority's land and unauthorised construction.

Issue (i): Whether the order directing de-sealing of the project property was sustainable when sealing and confiscation preceded commencement of CIRP.

Analysis: The material established that the property was sealed in August 2019 and confiscated in July 2021, whereas CIRP commenced in May 2022. The statutory action was founded on unauthorised construction contrary to the sanctioned plan, and not on a post-moratorium recovery action. The premise that sealing occurred during moratorium was therefore erroneous.

Conclusion: The de-sealing order was unsustainable and was set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the Resolution Professional was authorised to challenge the order remanding the resolution plan.

Analysis: The Committee of Creditors had resolved to authorise the Resolution Professional to file the appeal, and that authorisation was not controverted. The appeal was consequently not an independent action by the Resolution Professional.

Conclusion: The appeal filed by the Resolution Professional was maintainable.

Issue (iii): Whether contractual possession and development rights under the hire-purchase agreement constituted assets of the corporate debtor and whether the resolution plan could deal with the statutory authority's land and unauthorised construction.

Analysis: The hire-purchase arrangement reserved title in the statutory authority until full payment and execution of conveyance, but conferred possession, construction, commercial exploitation, transfer of constructed units and a right to seek conveyance upon compliance. These valuable contractual and development rights could constitute assets under the insolvency framework if they subsisted on the insolvency commencement date. No formal cancellation of the agreement or allotment had been made, and regulatory sealing could not by itself establish contractual termination. Nevertheless, the Resolution Professional could acquire no superior right or title, and statutory ownership could not be compulsorily transferred through a resolution plan. The plan impermissibly proceeded as if the land belonged to the corporate debtor, required transfer of the land and approvals, and sought to prevent imposition of compounding charges and require regularisation of unauthorised construction. Regularisation or compounding remained within the statutory authority's exclusive domain and required compliance with applicable law.

Conclusion: The corporate debtor's subsisting contractual and development rights were capable of treatment as assets, but the resolution plan could not transfer the statutory authority's ownership or compel regularisation of unauthorised construction; remand to the Committee of Creditors for reconsideration was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The resolution plan must be reformulated by treating only legally subsisting contractual and development rights as part of the insolvency estate, while preserving the statutory authority's title and regulatory powers.

Ratio Decidendi: Contractual possession and development rights that subsist on the insolvency commencement date may constitute assets of a corporate debtor, but insolvency resolution cannot create superior title, divest a statutory authority of its land, or override mandatory statutory approval and regularisation requirements.

Issues: Whether the PMLA prosecution had territorial jurisdiction at Gurugram and whether, in view of the scheduled offence having been transferred to Delhi and part of the alleged money-laundering activity occurring there, the proceeding should be transferred to the PMLA Special Court at Delhi.

Analysis: Section 44 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act requires the offence punishable under Section 4 and the connected scheduled offence to be tried by the Special Court having jurisdiction over the money-laundering offence. Money laundering may involve several processes or activities, including acquiring, concealing, possessing, using, or projecting proceeds of crime as untainted property. By virtue of Section 178(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, an offence consisting of acts occurring in different local areas may be tried by a court having jurisdiction over any such area, and Section 46 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act applies the Code's procedure subject to consistency with the Act. The proceeds of crime were acquired at Gurugram, where the underlying project and attached land were situated, giving the Gurugram Special Court jurisdiction. However, cash, jewellery, vehicles, and fixed deposits constituting proceeds of crime were also seized or attached at Delhi, giving the Delhi Special Court concurrent jurisdiction. Since the scheduled offence had already been transferred to Delhi, the statutory requirement that the PMLA offence and the scheduled offence be tried by the same Special Court made transfer expedient in the interests of justice.

Conclusion: The PMLA prosecution was not without jurisdiction at Gurugram, but the proceeding was required to be transferred to the Special Judge, PMLA, Saket Court Complex, Delhi.

Issues: Whether the six-month limitation for claiming refund under the retrospective service-tax exemption commences from the date of presidential assent to the Finance Act, 2017 or from the date of the service-provider certificate required to support the refund application.

Analysis: Section 104 of the Finance Act, 2017 retrospectively exempted the relevant one-time upfront amount for long-term industrial-plot leases and provided for refund of tax already collected, with a six-month period for filing the claim. The refund application had to be accompanied by SIPCOT's certificate confirming payment of service tax. Since that certificate was issued on 19.12.2017, the limitation could commence only upon its issuance; the application filed on 26.02.2018 was consequently within six months. The Tribunal's computation from the date of presidential assent disregarded the mandatory supporting certificate.

Conclusion: The refund claim was within limitation, and the substantial questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether refund amounts withheld for want of evidence that service tax deducted by the Rajasthan Housing Board was deposited with the Revenue were admissible; (ii) Whether interest on the refunded service tax was payable at 12% from the dates of tax payment, or only at the statutory rate after the prescribed period from the refund applications.

Issue (i): Whether refund amounts withheld for want of evidence that service tax deducted by the Rajasthan Housing Board was deposited with the Revenue were admissible.

Analysis: A refund claimant must furnish documentary evidence establishing payment of the duty or tax claimed as refund. The narration in a show-cause notice of the claimant's assertion that tax had been deducted by the awarder does not establish actual deduction, deposit in the Government account, or absence of a separate refund to the awarder. No challans, certificates, or equivalent primary evidence established the relevant payments.

Conclusion: The withheld refund amounts were correctly denied for lack of documentary proof of duty payment, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest on the refunded service tax was payable at 12% from the dates of tax payment, or only at the statutory rate after the prescribed period from the refund applications.

Analysis: Refund claims for tax voluntarily paid under self-assessment fall within the statutory refund mechanism. Such payments cannot be treated as revenue deposits merely because they were subsequently asserted to have been made under a mistake of law. Interest on delayed refund accrues only after expiry of three months from receipt of the refund application, and the Tribunal cannot award equitable or compensatory interest beyond the statutory framework. The record showed that the refunds were ultimately made pursuant to the appellate orders, beyond the statutory three-month period.

Conclusion: The appellants are entitled to interest at 6% per annum from expiry of three months after their respective refund applications until payment of the sanctioned refunds, in favour of the assessee; interest at 12% from the dates of tax payment is denied.

Final Conclusion: The statutory refund regime governs both the evidentiary entitlement to refund and interest for delay; only proven refund claims qualify, and delayed payment of sanctioned refunds attracts interest at the notified statutory rate.

Ratio Decidendi: Tax voluntarily paid under self-assessment and claimed back as refund remains governed by the statutory refund provisions, and interest is payable only at the notified rate from expiry of three months after receipt of a valid refund application.

Issues: (i) Whether Cenvat credit was admissible where the imported aluminium scrap was not received in the factory and credit was availed on invalid, exhausted or fictitious documents; (ii) Whether the demand of duty for clandestine removal, invocation of the extended limitation period and penalties were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether Cenvat credit was admissible where the imported aluminium scrap was not received in the factory and credit was availed on invalid, exhausted or fictitious documents.

Analysis: Rule 3(1) requires receipt of inputs in the factory for availment of credit. Documentary endorsements showed diversion of imported scrap away from the factory; the material was corroborated by statements of the customs house agents and cargo personnel. The appellant did not produce supporting Cenvat records or invoices, while its statements admitted non-receipt of scrap and departmental investigation established that the stated suppliers had made no supplies.

Conclusion: The Cenvat credit was wrongly availed and its reversal was sustainable, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand of duty for clandestine removal, invocation of the extended limitation period and penalties were sustainable.

Analysis: Parallel invoices, transport and freight records, booking registers, delivery documents and statements established clearances of final products without invoices and without payment of duty. The evidence demonstrated fraudulent conduct causing duty evasion, rather than a procedural lapse, and supported invocation of the extended period and imposition of penalties.

Conclusion: The duty demand for clandestine removal, extended limitation and penalties were sustainable, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The confirmed reversal of inadmissible credit, excise-duty demand, extended limitation and penalties remain enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: Cenvat credit is unavailable where inputs are not actually received in the registered factory, and corroborated documentary and testimonial evidence of undisclosed clearances establishes clandestine removal and justifies the extended limitation period where fraud is shown.

Issues: (i) Whether the charge of clandestine removal was established; (ii) Whether individual penalties were justified.

Issue (i): Whether the charge of clandestine removal was established.

Analysis: The adjudicating authority rejected the requested cross-examination despite treating the reply as interim, but did not communicate that rejection or grant a further opportunity to file a final reply on merits. The demand was consequently determined solely on the show-cause allegations. Seeking cross-examination was a permissible means of disputing the alleged admissions, notwithstanding that the statements had not been formally retracted. The proceedings therefore breached audi alteram partem and denied a reasonable opportunity to defend.

Conclusion: The allegation of clandestine removal was not proved; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether individual penalties were justified.

Analysis: The penalised individuals were likewise not afforded a reasonable opportunity to present their defence. The procedural infirmity that invalidated the demand equally affected the penalties.

Conclusion: The individual penalties could not be sustained; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The demand and penalties were set aside because the adjudication was conducted in breach of natural justice, and a remand was considered purposeless given the age of the alleged activity.

Ratio Decidendi: Where liability is founded on statements and the noticees seek cross-examination, rejection of that request without communicating the decision and affording a further effective opportunity to answer the case violates audi alteram partem and vitiates the adjudication.

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation for demanding central excise duty could validly be invoked.

Analysis: The Department had been informed through prior correspondence of the assessee's intended procurement and packing/labelling activities in respect of crankshafts. It could not, after three years, claim ignorance of those material facts. Further, despite the direction to issue a proper recovery notice, the show-cause notice was issued beyond one year, and the lower orders did not address these facts. The extended period was therefore invoked without justification.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was legally unsustainable; consequently, the duty demand and consequential penalty could not survive.

Issues: (i) Whether Rule 8A(3) of the Wealth Tax Rules, 1957, requiring a degree in Agricultural Science and prescribed experience for registration as a valuer of agricultural land, is unconstitutional under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India; (ii) Whether rejection of the petitioner's application for registration as an agricultural-land valuer for want of the prescribed qualification was valid.

Issue (i): Whether Rule 8A(3) of the Wealth Tax Rules, 1957, requiring a degree in Agricultural Science and prescribed experience for registration as a valuer of agricultural land, is unconstitutional under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: Section 34AB of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 authorises distinct qualifications for valuers of different asset classes. Rule 8A prescribes qualifications corresponding to the specialised nature of each asset. Agricultural-land valuation entails assessment of soil quality and fertility, irrigation, cultivation, crops, productivity, land classification, access, comparable sales and other agricultural characteristics reflected in the prescribed valuation form. A degree in Agricultural Science with farm-valuation experience bears a rational nexus to this object. The alternative eligibility extended to specified former Government officers rests on their substantial practical experience in land administration and valuation, constituting a valid classification. A statutory qualification is not invalid merely because another professional qualification may also enable a person to undertake valuation work.

Conclusion: Rule 8A(3) of the Wealth Tax Rules, 1957 is constitutionally valid and does not violate Articles 14 or 19 of the Constitution of India. The issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether rejection of the petitioner's application for registration as an agricultural-land valuer for want of the prescribed qualification was valid.

Analysis: The petitioner held a Civil Engineering qualification and was registered for valuation of non-agricultural immovable properties, but did not possess the Agricultural Science degree and farm-valuation experience required by Rule 8A(3). Registration for a different asset category could not substitute compliance with the distinct statutory qualifications applicable to agricultural lands.

Conclusion: Rejection of the application for registration as a valuer of agricultural land was valid. The issue is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The prescribed specialised qualification regime for agricultural-land valuers remains enforceable, and civil-engineering credentials do not confer eligibility for that separate registration category.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory rule prescribing specialised qualifications for valuation of a distinct class of assets is valid where the qualification has a rational nexus with the expertise required, and an experience-based alternative for specified public officers constitutes a reasonable classification.

Issues: Whether confirmation of the provisional attachment of movable and immovable properties was sustainable on the ground that they were acquired from, or represented, proceeds of crime.

Analysis: Under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, property traceable to proceeds generated through scheduled offences remains liable to attachment notwithstanding its layering or acquisition in another person's name. The material established active and knowing participation in the fraudulent schemes, receipt of funds from the group entities, and use of those funds for acquisition of assets. The asserted commission income did not displace the evidence that the funds represented proceeds of crime. The assets held in the spouse's name were funded from such proceeds; the disclosed loan did not explain the balance consideration or its repayment. Rental income from property nominally transferred to another person was nevertheless enjoyed by the appellants, establishing beneficial control and concealment of the tainted asset.

Conclusion: The attached properties were validly treated as proceeds of crime, and confirmation of the provisional attachment was sustained against the appellants.

Issues: Whether refusal to confirm seizure of domestic properties equivalent to the value of funds allegedly transferred abroad through hawala channels was sustainable under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999.

Analysis: Section 37A(1) permits seizure of property of equivalent value situated in India where foreign exchange, foreign security, or property outside India is suspected to have been held in contravention of Section 4. At the seizure-confirmation stage, the material need only disclose a prima facie case; final adjudication follows separately. The tally data, e-mails, witness statements, token-based cash-delivery mechanism, identification of intermediaries, and corresponding deposits in the overseas bank accounts cumulatively supported a prima facie inference of transfer of funds from India to Dubai through unauthorized channels. The separate legal personality of the overseas company did not negate the material indicating the respondent's alleged role in the contravention or prevent seizure of the respondent's Indian properties of equivalent value. The subsequent settlement order under the Income-tax Act operated in a distinct statutory field and could not override proceedings under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999.

Conclusion: The refusal to confirm the seizure was legally unsustainable; a prima facie case of contravention of Section 4 was established, warranting seizure under Section 37A(1) of property situated in India equivalent to the amount involved.

Issues: (i) Whether the taxability of the write-back of employee-benefit provisions must be determined after giving final effect to the appellate proceedings for the year in which the corresponding provision was claimed; (ii) Whether interest under section 234D for Assessment Year 2009-10 requires recomputation following modification of the assessment pursuant to appellate orders; (iii) Whether refunds adjusted against outstanding demand must first be appropriated towards interest refundable and thereafter towards principal tax while computing interest under section 244A; (iv) Whether interest under section 234D for Assessment Year 2011-12 could be levied beyond one month.

Issue (i): Whether the taxability of the write-back of employee-benefit provisions must be determined after giving final effect to the appellate proceedings for the year in which the corresponding provision was claimed.

Analysis: A write-back is taxable where the corresponding expenditure was allowed as a deduction in the earlier year; conversely, taxing it where the deduction was not allowed would result in double taxation. Since the final consequential effect of the appellate orders for Assessment Year 2008-09 remained to be worked out, the write-back could not be independently determined.

Conclusion: The taxability of the write-back was restored for determination after giving final effect to the appellate orders for Assessment Year 2008-09.

Issue (ii): Whether interest under section 234D for Assessment Year 2009-10 requires recomputation following modification of the assessment pursuant to appellate orders.

Analysis: Levy of interest under section 234D is consequential upon the final regular-assessment position. As the assessment had been modified pursuant to appellate directions, the existence and quantum of any excess demand required verification against the final order giving effect to those directions.

Conclusion: The levy of interest under section 234D was restored for fresh verification and recomputation; no interest is chargeable if the final regular assessment results in no excess demand.

Issue (iii): Whether refunds adjusted against outstanding demand must first be appropriated towards interest refundable and thereafter towards principal tax while computing interest under section 244A.

Analysis: The applicable judicial principle requires a refund adjusted against an outstanding demand to be first appropriated towards the interest component payable to the assessee and only thereafter towards the principal tax component. The same principle applied to both assessment years.

Conclusion: The adjustment must first be made against interest refundable and thereafter against principal tax, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether interest under section 234D for Assessment Year 2011-12 could be levied beyond one month.

Analysis: The prior coordinate-bench decision in the assessee's own case, on identical facts and chronology, confined the period of charge under section 234D to March 2013. Subsequent rectification and appellate-effect orders did not alter the relevant date of the original regular assessment for this purpose.

Conclusion: Interest under section 234D was restricted to one month, from 01.03.2013 to 31.03.2013, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The write-back and the consequential interest for Assessment Year 2009-10 require determination on the final appellate-effect position, while the assessee receives the prescribed refund-interest adjustment and restricted section 234D charge for Assessment Year 2011-12.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a refund is adjusted against an outstanding tax demand, appropriation must first be towards interest payable on the refund and thereafter towards the principal tax amount.