Issues: (i) Whether the classification of ONT/ONU and OLT under Customs Tariff Item 8517 62 90 contained an error apparent on the record; (ii) Whether rectification was required concerning the applicability of exemption notifications, consideration of the telecom expert report, and the finding of liability to confiscation.

Issue (i): Whether the classification of ONT/ONU and OLT under Customs Tariff Item 8517 62 90 contained an error apparent on the record.

Analysis: ONT/ONU receive broadband data through optical fibre and transmit it to subscriber devices through cables or Wi-Fi; OLTs similarly receive and transmit data between the internet service provider and subscribers. Such functions place the goods within the specific six-digit sub-heading for machines for reception, conversion and transmission or regeneration of data. The residual sub-heading 8517 69, including entries for subscriber end equipment, cannot apply once the goods fall within sub-heading 8517 62. The coordinate-bench decision was distinguishable because the functions of the goods there were not evident. An advance ruling applies only to the applicant concerned and did not govern the classification in this case.

Conclusion: The classification of ONT/ONU and OLT under Customs Tariff Item 8517 62 90 contains no error apparent on the record and is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether rectification was required concerning the applicability of exemption notifications, consideration of the telecom expert report, and the finding of liability to confiscation.

Analysis: The exemption notifications required consideration in their form applicable during the respective periods of dispute. The expert report relied upon by the assessee could be examined or cross-examined in the remand proceedings; there was no basis to require its acceptance without such examination. Although no goods had actually been confiscated and no consequential penalty had been imposed, the challenged finding of liability to confiscation required a fresh decision.

Conclusion: The exemption claims and the finding of liability to confiscation are to be reconsidered by the Commissioner, with the applicable notifications and expert evidence being addressed afresh; this is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The tariff classification determination remains undisturbed, while the exemption eligibility and confiscation aspects require fresh adjudication on the corrected basis.

Issues: (i) Classification of oven-roasted pistachios and almonds; (ii) Classification of oven-roasted cashew nuts; (iii) Availability of preferential basic customs duty exemption under Notification No. 46/2011-Cus dated 01.06.2011.

Issue (i): Classification of oven-roasted pistachios and almonds.

Analysis: Heading 2008 covers nuts otherwise prepared or preserved, while the relevant HSN Explanatory Notes expressly include almonds and other nuts that are dry-roasted, oil-roasted or fat-roasted. Roasting is distinct from the drying and preservation processes contemplated in Chapter 8. Applying the tariff terms, HSN guidance and common trade understanding, roasted almonds and pistachios fall within the entry for other roasted nuts and seeds.

Conclusion: Oven-roasted pistachios and almonds are classifiable under CTI 2008 19 91, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Classification of oven-roasted cashew nuts.

Analysis: CTI 2008 19 10 specifically describes cashew nuts that are roasted, salted or roasted and salted. A specific tariff entry must apply in preference to a residual entry. Roasting produces a product distinct from raw or merely dried nuts and is covered by Heading 2008.

Conclusion: Oven-roasted cashew nuts are classifiable under CTI 2008 19 10, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Availability of preferential basic customs duty exemption under Notification No. 46/2011-Cus dated 01.06.2011.

Analysis: The notification benefit is contingent upon proof, to the satisfaction of the competent customs officer, that the imported goods originate in the specified country under the applicable ASEAN-India preferential rules of origin and the Customs (Administration of Rules of Origin under Trade Agreements) Rules, 2020.

Conclusion: The notification benefit is available only upon satisfactory proof of the prescribed preferential origin, in favour of the assessee subject to fulfilment of that requirement.

Final Conclusion: The roasted pistachios, almonds and cashew nuts receive the stated tariff treatment, while preferential duty treatment remains dependent on establishing qualifying origin. No ruling was issued on roasted areca nuts because that classification question had already been decided by the High Court.

Ratio Decidendi: Roasted nuts, being products prepared by a process distinct from drying or preservation under Chapter 8, are classifiable under Heading 2008; where a specific roasted-nut tariff entry exists, it prevails over a general or residual entry.

Issues: (i) Whether the Corporate Debtor was denied a fair opportunity of hearing before admission of the financial creditor's insolvency application. (ii) Whether a pending scheme of compromise and arrangement and ongoing settlement negotiations required deferment of the insolvency application. (iii) Whether pending counterclaims, asserted receivables and commercial viability barred admission upon establishment of financial debt and default.

Issue (i): Whether the Corporate Debtor was denied a fair opportunity of hearing before admission of the financial creditor's insolvency application.

Analysis: The Corporate Debtor had filed pleadings and written submissions and was afforded repeated opportunities to advance oral submissions. Its right to address oral arguments was closed only after it failed to utilise those opportunities, including a further opportunity afforded following a change in Bench composition. The adjudication proceeded on the available pleadings, documents and written submissions rather than ex parte. Fair opportunity does not require indefinite adjournments where a party has adequately participated but fails to argue.

Conclusion: There was no violation of the principles of natural justice and no procedural infirmity in deciding the insolvency application on the record.

Issue (ii): Whether a pending scheme of compromise and arrangement and ongoing settlement negotiations required deferment of the insolvency application.

Analysis: A scheme under Sections 230-232 remains a proposal until approved in accordance with law and made binding. Settlement negotiations and unsuccessful one-time settlement proposals do not create a legal embargo on an insolvency application. The settlement proposal had failed for want of the stipulated upfront payment, and the statutory process could not be kept pending indefinitely upon uncertain future negotiations.

Conclusion: The pending scheme and settlement negotiations did not bar or require postponement of admission of the insolvency application.

Issue (iii): Whether pending counterclaims, asserted receivables and commercial viability barred admission upon establishment of financial debt and default.

Analysis: The jurisdictional enquiry is confined to the existence of financial debt, occurrence of default and completeness of the application. The credit facilities, default, classification of accounts as non-performing assets and acknowledgments through settlement proposals established debt and default. The counterclaim before the debt recovery forum remained undecided and could not displace the established default. Claimed receivables, future arbitral recoveries, commercial viability and business hardship do not override the statutory insolvency framework, which itself provides for resolution while preserving the corporate debtor as a going concern.

Conclusion: Pending counterclaims, prospective recoveries and asserted viability did not preclude admission once financial debt and default were established.

Final Conclusion: The admission of the Corporate Debtor to the corporate insolvency resolution process was legally sustainable, and the connected challenges to the procedural orders furnished no basis for appellate intervention.

Ratio Decidendi: Once financial debt and default are established under Section 7, unapproved compromise proposals, ongoing settlement negotiations, and undecided counterclaims do not ordinarily justify deferral of insolvency admission; adequate repeated opportunities satisfy natural justice even where oral argument is subsequently closed for non-utilisation.

Issues: Whether the application for initiation of insolvency resolution process against the personal guarantor under Section 95 was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The corporate debtor's part-payment on 03.02.2021 was undisputed. Under the deed of guarantee, a part-payment by the borrower bound the guarantor; further, the guarantor's liability was co-extensive with that of the principal borrower. The earlier dismissal of the recovery application for default did not extinguish the underlying debt or make the Section 95 proceeding non-maintainable.

Conclusion: The Section 95 application instituted on 28.09.2023 was within limitation and was maintainable against the personal guarantor.

Issues: Whether gratuity and leave encashment payable to an employee who superannuated during the corporate insolvency resolution process constitute insolvency resolution process costs.

Analysis: Section 5(13) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 employs an exhaustive definition of insolvency resolution process costs. Apart from the resolution professional's remuneration, the enumerated categories concern expenses actually incurred by the resolution professional during the insolvency resolution process. Gratuity accrues as a terminal benefit upon cessation of employment and is not an expense incurred by the resolution professional; it is also not equivalent to salary payable for services during the process. Leave encashment likewise cannot be included in insolvency resolution process costs and must be addressed under the resolution-plan framework and payment priority prescribed by the Code.

Conclusion: Gratuity and leave encashment do not form part of insolvency resolution process costs; the issue is decided against the appellant.

Issues: Whether, pending the appeal, suspension of a resolution professional's registration for misconduct alleged in one CIRP could operate across all other assignments without an opportunity of hearing concerning those assignments.

Analysis: The statutory scheme requires Board confirmation for appointment or replacement of a resolution professional, while Regulation 13(7) contemplates communication of disciplinary action to the committees of creditors in other ongoing assignments. The blanket suspension was prima facie disproportionate, undermined the respective committees' statutory role, and affected the appellant's other assignments without a hearing on conduct in those assignments. The appellant established a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. The wider appellate scope under Section 220(7) was left for determination in the main appeal.

Outcome: The suspension was stayed insofar as it barred the appellant from acting in assignments other than the CIRP in which he had been removed; the Board may communicate its order to the respective committees of creditors for their decision.

Issues: (i) Whether the Section 7 application was validly authorised by the partnership firm notwithstanding objections by one surviving partner and the intervention of a deceased partner's legal representative; (ii) Whether the asserted financial debt and default entitled the appellant to initiate insolvency proceedings within limitation.

Issue (i): Whether the Section 7 application was validly authorised by the partnership firm notwithstanding objections by one surviving partner and the intervention of a deceased partner's legal representative.

Analysis: Under the partnership deed, the death of a partner did not dissolve the firm, and a nominee of the deceased partner could join only upon acceptance by the surviving partners. As the legal representative had not been admitted as a partner, he lacked standing to intervene in the insolvency proceeding. Decisions concerning the firm's business could be taken by a majority under the partnership deed and Section 12(c) of the Partnership Act, 1932. The decision of two of the three surviving partners to commence the proceeding was therefore binding. A partner acting in the firm's name could institute the application because each partner is an agent of the firm, and neither Rule 4 nor Form 1 required signatures of every partner. Any challenge to the majority decision lay before the competent civil forum.

Conclusion: The Section 7 application was validly authorised; the objection to its institution fails.

Issue (ii): Whether the asserted financial debt and default entitled the appellant to initiate insolvency proceedings within limitation.

Analysis: The corporate debtor's balance sheets classified the appellant as a sundry creditor, and the ledger and Form 1 showed amounts advanced and repayable by the corporate debtor. Absence of a formal loan agreement or an interest stipulation did not negate the existence of a debt, and the principal amount exceeded the statutory threshold. However, the last transaction was on 31.03.2019, furnishing the nearest ascertainable point for default and limitation. The subsequently asserted default date of 30.05.2022 was unsupported by the record. As the Section 7 application was filed after expiry of the limitation period reckoned from the last transaction, the debt was time-barred.

Conclusion: The Section 7 application was not maintainable because the claim was barred by limitation.

Final Conclusion: Although the initiation of proceedings was duly authorised and the amount constituted a debt, insolvency jurisdiction could not be invoked for a time-barred claim.

Ratio Decidendi: A Section 7 insolvency application founded on an otherwise established financial debt cannot be maintained after expiry of limitation, and an unsupported later date of default cannot extend the limitation period.

Issues: Whether refund of service tax paid on specified services used for authorised operations of an SEZ unit can be denied because the services were not wholly consumed within the SEZ.

Analysis: Section 26(1)(e) of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 grants service-tax exemption for taxable services provided to an SEZ unit for authorised operations. Notification No. 17/2011-Service Tax dated 01.03.2011 regulates that exemption through a refund mechanism where tax has been paid. The requirement concerning services being wholly consumed within the SEZ applies only to the option of obtaining ab initio exemption; it does not restrict refund of tax paid on specified services actually used for authorised operations. The notification permits proportionate restriction only where services are shared between SEZ and DTA operations, and no such sharing was established. The services were approved specified services and no finding established that they were unconnected with authorised operations. The SEZ Act prevails over inconsistent restrictions under the Finance Act, 1994 or notifications issued thereunder.

Conclusion: Refund of Rs.13,37,485 on services used for authorised operations could not be denied merely because those services were not wholly consumed within the SEZ; the assessee was entitled to that refund.

Issues: Whether the balance VAT payable at 12.5% on pre-2010 sales of pressure cookers must be computed on the original sale price on which 4% VAT was initially collected, or by treating the gross amount inclusive of the earlier VAT as the revised tax-inclusive consideration.

Analysis: Under the definitions of output tax, sale price, gross turnover and taxable turnover, VAT is chargeable on the sale price exclusive of tax charged or chargeable. The earlier 4% VAT had been collected and paid on the stated sale price of Rs.100. Recomputing the sale price as Rs.91 to accommodate the subsequently determined 12.5% rate would disconnect the computation from the original taxable sale price and artificially reduce the differential tax liability. Computing the total 12.5% VAT and the balance 8.5% liability on Rs.100 does not amount to levying VAT on VAT, because the levy remains on the original sale price and not on the tax component.

Conclusion: The balance 8.5% VAT is payable on the original sale price on which the earlier 4% VAT was paid; the tax-inclusive recomputation advanced by the assessee is impermissible.

Issues: Whether pending civil and arbitral proceedings concerning operational-credit claims, which had not crystallised into determinable and quantifiable claims before approval of the resolution plan, survived the approved resolution plan.

Analysis: The final list of operational creditors quantified the disputed claims at a notional value of Re.1 and did not preserve them subject to the outcome of pending proceedings. The resolution plan, which had attained finality, provided that the settlement corpus available to relevant operational creditors was payable pro rata only for crystallised and approved claims within the stipulated period. Its provisions, read harmoniously, discharged and extinguished pre-effective-date liabilities and required pending proceedings by operational creditors to be withdrawn, abated, settled or extinguished. The clean slate and fresh start principles preclude indeterminate claims from resurfacing after plan approval. There was no ambiguity warranting application of contra proferentem or adoption of a face-value reservation mechanism.

Conclusion: Pending civil and arbitral claims that had not crystallised by approval of the resolution plan stood abated, waived, withdrawn and extinguished; the operational creditors were entitled to no amount beyond their quantified Re.1 claims. The issue is decided in favour of the appellant.

Outcome: Delay condoned; the Special Leave Petitions seeking bail were dismissed, and pending applications were disposed of.

Issues: Whether the extended limitation period for recovery of service tax for 2016-17 was validly invoked, and whether the penalty for suppression was sustainable.

Analysis: The appellant, though registered, neither filed ST-3 returns nor disclosed gross receipts, taxable receipts, exempt receipts, abatements, or its service-tax liability for the relevant period. Statutory returns required disclosure of gross receipts before deductions or exemptions could be claimed. The failure to respond to departmental requests for records further prevented verification. The prescribed statutory manner for disclosure could not be replaced by an undisclosed claim of abatements, and a party could not derive advantage from its own default. These circumstances established deliberate suppression of taxable receipts with intent to evade service tax, warranting invocation of the extended period. Since suppression justifying the extended period stood established, the penalty was consequentially justified.

Conclusion: The extended period under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 was validly invoked, and the penalty under Section 78 of that Act was sustainable; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether tax was leviable under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 on imported cars claimed to have been sold in the course of high seas sales; (ii) Whether the Tribunal could restore the assessment of tax for breach of conditions under G.O.Ms.No.381 despite no departmental appeal against the first appellate order.

Issue (i): Whether tax was leviable under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 on imported cars claimed to have been sold in the course of high seas sales.

Analysis: The import and sale records showed that the dealer's sale invoices were raised after the cars entered Indian territory and from its Tamil Nadu factory address. The dealer paid customs duty, while no reliable evidence established that title passed while the cars were on the high seas. Transport documents did not prove that the sales occurred before entry into the customs frontier or outside Tamil Nadu. The place of transfer, in the absence of contrary evidence, was determinable from the sale invoices.

Conclusion: The sales were not high seas sales and were taxable under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Tribunal could restore the assessment of tax for breach of conditions under G.O.Ms.No.381 despite no departmental appeal against the first appellate order.

Analysis: The exemption granted under G.O.Ms.No.381, issued under Section 17 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, required the purchased goods to be used for the declared manufacturing purpose; its third proviso imposed tax where the goods were otherwise disposed of. The dealer failed to establish that the goods purchased against declarations were used in manufacture or correlate them with exports. The exemption under Section 5(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 was unavailable to a dealer that had obtained the State exemption by declaration and breached its conditions. The Tribunal was entitled, in the dealer's appeal, to correct the apparent legal error in substituting compounding fees for the tax consequence expressly prescribed by the exemption notification.

Conclusion: The Tribunal rightly restored the assessment of tax for violation of the conditions of G.O.Ms.No.381. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The claimed import-sale exemption and the conditional exemption for locally purchased goods were unavailable on the established facts, and the tax liability under the State regime remained enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: A dealer that avails a conditional State tax exemption on a declaration must satisfy its stipulated use condition; upon breach, the prescribed tax consequence applies and cannot be displaced by an alternative export-sale claim or compounding mechanism.

Issues: (i) Whether project completion for anti-profiteering purposes is reckoned from the application for, or actual issuance of, the occupancy certificate; (ii) Whether the investigation period was correctly confined to 01.07.2017 to the date of occupancy certificate; (iii) Whether the revised methodology and quantification of profiteering were legally sustainable; (iv) Whether homebuyers were identifiable recipients requiring restitution under Rule 133(3)(b), rather than deposit under Rule 133(3)(c); and (v) Whether penalty under Section 171(3A) was leviable.

Issue (i): Whether project completion for anti-profiteering purposes is reckoned from the application for, or actual issuance of, the occupancy certificate.

Analysis: A project is completed only upon actual grant of the occupancy certificate by the competent authority. Mere filing of an application does not establish completion. The occupancy certificate was issued during the GST period and input tax credit was availed until that date, establishing that the project continued post-GST.

Conclusion: Project completion is reckoned from actual issuance of the occupancy certificate, not from the application date. The finding is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the investigation period was correctly confined to 01.07.2017 to the date of occupancy certificate.

Analysis: Construction services supplied before issuance of the occupancy certificate remain taxable, whereas post-certificate sale of building is outside taxable supply and constitutes exempt supply for input tax credit purposes. As no admissible input tax credit benefit survives for post-certificate sales, anti-profiteering computation must end on issuance of the occupancy certificate.

Conclusion: The investigation was correctly restricted to 01.07.2017 to 13.10.2017. The finding is against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the revised methodology and quantification of profiteering were legally sustainable.

Analysis: The project fell within the category where construction commenced before GST but continued after GST, and purchasers who paid before GST remained entitled to the benefit of post-GST input tax credit. The revised computation used Chartered Accountant-certified purchase and credit data, compared pre-GST and post-GST credit ratios, calculated per-square-foot savings, and confined the calculation to the period before occupancy certification. It quantified the base benefit at Rs. 2,38,495 and GST thereon at Rs. 28,619.

Conclusion: The revised methodology and total profiteering quantification of Rs. 2,67,114 were sustainable. The finding is against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether homebuyers were identifiable recipients requiring restitution under Rule 133(3)(b), rather than deposit under Rule 133(3)(c).

Analysis: Rule 133(3)(c) is a narrow residuary mechanism applicable only where recipients are genuinely incapable of identification. Non-participation in proceedings, present untraceability, or resale of flats does not make recipients unidentifiable where the supplier's transaction, allotment, payment, and contact records disclose their identities. The general statutory remedy is restitution to identifiable recipients with interest.

Conclusion: The homebuyers were identifiable, and the profiteered amount must be refunded to them individually with interest at 18% per annum. The finding is against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether penalty under Section 171(3A) was leviable.

Analysis: The investigation period preceded the effective date of Section 171(3A). Penal provisions cannot operate retrospectively absent express legislative mandate.

Conclusion: No penalty under Section 171(3A) is leviable for the relevant period. The finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The additional post-GST input tax credit benefit was required to be passed on to the identifiable homebuyers through commensurate price reduction and restitution with statutory interest, while the subsequently introduced penalty provision could not govern the pre-2020 period.

Ratio Decidendi: In a real-estate anti-profiteering matter, the benefit of post-GST input tax credit must be computed only until actual issuance of the occupancy certificate and passed to identifiable purchasers; the residuary consumer welfare fund mechanism applies only where identification is genuinely impossible, and a later penal provision cannot be retrospectively applied.

Issues: Whether CENVAT credit is admissible on input services used for setting up a manufacturing plant after deletion of the expression "setting up" from the inclusive part of the definition of input service with effect from 01.04.2011.

Analysis: Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 contains a means clause, an inclusive clause and an exclusion clause. Services used directly or indirectly in or in relation to manufacture fall within the means clause. Services required for erection, commissioning, installation and fabrication of plant and machinery, technical consultancy, recruitment, information technology, transportation of inputs and capital goods, security, clearing and forwarding, and related business activities had a direct nexus with manufacture because the factory could not be established for production without them. The deletion of "setting up" from the inclusive clause does not exclude services independently covered by the means clause; denial arises only where the service is specifically covered by the exclusion clause. The disputed services were not related to construction of a building or civil structure and were not otherwise excluded.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit on the disputed services used for setting up the plant is admissible; the assessee is entitled to the credit, and the demand, interest and penalty are unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand for differential reversal of Cenvat credit on coal removed as such was sustainable; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation was invocable.

Issue (i): Whether the demand for differential reversal of Cenvat credit on coal removed as such was sustainable.

Analysis: Cenvat credit on coal used in the manufacture of dutiable finished goods was undisputed. The Revenue treated all coal cleared as such as domestically procured coal requiring reversal at the higher rate, without corroborative evidence. Purchase orders and sale invoices identified the cleared coal as South African-origin imported coal, and the corresponding duty payments were reflected in ER-1 returns. The documentary record supported the assessee's claim that imported coal alone was cleared as such and that credit had been reversed at the applicable rate.

Conclusion: The differential credit-reversal demand was unsustainable on merits, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation was invocable.

Analysis: Details of coal cleared as such had been furnished to the departmental authorities in 2014, while the statutory ER-1 and ER-6 returns disclosed the clearances and reversal particulars. The show-cause notice issued in December 2018 was not supported by material establishing suppression by the assessee.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable and the demand was time-barred, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The confirmed recovery of differential Cenvat credit, interest and penalty could not survive either on the evidentiary merits or on limitation, with consequential relief available in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where statutory returns and contemporaneous transactional documents disclose removal of inputs as such, a higher reversal liability cannot be imposed without corroborative evidence, and such disclosure negates suppression for invoking the extended limitation period.

Issues: (i) Whether additions in unabated assessment years under Section 153C could survive without being founded on incriminating material seized during search; (ii) Whether the assessments were valid where the satisfaction recorded under Section 153C did not conform to the statutory requirements regarding material belonging to the third party and its bearing on determination of total income.

Issue (i): Whether additions in unabated assessment years under Section 153C could survive without being founded on incriminating material seized during search.

Analysis: The additions for the unabated years were found not to be based on any specific seized or incriminating material. The absence of such material rendered the additions impermissible in assessments initiated pursuant to search.

Conclusion: The additions for the unabated years were unsustainable and stood deleted, in favour of the assessees.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessments were valid where the satisfaction recorded under Section 153C did not conform to the statutory requirements regarding material belonging to the third party and its bearing on determination of total income.

Analysis: Section 153C distinguishes between seized assets that belong to a third party and seized books, documents or information that pertain to or relate to that party; these statutory categories cannot be treated as interchangeable. Further, the jurisdictional Assessing Officer's satisfaction did not expressly record that the seized material had a bearing on determination of the assessees' total income. Such satisfaction was deficient under the statutory jurisdictional conditions.

Conclusion: The Section 153C assessments for both abated and unabated years were invalid and were quashed, in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: The search assessments were annulled, and the consequential challenges on factual additions and other legal grounds did not require adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: A valid assumption of jurisdiction under Section 153C requires a statutory-compliant satisfaction identifying qualifying seized material and expressly recording its bearing on determination of the third party's total income; unabated-year additions additionally require incriminating material.