Issues: Whether the writ petition, earlier disposed of solely on limitation and subsequently set aside by the Supreme Court, should be revived to adjudicate the unaddressed challenge to disallowance of depreciation on goodwill.

Analysis: The earlier disposal addressed only limitation, while the remaining grounds concerning depreciation on goodwill were unrelated and had not been adjudicated. Revival avoided requiring a fresh petition for issues already raised. Pending consideration of those grounds, protection against further action on the reassessment notice was warranted without prejudice to the Revenue's objections on maintainability and availability of an appellate remedy.

Outcome: The interim application was allowed; the writ petition was revived, listed for admission, and further proceedings pursuant to the reassessment notice were stayed until further orders.

Issues: Whether earlier allotment letters and the memorandum of understanding, subsequently revised as part of a continuing real-estate transaction, constituted an agreement fixing consideration so as to attract the provisos to Section 56(2)(x)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and require adoption of the stamp duty value on the allotment date rather than the registration date.

Analysis: An allotment supported by an MOU and acted upon through banking-channel payments may constitute an agreement to sell for applying the provisos. Subsequent changes to building plans, flat particulars, parking rights and consideration did not negate the earlier arrangement where the Revenue had not established cancellation, rescission, abandonment or refund of payments. The provisos are intended to alleviate hardship arising from appreciation in stamp duty value between the parties' commitment to a transaction and formal registration. A contrary construction would improperly deny their benefit in genuine under-construction property transactions merely because project-related revisions occurred. The earlier allotment also formed part of the documentary chain to the registered agreement.

Conclusion: The provisos to Section 56(2)(x)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applied; the stamp duty value as on the relevant allotment or agreement date, and not the registration date, was required to be considered. The deletion of the deemed-income addition was upheld.

Issues: Whether non-compliance with the standard operating procedure for reminders before return filing relieves a registered person from statutory late fee for delayed filing of returns.

Analysis: The obligation to furnish returns within the prescribed time is statutory. The standard operating procedure for system-generated reminders is only a facilitative measure and does not displace the taxpayer's statutory obligation. Notice had also been served, while the returns remained unfiled within the stipulated period.

Conclusion: Failure to follow the reminder procedure does not exempt the assessee from late fee for delayed filing of returns; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether deletion of additions for allegedly unverifiable business expenses, after sustaining a proportionate disallowance, gave rise to a substantial question of law.

Analysis: The appellate findings established that vouchers and bills produced during remand proceedings had been verified and no specific defect was identified. A proportionate disallowance was nevertheless sustained for expense heads lacking adequate supporting material, control, or explanation. The Tribunal affirmed this fact-based determination, including the sustained disallowances, and the findings were concurrent.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose; the deletion of the balance additions was sustained in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment notice and consequential assessment for Assessment Year 2015-16 were barred by limitation; (ii) Whether the Revenue's concession concerning reassessment notices in Rajeev Bansal applied independently to invalidate the impugned proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment notice and consequential assessment for Assessment Year 2015-16 were barred by limitation.

Analysis: The amended reassessment regime governed a notice issued after 01.04.2021. Although the six-year period from the end of the relevant assessment year expired on 31.03.2022, the time allowed to respond to the notice under Section 148A(b) was excluded under the first proviso to Section 149(1), and the fourth proviso afforded a further seven-day extension. The resulting outer date for passing the order under Section 148A(d) and issuing the notice under Section 148 was 09.04.2022. The order and notice issued on 18.04.2022 exceeded that mandatory outer limit. The period available for passing an order under Section 148A(d) could not override the statutory cap for issuance of the notice under Section 148.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice, consequential assessment, and penalty were time-barred and are quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Revenue's concession concerning reassessment notices in Rajeev Bansal applied independently to invalidate the impugned proceedings.

Analysis: The concession was made in the specific context of limitation extensions under the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. Since the Revenue did not rely on that enactment to sustain these proceedings, which were instead tested under Sections 148, 148A and 149, the concession could not be extended to the present facts. The issue did not affect the relief granted on the independent ground of statutory limitation.

Conclusion: The concession in Rajeev Bansal was not germane to the impugned reassessment proceedings, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Reassessment jurisdiction must be exercised within the outer time limit prescribed for issuance of a notice under Section 148, after giving effect only to the statutory exclusions and extensions.

Ratio Decidendi: The time available for an order under Section 148A(d) does not enlarge the mandatory outer limitation under Section 149(1) for issuing a reassessment notice under Section 148.

Issues: Whether penalties for export-goods misdeclaration could be imposed on a customs broker's G-card holder under Sections 114(iii) and 114AA where knowledge of the misdeclaration was not established.

Analysis: The appellant had obtained KYC documentation from the exporter and filed export documents according to the exporter's declaration. The Revenue did not establish that the appellant knew that the goods stuffed in the container differed from those declared in the shipping bills.

Conclusion: Penalties under Sections 114(iii) and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were not imposable on the appellant and were set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty for misdeclaration requires proof that the person penalised had knowledge of the misdeclaration.

Issues: (i) Whether the balance consideration of Rs. 2.50 crore under the Deed of Assignment accrued as taxable income in A.Y. 2013-14; (ii) Whether property-tax and advertisement expenditure of Rs. 3.97 lakh was allowable as business expenditure.

Issue (i): Whether the balance consideration of Rs. 2.50 crore under the Deed of Assignment accrued as taxable income in A.Y. 2013-14.

Analysis: Under the mercantile system, taxable accrual requires a vested, unconditional and enforceable right to receive income; a contractual claim alone does not establish accrual. The disputed third tranche was conditional upon fulfilment of contractual obligations and subject to a step-in mechanism permitting deduction of costs by the assignee. Its quantum and collection were therefore uncertain. Subsequent recovery proceedings and consent terms corroborated that the receipt had remained conditional and disputed. The tax treatment adopted by the sister concern was not determinative of accrual in the assessee's hands.

Conclusion: The Rs. 2.50 crore third tranche did not accrue as taxable income in A.Y. 2013-14; the finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether property-tax and advertisement expenditure of Rs. 3.97 lakh was allowable as business expenditure.

Analysis: The payments were made through the assessee's bank account and related to its real-estate project. As the assessee followed the percentage completion method, expenses incurred earlier and carried in work-in-progress could be claimed when corresponding project revenue was recognised. No double deduction or material contradicting the business nexus and genuineness of the expenditure was established.

Conclusion: The expenditure of Rs. 3.97 lakh was allowable under Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; the finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Conditional and disputed contractual receipts lacking reasonable certainty of collection are not taxable on accrual, and project expenditure carried in work-in-progress is deductible on recognition of corresponding revenue where its business nexus and genuineness are established.

Ratio Decidendi: Under mercantile accounting, income accrues only when the right to receive is vested, enforceable and reasonably certain; a conditional and disputed receipt subject to contractual adjustment cannot be taxed as real income.

Issues: Whether excise duty demand based on an erroneous ER-1 return entry showing 85,160 kg as home-consumption clearance was sustainable; and whether the extended limitation period was invocable.

Issue (i): Whether excise duty demand based on an erroneous ER-1 return entry showing 85,160 kg as home-consumption clearance was sustainable.

Analysis: The ER-1 records, read harmoniously with the excise invoice, established that only 4,160 kg of wax was cleared for home consumption on payment of duty, while 81,000 kg was exported under bond. The entry of 85,160 kg as home-consumption clearance was a genuine typographical error.

Conclusion: The demand founded on the erroneous home-clearance quantity was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period was invocable.

Analysis: The ER-1 return was filed and disclosed the relevant quantities and duty payment. The discrepancy was apparent from the return, but the department did not raise it for over two years before issuing the show-cause notice. Suppression was not established.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended limitation period was invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The excise duty demand was unsustainable both on merits and on limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where statutory returns and supporting records disclose a discrepancy attributable to a genuine clerical error, and the material is available to the department, suppression cannot be invoked to sustain demand through the extended limitation period.

Issues: Whether the provisional attachment of the assessee's bank account satisfied the statutory preconditions under Section 83 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: A provisional attachment requires both initiation of proceedings under Chapters XII, XIV or XV and the Commissioner's opinion, founded on tangible material, that attachment is necessary to protect Government revenue. Summons issued under Section 70, falling in Chapter XIV, fulfilled the first condition. Although the attachment order incorrectly referred to proceedings under Sections 74 and 122, which had not then commenced, that error did not negate the initiation of proceedings under Section 70. The order, however, merely reproduced the statutory expression concerning protection of revenue and disclosed neither tangible material nor a rational basis for the opinion that attachment was necessary.

Conclusion: The provisional attachment order was unsustainable and was quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 115JA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applied to a banking company; (ii) Whether salary paid outside India to expatriate employees posted at the Indian permanent establishment was subject to the limitation under Section 44C of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether Section 115JA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applied to a banking company.

Analysis: The applicability issue was covered by the earlier ruling concerning a banking company, which established that the MAT provision was inapplicable to banking companies before the relevant amendment. The questions raised on the interaction of the Income-tax Act, the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and the Companies Act, 1956 therefore disclosed no substantial question of law.

Conclusion: Section 115JA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was inapplicable to the assessee banking company; decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether salary paid outside India to expatriate employees posted at the Indian permanent establishment was subject to the limitation under Section 44C of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 44C limits head office expenditure, including salary paid to persons employed in or managing an office outside India. Salary paid to employees posted in India at the assessee's Indian branch permanent establishment does not fall within that definition.

Conclusion: Section 44C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 did not apply to the expatriate employees' salary; decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The MAT and expatriate-salary questions were declined for want of a substantial question of law, while the separate question concerning allocated direct expenses and NRI desk expenses remains for adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory restriction on head office expenditure does not extend to salary paid to employees posted at and serving an Indian permanent establishment, where the provision confines such expenditure to employees of an office outside India.

Issues: (i) Whether additions for alleged under-valuation of closing stock could be sustained solely on the basis of stock statements furnished to a bank. (ii) Whether interest on unpaid purchase price was disallowable under the related-party expenditure provision. (iii) Whether expenditure on a Keyman Insurance Policy was allowable as a business expense.

Issue (i): Whether additions for alleged under-valuation of closing stock could be sustained solely on the basis of stock statements furnished to a bank.

Analysis: The statutory framework governing valuation of closing stock requires consideration of the consistently followed accounting method and the reliability of the underlying books. Stock statements submitted to a bank for obtaining credit, particularly where the stock is hypothecated and not physically verified, may be estimated or inflated and cannot, without independent corroboration, establish the actual closing stock for tax purposes. The assessee had consistently followed its valuation method, reconciled the difference between book stock and the bank statement, and its books had not been found defective. Applying the principle of consistency and the concurrent factual findings, the bank statement alone was insufficient to support the addition.

Conclusion: The addition for under-valuation of closing stock was not sustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether interest on unpaid purchase price was disallowable under the related-party expenditure provision.

Analysis: Disallowance under the related-party expenditure provision requires material showing that the payment was to a specified related party and that the expenditure was excessive or unreasonable having regard to the legitimate needs of the business or the benefit derived. The interest on unpaid purchase price was not shown to have been paid to a related party, and the rate was not unreasonable when compared with the higher rate paid by the assessee to banks. The Tribunal consistently followed its earlier decision for the assessee.

Conclusion: The disallowance of interest on unpaid purchase price was not sustainable.

Issue (iii): Whether expenditure on a Keyman Insurance Policy was allowable as a business expense.

Analysis: Expenditure incurred for the business benefit of the assessee company is allowable where the company is the beneficiary of the Keyman Insurance Policy. The concurrent findings established that the policy benefited the assessee company rather than the individual directors, and the earlier-year decision was consistently followed.

Conclusion: The disallowance of the Keyman Insurance expenditure was not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose from the concurrent findings allowing deletion of the disputed additions.

Ratio Decidendi: A tax addition cannot be sustained solely on the basis of an estimated bank stock statement without independent verification where the assessee's books and consistently followed valuation method remain unchallenged; related-party expenditure requires proof of both the specified relationship and excessiveness or unreasonableness, while business expenditure benefiting the assessee company is allowable.

Issues: Whether recovery of the outstanding income-tax demand should be stayed pending disposal of the appeal.

Analysis: The proviso to section 254(2A) required payment of 20% of the disputed demand for grant of stay. As no amount had been deposited, a stay was made conditional upon payment of 20% of the outstanding demand in three instalments.

Conclusion: Stay of recovery was granted in favour of the assessee for 180 days or until disposal of the appeal, whichever was earlier, conditional upon payment of 20% of the demand as directed.

Issues: (i) Whether for A.Y. 2017-18 the threshold under Section 194B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for winnings from card games and other games had to be applied to each individual payment at the time of payment, or by aggregating winnings accumulated in a player's wallet during the financial year; (ii) Whether disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be made in respect of player winnings that were not routed through the profit and loss account and were not claimed as deductible expenditure; (iii) Whether disallowance in respect of payments made to Facebook Ireland for online banner advertisements was sustainable on the footing that the payment attracted withholding tax as royalty or fees for technical services.

Issue (i): Whether for A.Y. 2017-18 the threshold under Section 194B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for winnings from card games and other games had to be applied to each individual payment at the time of payment, or by aggregating winnings accumulated in a player's wallet during the financial year.

Analysis: Section 194B, as applicable for the relevant year, required deduction where winnings were paid in an amount exceeding Rs. 10,000 at the time of payment. The provision did not use the expression aggregate amount or otherwise require clubbing of multiple payments during the financial year. The statutory contrast with Section 194C and Section 194J, which expressly incorporate aggregation language, showed that aggregation could not be imported into Section 194B by implication. The later amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 2023 and the Finance Act, 2025 were treated as showing that Parliament expressly legislates when it intends an aggregate basis or a single-transaction basis. The wallet mechanism was held to be only a technological mode for holding balances and not a basis to deem multiple winnings across dates as one payment. The circulars and authorities relied upon supported a per-payment construction of the unamended provision.

Conclusion: The threshold under Section 194B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the relevant year had to be tested with reference to each individual payment made to the winner at the time of payment and not by aggregating wallet balances or cumulative winnings; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be made in respect of player winnings that were not routed through the profit and loss account and were not claimed as deductible expenditure.

Analysis: Section 40(a)(ia) operates as a disallowance provision in respect of expenditure otherwise allowable in computing business income where tax deductible at source has not been deducted or paid. The record showed that the impugned payouts to players were not debited to the profit and loss account and were never claimed as deductible expenditure. They were reflected as liabilities and not as business outgoings claimed against taxable income. In such a situation, the disallowance machinery under Section 40(a)(ia) could not be invoked. The Tribunal accepted the alternative contention on this independent ground as well.

Conclusion: Section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was not attracted because the winnings paid to players were not claimed as expenditure; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether disallowance in respect of payments made to Facebook Ireland for online banner advertisements was sustainable on the footing that the payment attracted withholding tax as royalty or fees for technical services.

Analysis: The Tribunal followed the coordinate bench decisions in the assessee's own cases for earlier years. Those decisions treated the payment for banner advertisement on Facebook's platform as consideration for use of a standard facility, without any possessory or economic rights in the server, without any dedicated equipment being placed at the assessee's disposal, and without any element of managerial, technical, or consultancy service. The payment was therefore not characterised as royalty or fees for technical services, and the relief granted by the first appellate authority was upheld.

Conclusion: The deletion of disallowance relating to payments made to Facebook Ireland was upheld, and this issue was decided against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The principal disallowance relating to alleged non-compliance with withholding on gaming winnings was deleted because Section 194B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in its then form, operated on a per-payment basis and, independently, Section 40(a)(ia) could not be applied where the payouts were not claimed as expenditure. The relief granted on the Facebook Ireland issue was also sustained, resulting in complete substantive success for the assessee in the cross-appeals.

Ratio Decidendi: Where Section 194B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as applicable to the relevant year, does not expressly provide for aggregation, the TDS threshold must be applied to each payment at the time of payment, and Section 40(a)(ia) cannot disallow sums that were never claimed as deductible expenditure in computing income.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment notice and rejection of objections were invalid for failure to supply the material relied upon against the assessee; (ii) whether the reassessment was founded on tangible material giving rise to a reason to believe that income had escaped assessment, rather than mere suspicion.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment notice and rejection of objections were invalid for failure to supply the material relied upon against the assessee.

Analysis: The reassessment was based on investigation material, transaction details and a statement recorded during survey proceedings. The assessee specifically requested the material, information and statement relied upon to establish its connection with the alleged accommodation entry. Refusal to provide that material merely because it was confidential prevented an effective response and violated the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were invalid for non-supply of the material relied upon against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the reassessment was founded on tangible material giving rise to a reason to believe that income had escaped assessment, rather than mere suspicion.

Analysis: The notice and recorded reasons contained only the assessee's name and a bald allegation concerning an accommodation entry, without disclosing tangible material or a specific nexus connecting the assessee with the alleged layered transactions. The statutory requirement under Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is a reason to believe, which cannot be replaced by suspicion. The actual reasons recorded on 11.03.2019 were also not produced, while the document supplied was an e-letter dated 09.04.2019.

Conclusion: The reassessment was based on suspicion and not on the requisite reason to believe supported by tangible material.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment notice and the order rejecting the objections could not stand because the relied-upon material was withheld and the recorded reasons did not establish the statutory basis for reopening the assessment.

Ratio Decidendi: Reassessment cannot be sustained where the material relied upon is not supplied to the assessee and the recorded reasons disclose only suspicion without tangible material establishing a reason to believe that income has escaped assessment.

Issues: (i) Whether notice under Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was mandatory before completing a block assessment under Section 158BC of the Income-tax Act, 1961. (ii) Whether a block assessment could be made on the basis of material collected after the search when the relevant transaction had already been examined in a regular assessment.

Issue (i): Whether notice under Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was mandatory before completing a block assessment under Section 158BC of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The statutory scheme governing block assessments requires compliance with the procedure under Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 where the assessment is to be completed under Section 143(3) read with Section 158BC. The requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be treated as a curable procedural irregularity. The assessment record contained no evidence that such notice had been issued, and the Revenue was unable to produce one.

Conclusion: Notice under Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was mandatory, and its non-issuance invalidated the block assessment.

Issue (ii): Whether a block assessment could be made on the basis of material collected after the search when the relevant transaction had already been examined in a regular assessment.

Analysis: Block assessment under Chapter XIV-B and Section 158BC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is confined to undisclosed income detected as a result of the search under Section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Material collected after the search during assessment proceedings cannot be treated as material found during the search. The transaction had already been examined in the regular assessment under Section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the block assessment was founded on post-search material rather than qualifying search material. The legal objection could also be raised before the Tribunal without a separate cross-appeal because it supported the order under challenge.

Conclusion: The block assessment could not be sustained on the basis of post-search material relating to a transaction already examined in the regular assessment.

Final Conclusion: The jurisdictional defects rendered the block assessment unsustainable. The assessment order and the Tribunal's order were quashed and set aside, while the remaining question concerning the substantive capital-gains addition was left undecided.

Ratio Decidendi: A block assessment under Section 158BC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires a valid notice under Section 143(2) and must be based on material found during the search, not material collected thereafter.

Issues: (i) Whether a court-approved reduction of share capital could be treated as a buy-back taxable under section 115QA of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) whether interest on borrowings used for the capital reduction was allowable as a business deduction; (iii) whether interest on compulsorily convertible debentures issued to a foreign investor was deductible; and (iv) whether disallowances relating to property management fees and advances from customers were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the court-approved reduction of share capital was a buy-back taxable under section 115QA of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Capital reduction under sections 100 to 104 of the Companies Act, 1956 and buy-back are distinct statutory mechanisms. Capital reduction involved direct cancellation of shares pursuant to a High Court-approved scheme, whereas a buy-back involved purchase of the company's own shares. The statutory treatment of capital reduction as dividend under section 2(22)(d) read with section 115-O, and the separate treatment of buy-back under section 115QA, confirmed that the two transactions could not be conflated. The amendment to section 115QA extended the provision to buy-backs undertaken under different company-law provisions, but did not convert a capital reduction into a buy-back. Taxing the same distribution under both regimes would also result in impermissible double taxation.

Conclusion: The capital reduction was not a buy-back taxable under section 115QA, and the consequential tax and interest liability was quashed.

Issue (ii): Whether interest on borrowings used for the capital reduction was allowable under section 36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The borrowing represented securitisation or discounting of future lease rentals and was undertaken as part of a commercial restructuring of the capital structure. The capital reduction was commercially expedient and connected with the assessee's business. Interest incurred for this purpose did not create an enduring capital asset or enhance the capital structure and was revenue in nature.

Conclusion: The interest expenditure incurred on borrowings used for the capital reduction was allowable as a business deduction.

Issue (iii): Whether interest on compulsorily convertible debentures issued to a foreign investor was deductible.

Analysis: Documentary evidence established the identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of the foreign investor and the subscription transaction. Compulsorily convertible debentures retain the character of debt until conversion and interest paid on them is not converted into dividend or capital expenditure merely because of their convertible feature. The extended source-of-source requirement under section 68 did not apply to the foreign investor's subscription to the debentures in the circumstances considered.

Conclusion: The disallowance of interest on the compulsorily convertible debentures was deleted.

Issue (iv): Whether the disallowances of property management fees and advances from customers were sustainable.

Analysis: The property management services were supported by agreements and other documentary material, were commercially connected with the business and were not shown to be non-genuine or covered by the related-party restriction. The amounts classified as advances from customers represented excess common-area-maintenance collections contractually adjustable or refundable after audit and were supported by credit notes. The additions therefore lacked evidentiary basis.

Conclusion: The deletion of the disallowances relating to property management fees and advances from customers was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded on all substantively adjudicated issues, while the Revenue failed to establish grounds for disturbing the relief granted by the first appellate authority.

Ratio Decidendi: A court-approved capital reduction involving direct cancellation of shares is legally distinct from a buy-back and cannot be subjected to the buy-back tax merely by deeming the transaction to be a purchase of own shares.

Issues: Whether penalty under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustainable where the returned loss was reduced in assessment because exempt partnership profit was inadvertently deducted again in Schedule BP.

Analysis: Section 270A(2)(g) covers cases where assessment has the effect of reducing a returned loss, but section 270A(6) excludes cases where the assessee offers a bona fide explanation and discloses all material facts. The exempt share of partnership profit was disclosed in the return and reflected in the balance sheet. The error was confined to the computation in Schedule BP, was explained during assessment proceedings, and was supported by the Chartered Accountant's affidavit. Repetition of the error in the revised return, without more, did not establish misreporting or negate the bona fide explanation. The Revenue did not establish that the explanation was false or that the assessee had suppressed the relevant income.

Conclusion: Penalty under section 270A was not sustainable and the penalty sustained by the appellate authority was directed to be deleted.

Ratio Decidendi: Reduction of a returned loss under section 270A(2)(g) does not by itself justify penalty where the assessee has disclosed all material facts and established that the reduction resulted from a bona fide computational error rather than under-reporting or misreporting.

Issues: (i) Whether the advance ruling applications were admissible where the classification issue had already been decided by a High Court; (ii) whether the Authority could partially reject the applications and separately determine the exemption question.

Issue (i): Whether the advance ruling applications were admissible where the classification issue had already been decided by a High Court.

Analysis: Section 28-I(2) of the Customs Act, 1962 requires the Authority to allow or reject an application and bars allowance where the question raised is the same as a matter already decided by an Appellate Tribunal or Court. The statutory advance ruling mechanism is intended to provide certainty and requires subordinate authorities to follow binding judicial precedent. The classification of roasted areca nuts had already been decided by the Madras High Court, and the issue raised was found to be squarely covered by that decision.

Conclusion: The classification question was not admissible for advance ruling because it was the same as an issue already decided by a Court.

Issue (ii): Whether the Authority could partially reject the applications and separately determine the exemption question.

Analysis: The statutory scheme requires an application to be allowed or rejected on the grounds prescribed by Section 28-I(2) of the Customs Act, 1962. It does not contemplate partial rejection of an application where one question is barred but another question is not covered by the earlier judgment. The Authority therefore declined to separately determine the exemption issue.

Conclusion: The Authority could not partially reject the applications or separately rule on the exemption question.

Final Conclusion: The advance ruling applications were rejected in their entirety without any ruling on the classification or customs duty exemption merits.

Ratio Decidendi: An advance ruling application cannot be entertained on a question already decided by a Court, and the statutory scheme does not permit partial rejection of the application while adjudicating a remaining question separately.

Issues: (i) Whether any further statutory pre-deposit was required for admission of the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal; and (ii) whether the prescribed court fee had been paid.

Analysis: The statutory scheme requires payment of the prescribed pre-deposit for an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal in addition to the amount deposited at the first appellate stage. Since the pre-deposit already made at the first appellate stage exceeded the amount required on the reduced tax demand, no further pre-deposit was required. The prescribed fee under Rule 110(5) was calculated with a minimum of Rs. 5,000, whereas only Rs. 3,000 had been paid, leaving a shortfall of Rs. 2,000. The appellant agreed to pay the balance.

Outcome: No further statutory pre-deposit was required. The appeal was not finally admitted; the Registry was directed to verify the earlier pre-deposit and place the matter before the Bench after payment of the short court fee, and the matter was listed for further orders.

Issues: Whether writ petitions challenging GST assessment orders should be entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution of India despite the availability of a statutory appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, when the petitioner alleges breach of natural justice for want of adequate personal hearing.

Analysis: The impugned assessment orders were passed under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and were admittedly appealable under Section 107 of that Act. The plea that the petitioner was denied adequate opportunity of hearing, including cancellation of the third date of personal hearing, was treated as a ground capable of examination by the appellate authority. The reliance on the decision concerning provisional attachment and writ interference was distinguished on the basis that it did not permit disregard of an efficacious alternate statutory remedy in every case where a natural justice plea is raised. The dispute was therefore regarded as one appropriately addressable in the statutory appellate forum.

Conclusion: The writ petitions were not entertained, and the petitioner was relegated to the statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; the issue was decided against the assessee.