Issues: Whether a scheduled-offence case could be committed to the designated Special Court under Section 44(1)(c) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 when that Special Court had not taken cognizance of the money-laundering complaint.

Analysis: Section 44(1)(c) applies where the court handling the scheduled offence and the Special Court handling the money-laundering complaint have both taken cognizance and are different courts. Cognizance by the Special Court is an express statutory precondition, not an anticipated or dispensable formality. A pre-cognizance notice under Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 does not amount to cognizance. The absence of the sanction required under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 also prevented cognizance against the former public servant. Further, committal is discretionary and intended to avoid delay and inconsistent findings; it could not justifiably be used to displace a scheduled-offence trial that had substantially concluded, thereby prejudicing the accused's right to speedy trial.

Conclusion: The committal application was premature and was rightly refused; the issue is decided against the petitioner.

Issues: Whether the petitioner should be permitted to pursue the statutory appellate remedy against the assessment order.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of by granting liberty to file an appeal within two weeks along with the statutory pre-deposit and an application for condonation of delay.

Issues: (i) Whether an Ophthalmic Binocular Surgical Microscope is classifiable under tariff heading 9018 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975; (ii) Whether the product falls under Entry No. 483 of Schedule I of Notification No. 09/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025.

Issue (i): Whether an Ophthalmic Binocular Surgical Microscope is classifiable under tariff heading 9018 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

Analysis: Heading 9011 covers compound optical microscopes generally used by amateurs, teachers, industry and research laboratories, while its HSN notes expressly exclude ophthalmic binocular-type microscopes. Heading 9012 concerns non-optical microscopes, including electron and proton microscopes and diffraction apparatus. The product is a specialised, electrically powered stereoscopic instrument designed exclusively for ophthalmic examination and delicate eye surgeries. Heading 9018 and its HSN notes cover instruments used in medical or surgical practice, including ophthalmic binocular-type microscopes mounted on adjustable supports for eye examination.

Conclusion: The Ophthalmic Binocular Surgical Microscope is classifiable under tariff heading 9018 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the product falls under Entry No. 483 of Schedule I of Notification No. 09/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025.

Analysis: Entry No. 483 covers goods of heading 9018, namely instruments and appliances used in medical, surgical, dental or veterinary sciences. Since the product is classified under heading 9018, it is covered by that entry.

Conclusion: The product falls under Entry No. 483 of Schedule I of Notification No. 09/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 and is taxable at 5%, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The specialised ophthalmic surgical microscope attracts the concessional rate applicable to medical and surgical instruments of heading 9018.

Ratio Decidendi: A microscope specially designed and used for ophthalmic examination and surgery is classifiable as an ophthalmic medical instrument under heading 9018, notwithstanding its magnification function.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition for unexplained investment in immovable property was sustainable; (ii) Whether the addition for unexplained cash deposits in bank accounts was justified.

Issue (i): Whether the addition for unexplained investment in immovable property was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 69 applies where an investment is not recorded and the assessee offers no satisfactory explanation of its nature and source. The assessee established the sources through confirmations, income-tax returns, financial statements, ledger accounts, bank statements and a fund-flow statement. The principal parties responded to notices under Section 133(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the receipts were directly correlated with payments to the property seller through banking channels. After the assessee discharged the initial burden, the Revenue produced no independent material to discredit the evidence, establish accommodation entries, or show that the funds belonged to the assessee.

Conclusion: The investment source was satisfactorily explained; the addition under Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition for unexplained cash deposits in bank accounts was justified.

Analysis: The cash deposits were substantially supported by professional receipts, interest income and rental income that had been disclosed in the return. Cash already accounted for and offered to tax could not be treated again as unexplained money merely because it was later deposited in bank accounts, absent contrary evidence. However, the claimed opening cash balance lacked sufficient contemporaneous substantiation through a cash book or supporting records. A reasonable acceptance of 50% of that opening balance was warranted.

Conclusion: Cash deposits were explained except for Rs. 5,12,700, representing 50% of the unsubstantiated opening cash balance; the addition under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was restricted to that amount, partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The unexplained-investment addition was eliminated, while only the unsubstantiated portion of the opening cash balance remained taxable as unexplained money.

Ratio Decidendi: Once an assessee substantiates the source and movement of funds through credible documentary evidence and banking records, the Revenue must bring cogent contrary material before treating the investment as unexplained; disclosed income deposited in a bank cannot ordinarily be taxed again as unexplained money.

Issues: Whether penalty for non-compliance with notices could be sustained where the assessee established reasonable cause.

Analysis: The notices were issued during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the assessee, an educational trust, explained that the disruption prevented effective compliance. No independent material established deliberate or wilful disregard of the notices. The assessee's bona fide belief regarding exemption, its subsequent participation in assessment proceedings, and the remand of the quantum proceedings supported the explanation. Penalty proceedings are independent of assessment proceedings, and a technical or venial default does not warrant penalty where reasonable cause is established.

Conclusion: The assessee had reasonable cause under Section 273B of the Income-tax Act, 1961; consequently, penalty under Section 271(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was unsustainable and was directed to be deleted.

Issues: Whether cash payments towards credit-card dues incurred for trading purchases could be assessed in their entirety as unexplained money when the assessee had disclosed business income under the presumptive-taxation scheme.

Analysis: The credit cards were used for business purchases, and there was no material that they funded capital acquisitions or personal expenditure. Where cash payments are intrinsically connected with business transactions, taxing the entire payment would amount to taxing gross receipts rather than real income. The assessee had disclosed profit at 20.2% of gross receipts under the presumptive scheme, and the Revenue produced no material showing that this rate did not fairly represent the business profitability.

Conclusion: The addition could be made only to the extent of the 20.2% profit element in the cash payments; the balance of the addition was liable to be deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a charitable trust's exemption is wholly denied under section 11 upon loans or advances to trustees attracting section 13, or is restricted only to the income or benefit attributable to the violation.

Analysis: Section 13(1)(c), read with sections 13(2)(a) and 13(3), addresses application of trust income or property for the benefit of specified persons. The settled interpretation, reinforced by CBDT Circular No. 387 dated 06.07.1984, confines taxation at the maximum marginal rate to the portion of income that has enured for the benefit of such persons; the remaining income remains eligible for section 11 exemption. The subsequent statutory amendment was treated as recognising this established position. The contrary reliance on CBDT Circular No. 5P dated 19.06.1968 and the decision concerning Bharat Diamond Bourse was not accepted as requiring forfeiture of exemption over the entire charitable income.

Conclusion: Even if the trustee advances constitute a section 13 violation, denial of section 11 exemption is limited to the value of the benefit, if any, conferred on the trustees; exemption for the balance income remains available subject to other statutory conditions.

Issues: (i) Whether the difference between opening Capital Work-in-Progress and the amount capitalised could be assessed as revenue expenditure or taxable income; (ii) Whether the reduction in Pre-operative Expenses could be treated as amortisation and added to taxable income.

Issue (i): Whether the difference between opening Capital Work-in-Progress and the amount capitalised could be assessed as revenue expenditure or taxable income.

Analysis: The reconciliation established that the full opening Capital Work-in-Progress balance was accounted for through capitalisation into fixed-asset accounts and reversal of duplicate entries. Transfers from Capital Work-in-Progress to fixed assets were balance sheet reclassifications, while correction of duplicate entries neither created taxable income nor constituted allowable expenditure. No part of the disputed amount was debited to the Profit and Loss Account or claimed as a deduction, and the Revenue produced no contrary accounting material.

Conclusion: The difference did not represent revenue expenditure or taxable income; deletion of the addition was sustained in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the reduction in Pre-operative Expenses could be treated as amortisation and added to taxable income.

Analysis: The Pre-operative Expenses ledger reflected project-related capital expenditure transferred to fixed-asset accounts on capitalisation, along with reversals of duplicate entries. These were confined to balance sheet accounts and did not constitute amortisation charged to the Profit and Loss Account. A reduction in a balance sheet asset cannot itself justify an income addition unless it is shown to be an inadmissible expenditure, a deduction claimed, a taxable remission or cessation, or income under a charging or deeming provision. No such basis was established.

Conclusion: The adjustment was not amortisation of expenditure and did not give rise to taxable income; deletion of the addition was sustained in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Both disputed accounting adjustments were held to be non-taxable balance sheet entries, comprising capitalisation transfers and rectification of duplicate entries.

Ratio Decidendi: A balance sheet adjustment or reclassification cannot be assessed as income or revenue expenditure merely from a numerical movement in accounts, absent evidence of a Profit and Loss Account charge, a claimed deduction, or another statutory basis for taxation.

Issues: Whether penalty for underreporting of income could be sustained where deduction was claimed under a bona fide belief and had initially been accepted in assessment and rectification proceedings; and whether a penalty notice and order not specifying the applicable limb of the penalty provision could sustain the levy.

Issue (i): Whether penalty for underreporting of income could be sustained where deduction was claimed under a bona fide belief and had initially been accepted in assessment and rectification proceedings.

Analysis: The deduction claim had been accepted in the scrutiny assessment and again in an earlier rectification order. This supported the genuineness of the assessee's explanation and bona fide belief in making the claim. The statutory exclusion for a genuine explanation applied, and the discretionary nature of penalty required consideration of the particular facts rather than automatic imposition.

Conclusion: The income was not underreported income in the circumstances, and penalty was not leviable. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a penalty notice and order not specifying the applicable limb of the penalty provision could sustain the levy.

Analysis: The notice and penalty order referred only to the general penalty provision without identifying the relevant sub-clause or limb under which the penalty was imposed. Such non-specification rendered the penalty unsustainable.

Conclusion: The penalty could not be sustained for failure to specify the applicable limb. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The penalty imposed for alleged underreporting was deleted.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty for underreporting cannot be imposed automatically where the assessee's claim rests on a genuine bona fide explanation accepted by the assessing authority in prior proceedings; the penalty notice and order must also specify the applicable statutory limb.

Issues: Whether the period during which the Interim Board for Settlement lacked quorum and was incapable of exercising jurisdiction must be excluded in computing the time limit for disposal of settlement applications under Section 127C(8A), as extended under Section 127C(12), of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The statutory settlement framework and its timelines must be read as a whole, consistently with the object of expeditious and effective settlement. The prescribed period necessarily assumes the continued existence of a duly constituted Interim Board capable of performing its statutory adjudicatory functions. A distinction exists between delay despite a competent forum being available and inability to decide because the forum lacks the legally required quorum. Treating both situations alike would make the statutory remedy dependent on administrative contingencies beyond the applicant's control and produce an arbitrary, unworkable result. The applicant had completed all required steps and the proceedings had been heard and reserved before the Board became non-functional.

Conclusion: The period from 01.10.2025 until the date of judgment, during which the Interim Board lacked quorum, must be excluded from computation of the statutory period. The settlement proceedings did not abate, and the abatement communications were unsustainable. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the petitioner should be permitted to seek rectification of the impugned assessment order under the statutory rectification mechanism.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to seek rectification before the Proper Officer.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration for non-existence at the declared principal place of business should be restored where the address discrepancy resulted from a genuine mistake and no GST demand was outstanding.

Analysis: The registered-address discrepancy concerned different offices in the same building and was attributed to redevelopment of the earlier premises. No GST dues were outstanding. Restoration, conditional upon payment of applicable charges, late fees and penalty, would enable lawful business operations while protecting revenue interests.

Conclusion: The cancelled GST registration is to be restored upon payment of applicable charges, late fees and penalty.

Issues: Whether the petitioner could seek interest on the refund released pursuant to the appellate order.

Analysis: Section 56 provides interest where a refund ordered under Section 54(5) is not made within sixty days of receipt of the refund application. Its proviso also covers a refund arising from a final order of an adjudicating authority, appellate authority, appellate tribunal or court, where the consequential refund application is not processed within sixty days.

Conclusion: The petitioner may apply to the competent authority for interest under Section 56, which must decide the application in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the GST demand and appellate order should be entertained despite the statutory appellate remedy before the GST Appellate Tribunal.

Analysis: The MGST/CGST statutory scheme provides a complete appellate mechanism. Exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and ordinarily inappropriate where an efficacious statutory remedy exists, particularly where resolution requires detailed examination of evidence. No established denial of natural justice, jurisdictional defect, or material indicating bias arose merely because the officer authorising inspection later acted as appellate authority; authorisation of inspection was distinct from adjudicatory functioning. The controversies concerning whether seized records represented suppressed sales or estimates, the applicable tax rate, and reconciliation of bank deposits and returns with the seized material were disputed factual matters requiring evidentiary appreciation.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable in the absence of exceptional grounds warranting bypass of the statutory appellate remedy.

Issues: Whether proceeds from sale of flats held by the assessee were taxable as capital gains or as business income.

Analysis: The asset was acquired and consistently reflected in audited accounts as an investment; the memorandum indicated an object of holding and leasing the flats; a broker was engaged to locate tenants; and the first sale occurred after a substantial holding period. The isolated project, absence of other similar projects, staggered sales over several years, and absence of volume, frequency, continuity or regularity characteristic of real-estate trading supported the assessee's investment intent. Although book treatment is not conclusive, it is a relevant factor when evaluated with the overall conduct and duration of holding. Further, the Revenue had accepted capital-gains treatment in earlier assessments, which had attained finality, and no material change in facts or incriminating material justified a different treatment for the relevant year. The principles governing adventure in the nature of trade require assessment of intention and the totality of circumstances; the burden to establish a trading character rested on the Revenue.

Conclusion: The sale proceeds were assessable under the head capital gains and not as business income, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether revisionary jurisdiction could be exercised over purchase disallowances already forming the subject matter of a pending first appeal; (ii) Whether the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue because the Assessing Officer estimated profit on disputed purchases rather than adding the entire amount as unexplained expenditure, and did not treat an outstanding supplier balance as ceased liability.

Issue (i): Whether revisionary jurisdiction could be exercised over purchase disallowances already forming the subject matter of a pending first appeal.

Analysis: The disallowance relating to purchases from the two suppliers, including the genuineness of such purchases and the estimation of profit embedded therein, was already under challenge before the first appellate authority. Clause (c) of Explanation 1 to Section 263 confines revisionary power, where an assessment is the subject of an appeal, to matters not considered and decided in that appeal. The subject of the revision was part of the larger purchase-disallowance issue pending in appeal; the authorities relied upon for the contrary position concerned matters not appealed or a period preceding the relevant statutory amendment.

Conclusion: Revision under Section 263 in respect of the disputed purchases was barred and the revisionary order was invalid to that extent, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue because the Assessing Officer estimated profit on disputed purchases rather than adding the entire amount as unexplained expenditure, and did not treat an outstanding supplier balance as ceased liability.

Analysis: The assessment record showed that the Assessing Officer had called for and considered invoices, ledger accounts, transport and e-way bill records, bank-payment details, confirmations, and GST-related material before estimating the profit element on the purchases. A detailed inquiry followed by adoption of a legally plausible view cannot be revised merely because the Principal Commissioner prefers addition of the entire purchase amount under Section 69C. The decision supporting full addition on different facts was distinguishable. Further, the alleged non-genuineness of the supplier did not by itself establish remission or cessation of the outstanding trading liability; no material showed a write-back, waiver, remission, or cessation during the relevant year.

Conclusion: The assessment was not amenable to revision on either the purchase addition or the outstanding liability; the Principal Commissioner could not substitute a different view under Section 263, and no addition under Section 41(1) was warranted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The revisionary action failed both because it intruded into an issue pending in first appeal and because the original assessment reflected inquiry and a sustainable view, with no factual basis for treating the creditor balance as ceased.

Ratio Decidendi: Revisionary power cannot be used to revisit an issue pending in appeal or to substitute the revisional authority's view for a plausible view adopted after inquiry; a trading liability cannot be taxed as ceased without material establishing remission or cessation.

Issues: Whether interim stay of the order declaring the earlier advance ruling void ab initio should be granted pending final adjudication of the appeal.

Analysis: The questions concerning the scope of the power to declare an advance ruling void ab initio, the alleged misrepresentation of material facts, and procedural fairness require detailed examination at the final hearing. At the interim stage, staying the impugned order would revive the earlier ruling despite the finding of misrepresentation recorded in the impugned order.

Outcome: The appeal was admitted for final hearing, and the interim-stay application was dismissed.

Issues: (i) Whether the imported powdered Pelargonium sidoides root extract containing Maltodextrin as a carrier is classifiable as a vegetable extract under Customs Tariff Item 1302 19 19 or as a medicament under Customs Tariff Item 3003 90 90; (ii) Whether the goods qualify for the exemption under Serial No. 37 of Notification No. 45/2025-Customs dated 24.10.2025.

Issue (i): Whether the imported powdered Pelargonium sidoides root extract containing Maltodextrin as a carrier is classifiable as a vegetable extract under Customs Tariff Item 1302 19 19 or as a medicament under Customs Tariff Item 3003 90 90.

Analysis: Classification is governed by Rule 1 of the General Rules for Interpretation, read with the relevant heading terms, Chapter Notes and HSN Explanatory Notes. Heading 1302 covers vegetable extracts, including solid extracts produced by removal of extraction solvent; the addition of an inert material for handling, drying or standardisation does not alter the extract's classification. The manufacturing process comprised hydro-ethanolic extraction, filtration, vacuum drying and addition of Maltodextrin, without chromatographic purification, ultrafiltration, additional extraction cycles or other high-refinement processes. Vacuum drying was merely removal of solvent and did not constitute concentration or purification.

Analysis: The product consisted of one botanical extract and Maltodextrin functioning as an inert carrier, rather than two or more active therapeutic constituents mixed for therapeutic or prophylactic use. It was imported in bulk as raw material, not in measured doses or retail packs. Its intended use in pharmaceutical manufacture could not determine classification where the tariff description at import governed. The prior finding that the extract underwent concentration was unsupported by the record and was an apparent error of fact.

Conclusion: The goods are classifiable under Customs Tariff Item 1302 19 19 as other vegetable extracts, and not under Customs Tariff Item 3003 90 90, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the goods qualify for the exemption under Serial No. 37 of Notification No. 45/2025-Customs dated 24.10.2025.

Analysis: Upon classification under Customs Tariff Item 1302 19 19, the goods fell within the relevant exemption entry. Availability of the concession remains dependent upon compliance with the notification conditions and assessment-stage verification.

Conclusion: The goods are eligible for the exemption under Serial No. 37 of Notification No. 45/2025-Customs dated 24.10.2025, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The earlier advance ruling was modified by correcting the erroneous factual premise concerning concentration and by recognising the product as a simple vegetable extract with an inert carrier.

Ratio Decidendi: A single botanical extract remains classifiable as a vegetable extract where solvent removal and addition of an inert carrier do not amount to purification or create a medicinal mixture; downstream pharmaceutical use does not itself render it a medicament.

Issues: Whether the security-service provider could pursue its unpaid service claim in the ongoing corporate insolvency proceedings before the NCLT.

Analysis: The company is now undergoing the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process before the NCLT. The claim for payment for security services may therefore be placed before that forum for consideration in the insolvency proceedings.

Conclusion: The petitioner may join the NCLT proceedings and submit its claim for unpaid security-service charges.