Cheque execution and statutory presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act require a probable defence to rebut liability in revision.

Proof of a cheque and its execution triggers the statutory presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act in favour of the complainant, and the accused must rebut them with a probable defence on the preponderance of probabilities; mere denial is insufficient. A bank return memo carries its own presumptive value, and absence of a bank official does not by itself defeat documentary proof of dishonour. Financial capacity and liability must be displaced by reliable evidence, not conjecture. In revision, concurrent findings are not disturbed unless there is patent illegality, perversity, or miscarriage of justice.

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Issues: (i) Whether the cheque and its execution were proved and the statutory presumption under the Negotiable Instruments Act arose in favour of the complainant; (ii) whether the accused rebutted the presumption of legally enforceable debt or liability, including the challenge to dishonour proof and financial capacity of the complainant; and (iii) whether the concurrent findings of conviction suffered from illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error warranting interference in revision.

Issue (i): Whether the cheque and its execution were proved and the statutory presumption under the Negotiable Instruments Act arose in favour of the complainant.

Analysis: The cheque was produced and proved in evidence. The accused did not adduce any credible material, handwriting evidence, or other reliable proof to dislodge the execution or signature on the cheque. Once execution was not specifically disproved, the statutory presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act came into operation.

Conclusion: The cheque and its execution were proved, and the statutory presumption arose in favour of the complainant.

Issue (ii): Whether the accused rebutted the presumption of legally enforceable debt or liability, including the challenge to dishonour proof and financial capacity of the complainant.

Analysis: The burden shifted to the accused to raise a probable defence on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. Mere denial was held insufficient. The bank return memo carried the statutory presumption of dishonour, and the absence of a bank official did not by itself render the documentary evidence inadmissible. The accused also failed to bring reliable evidence to show absence of liability or to rebut the complainant's version regarding the transaction and financial capacity.

Conclusion: The presumption of legally enforceable debt or liability was not rebutted, and the challenge to dishonour proof failed.

Issue (iii): Whether the concurrent findings of conviction suffered from illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error warranting interference in revision.

Analysis: Revisional jurisdiction is limited and does not permit reappreciation of evidence as a second appeal unless there is patent illegality, perversity, or miscarriage of justice. The courts below had considered the oral and documentary evidence, applied the settled presumptions, and recorded reasoned concurrent findings against the accused.

Conclusion: No ground for revisional interference was made out.

Final Conclusion: The conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the concurrent findings of the courts below were sustained, and the revision was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Once execution of the cheque is proved or not specifically disproved, the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act arise, and they can be rebutted only by a probable defence proved on the standard of preponderance of probabilities; in revision, concurrent findings are not interfered with absent patent illegality or perversity.

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