Article 21 limits special statute bail bars when prolonged custody makes timely trial unrealistic

Special bail restrictions under the UAPA and NDPS Act are noted as yielding to Article 21 where custody becomes unduly prolonged and the trial is unlikely to finish within a reasonable time. The text treats K.A. Najeeb as binding and states that the rigour of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA can melt down in such circumstances, while the narrower reading in later two-Judge decisions is not controlling. It also records that prolonged custody, the large number of remaining witnesses, the absence of recovery, the police-statement-based nature of the material, and the absence of shown antecedents supported bail pending trial.

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Issues: (i) Whether the statutory restrictions on bail under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 could continue to operate where the accused had undergone prolonged incarceration and the trial was unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time; (ii) whether, on the material placed, the appellant had made out a case for grant of bail pending trial.

Issue (i): Whether the statutory restrictions on bail under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 could continue to operate where the accused had undergone prolonged incarceration and the trial was unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time.

Analysis: The statutory embargo on bail under special enactments was held to be subordinate to the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The earlier three-Judge Bench ruling in K.A. Najeeb was treated as binding, and it was held that where timely conclusion of trial is not realistically possible and incarceration has become unduly prolonged, the rigour of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA melts down. The narrower reading of K.A. Najeeb in later two-Judge decisions was not accepted as controlling law. The principle that bail remains the norm and jail the exception was reiterated even in prosecutions under stringent special statutes.

Conclusion: The statutory restrictions did not bar grant of bail in the facts of the case, and the constitutional court could intervene in favour of the accused.

Issue (ii): Whether, on the material placed, the appellant had made out a case for grant of bail pending trial.

Analysis: The appellant had been in custody since 11.06.2020, more than 350 witnesses were still to be examined, and early conclusion of the trial was found to be well-nigh impossible. The Court also noted the absence of recovery from the appellant or from premises under his use, the essentially police-statement-based nature of the incriminating material, the absence of prior antecedents shown on record, and the fact that the appellant had not misused the earlier medical interim bail. These circumstances, taken together, were found sufficient to justify release on bail during pendency of the trial.

Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to bail pending trial.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the appellant was directed to be released on bail on terms to be fixed by the Special NIA Court, with ancillary conditions including deposit of passport and periodic appearance before the local police station.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions under special anti-terror and narcotics statutes, statutory bail restrictions cannot override Article 21 where prolonged incarceration and unrealistic prospects of trial completion would make continued detention constitutionally unjustifiable; in such cases, a constitutional court may grant bail on the facts and material before it.

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