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Issues: (i) Whether a recall application filed against an order passed on merits after participation of the appellant in the proceedings was maintainable, and whether the plea of non-impleadment, want of notice and denial of hearing could be sustained; (ii) Whether the appeal against the order rejecting recall and the appeal against the original order were barred by limitation and whether the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could be invoked.
Issue (i): Whether a recall application filed against an order passed on merits after participation of the appellant in the proceedings was maintainable, and whether the plea of non-impleadment, want of notice and denial of hearing could be sustained.
Analysis: The order sought to be recalled recorded that the appellant's counsel had participated in the proceedings, advanced submissions, and the impugned order itself was directed to be communicated to the SRA. On that basis, the appellant was treated as having knowledge of the proceedings and having been heard. A recall is not available to reopen a merits order merely by asserting absence of formal impleadment or service where participation and hearing are evident from the record.
Conclusion: The recall application was not maintainable and its rejection was upheld.
Issue (ii): Whether the appeal against the order rejecting recall and the appeal against the original order were barred by limitation and whether the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could be invoked.
Analysis: The challenge to the original order was raised beyond the prescribed period under Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The appellant had first chosen the remedy of recall after expiry of the appeal period, and therefore could not claim exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act for the earlier stages. The delay in filing the appeal against the original order was not condonable, while the appeal against the recall order failed on merits because the recall itself was impermissible.
Conclusion: The delay condonation plea failed, and both appeals were liable to be dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal held that the appellant had participated in the proceedings, could not seek recall of a merits order on the pleaded grounds, and could not overcome the statutory limitation for challenging the original order, resulting in dismissal of both appeals.
Ratio Decidendi: A party who participated in proceedings and was heard cannot seek recall of a merits order on the ground of absence of notice or impleadment, and the statutory appeal limitation under the insolvency framework cannot be circumvented by first pursuing an impermissible recall remedy and then seeking exclusion of time.